Andanayya & Orsv.Deputy Chief Engineer & Ors

Synopsis

This judgment resolves a long‑standing controversy regarding the scope of Section 28‑A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The appellants, landowners whose land was acquired, had initially filed an application under Section 28‑A seeking re‑determination of compensation based on an award of the Reference Court. That application was allowed. Subsequently, the High Court, in appeals filed by other landowners, further enhanced the compensation. The appellants then filed a second application under Section 28‑A, seeking re‑determination based on the High Court’s award. The Collector rejected it, and the High Court affirmed, relying on the decision in Ramsingbhai Jerambhai v. State of Gujarat (2018) 16 SCC 445, which held that Section 28‑A applies only to awards of the Reference Court and not to appellate court judgments. The Supreme Court overruled that view, holding that Ramsingbhai was per incuriam as it did not consider the earlier three‑Judge Bench decision in Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari (1995) 2 SCC 736, and also overlooked the doctrine of merger and the beneficial object of Section 28‑A. The Court clarified that a landowner is entitled to seek re‑determination on the basis of the final award of the appellate forum (High Court or Supreme Court), even if he had already received compensation based on the Reference Court’s award, and that the Collector must stay the application pending any appeal. The appeals were allowed and the matter remanded for fresh determination.

2. Basic Information of the Judgment

Case Title: Andanayya & Ors. vs. Deputy Chief Engineer & Ors.

Civil Appeal Nos.: Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 2587–2593 of 2021

Bench: Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh

Judgment Author: Justice M.M. Sundresh

Date of Decision: March 25, 2026

Citation: 2026 INSC 293

Appeal From: Judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka, dismissing the second application under Section 28‑A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

3. Legal Framework

This judgment involves the interpretation of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act), particularly Section 28‑A, the doctrine of merger, and the principles governing the filing of successive applications for re‑determination of compensation.

A. Key Provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894:

• Section 3(d): Defines “Court” as a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction (or a special judicial officer appointed by the Government) for the purposes of Part III of the Act.

• Section 18: Provides for reference to the Court for determination of compensation when the landowner is dissatisfied with the Collector’s award.

• Section 28‑A: Re‑determination of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court. It allows any person interested in other land covered by the same Section 4 notification, who had not sought a reference under Section 18, to apply to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court seeking re‑determination of compensation at the enhanced rate allowed by the Court.

• Section 54: Provides for appeals to the High Court and further to the Supreme Court from awards of the Court under Part III.

B. Related Precedents (Discussed in the Judgment):

• Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari (1995) 2 SCC 736 (Three‑Judge Bench): Held that a landowner could seek re‑determination under Section 28‑A on the basis of any award of the Reference Court (not necessarily the first) made after the coming into force of the provision. It emphasised that the limitation runs from the date of the award on the basis of which re‑determination is sought. The decision overruled Babua Ram and Karnail Singh on that point.

• Babua Ram v. State of U.P. (1995) 2 SCC 689 (Two‑Judge Bench): Held that the Collector should stay his hands in the matter of re‑determination if appeals against the Reference Court award are pending, and re‑determination should be based on the final judgment of the appellate forum.

• Bharatsing v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 92: Reiterated that no decision should be made on a Section 28‑A application during the pendency of an appeal, and that a second application based on the appellate award is not maintainable – but the Court distinguished this as not being the ratio.

• Ramsingbhai Jerambhai v. State of Gujarat (2018) 16 SCC 445 (Three‑Judge Bench): Held that Section 28‑A applies only to the award of the Reference Court (under Part III) and not to the judgment of the appellate court under Section 54.

• Banwari v. Haryana SIIDC (2024) SCC OnLine SC 3685: Held that Ramsingbhai was per incuriam because it did not consider Pradeep Kumari and the doctrine of merger, and that a landowner could seek re‑determination on the basis of a High Court award.

• Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguez v. Land Acquisition Collector (1996) 6 SCC 746: Discussed the limitation question but did not decide the issue of applicability to appellate awards.

4. Relevant Facts of the Case

1. Acquisition: Lands in Mavanoor Village, Hubballi Taluk, were acquired for the Hubballi‑Ankola Broad Gauge Line. Preliminary notification under Section 4(1) was issued on 18.04.2002.

2. Award by Collector: The Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) passed an award on 31.03.2003 fixing compensation at ₹40,000 per acre.

3. Reference Court Award: Some landowners sought reference under Section 18. The Reference Court, by judgment dated 17.11.2006, enhanced compensation to ₹2,00,000 per acre.

4. First Section 28‑A Application: The appellants, who had not sought reference, filed an application under Section 28‑A on 01.02.2007, within 90 days from the Reference Court award. The application was allowed on 02.04.2013 (after the High Court had dismissed the State’s appeals against the Reference Court award but while the landowners’ appeals for further enhancement were pending).

5. High Court Enhancement: In appeals filed by landowners (MFA Nos. 3289/2007 and 3291/2007), the High Court, by judgment dated 22.07.2013, enhanced compensation to ₹3,50,000 per acre.

6. Second Section 28‑A Application: The appellants filed a second application under Section 28‑A on 25.11.2013, seeking re‑determination based on the High Court’s award.

7. Rejection: The LAO rejected the second application on 30.11.2013, holding that the appellants had already accepted the enhanced compensation based on the Reference Court award and that a second application was not maintainable.

8. Writ Proceedings: The appellants filed writ petitions before the High Court. A Single Judge allowed the petitions and directed the LAO to re‑determine on the basis of the High Court award. The Division Bench reversed, relying on Ramsingbhai Jerambhai (supra).

9. Appeal to Supreme Court: The landowners appealed.

5. Issues Identified by the Supreme Court

The Court framed the following issues:

1. Whether a landowner who has already obtained re‑determination of compensation under Section 28‑A on the basis of a Reference Court award can later file a fresh application under Section 28‑A on the basis of an enhanced award of the appellate court (High Court or Supreme Court) for the same acquisition.

2. Whether the Collector/LAO is bound to stay the Section 28‑A application when appeals against the Reference Court award are pending, and re‑determine only on the basis of the final appellate award.

3. Whether the decision in Ramsingbhai Jerambhai (2018) 16 SCC 445 is a binding precedent on this issue.

6. Ratio Decidendi (The Reasoning and Decision of the Court)

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned judgment. The reasoning is as follows:

A. Doctrine of Merger and Finality of Compensation

• The Court applied the doctrine of merger: when an appeal is filed against the award of the Reference Court, the decree of the trial court merges with that of the appellate court. The appellate court’s judgment becomes the final, operative decree.

• Once the High Court passes an award, the earlier Reference Court award ceases to exist. Therefore, the “award of the Court” referred to in Section 28‑A must be understood to include the final award of the appellate forum.

B. Beneficial Construction of Section 28‑A

• Section 28‑A was inserted to remove inequality in payment of compensation to inarticulate and poor landowners who could not afford to seek a reference under Section 18. The Statement of Objects and Reasons emphasises that all landowners covered by the same notification should get equal compensation.

• A restrictive interpretation limiting re‑determination only to Reference Court awards would defeat this object. If a landowner receives compensation based on the Reference Court award, but later a higher amount is granted by the High Court, he would be denied the benefit of the enhanced amount, perpetuating inequality.

• The Court held that the expression “award of the Court” in Section 28‑A should be interpreted to mean the final award in the proceedings, i.e., the award that is operative at the time the application is made, including appellate court judgments.

C. Ramsingbhai Jerambhai is Per Incuriam

• The Court noted that Ramsingbhai (a three‑Judge Bench decision) did not consider the earlier three‑Judge Bench decision in Pradeep Kumari (1995). Pradeep Kumari had held that the object of Section 28‑A is to ensure equality and that a landowner can seek re‑determination on the basis of any award of the Court (including subsequent awards) that grants higher compensation.

• Since Ramsingbhai did not take note of Pradeep Kumari, it was rendered per incuriam. Moreover, Ramsingbhai also did not consider the doctrine of merger or the principle that an appeal is a continuation of the proceedings.

• Following the Constitution Bench’s observations in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, a co‑equal Bench must follow an earlier decision unless it is not possible to reconcile the ratio. The later decision in Ramsingbhai being per incuriam, it is not binding.

D. Collector Must Stay the Application During Appeal

• Relying on Babua Ram and Bharatsing, the Court held that the Collector/LAO is obliged to stay the Section 28‑A application when an appeal against the Reference Court award is pending. He should re‑determine only on the basis of the final judgment of the appellate forum. In the present case, the LAO erred by disposing of the first application while appeals were pending.

E. No Bar to a Second Application

• The Court clarified that a second application under Section 28‑A based on the appellate award is maintainable, even if the landowner has already received compensation on the basis of the Reference Court award. The receipt of money does not create estoppel or waiver, because the statutory right to equal compensation is independent.

• The earlier observation in Bharatsing that a second application is not maintainable was distinguished; the Court noted that in Bharatsing, the first application had been decided after the appeals were disposed of, so the second application was not necessary. Here, the first application was decided prematurely while appeals were pending.

7. New Legal Principles Established / Reiterated

1. Section 28‑A Includes Appellate Awards: The “award of the Court” under Section 28‑A includes the final award of the appellate court (High Court or Supreme Court) after the doctrine of merger operates. Landowners can seek re‑determination on the basis of such final awards.

2. Second Application Maintainable: A landowner who has already received re‑determined compensation based on a Reference Court award can file a fresh application under Section 28‑A when the High Court or Supreme Court further enhances compensation, provided the application is within three months from the date of the appellate award.

3. Collector Must Stay Application: The Collector/LAO is duty‑bound to stay the Section 28‑A application if any appeal against the Reference Court award is pending. Re‑determination shall be based on the final judgment of the appellate forum.

4. Per Incuriam in the Context of Land Acquisition: A subsequent decision of a co‑equal Bench that overlooks a prior binding decision of the same or larger strength on a material point is per incuriam and not binding.

8. The Court’s Analysis and Examination of Concepts

• Doctrine of Merger: The Court explained that when an appeal is filed, the decree of the trial court loses its independent existence and merges with the appellate decree. Hence, the “award of the Court” that is relevant for Section 28‑A is the award that remains operative after all appeals.

• Beneficial Interpretation: The Court emphasised that Section 28‑A is a welfare provision intended to ensure equality among landowners. A narrow interpretation limiting it to the Reference Court would defeat this purpose. The Court cited Pradeep Kumari to support a liberal construction.

• Per Incuriam – Application to Ramsingbhai: The Court analysed the earlier three‑Judge Bench decisions in Pradeep Kumari and Ramsingbhai and concluded that Ramsingbhai did not consider Pradeep Kumari, which was directly on point. Therefore, Ramsingbhai is per incuriam and not a binding precedent.

• Collector’s Role: The Court noted that the LAO had acted hastily in deciding the first application while appeals were pending. This was contrary to the directions in Babua Ram and Bharatsing.

9. Critical Analysis of the Judgment

• Strength – Harmonising Precedents: The Court resolved a conflict between two three‑Judge Bench decisions by declaring the later one per incuriam, thereby restoring the earlier, more liberal view in Pradeep Kumari. This ensures consistency and upholds the legislative intent of Section 28‑A.

• Pragmatic Approach: By allowing a second application, the Court prevents the anomaly where a landowner who received compensation based on a Reference Court award would be denied the benefit of a later High Court enhancement. This aligns with the principle of equality.

• Clarity on Limitation: The Court reaffirmed that limitation runs from the date of the award on which the application is based, and that the Collector must not decide the application until appeals are concluded.

• Potential Critique – Overruling a Co‑equal Bench: Declaring a decision of a co‑equal Bench per incuriam is a rare step. However, the Court justified it on the ground that the later decision did not consider the earlier binding precedent, which is a recognised exception to the doctrine of stare decisis.

• Impact: This judgment will have significant impact on all pending land acquisition matters where landowners have already claimed benefit under Section 28‑A based on Reference Court awards but later appellate enhancements have occurred. It will also guide Collectors to stay their hands until finality.

10. Final Outcome

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals. It set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court and also set aside the order of the LAO dated 30.11.2013. The Court directed the respondents to re‑determine the compensation payable to the appellants on the basis of the judgment of the High Court dated 22.07.2013 in MFA Nos. 3289 and 3291 of 2007, within eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment.

11. (MCQs)

1. According to the Supreme Court in this judgment, the term “award of the Court” in Section 28‑A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 includes:?
a) Only the award of the Collector under Section 11.
b) Only the award of the Reference Court under Part III.
c) The final award of the appellate court (High Court or Supreme Court) after the doctrine of merger operates.
d) Any award passed by any court, including a civil court in a title suit.

2. Why did the Supreme Court declare the decision in Ramsingbhai Jerambhai (2018) 16 SCC 445 as per incuriam?
a) Because it was rendered by a Bench of three Judges without jurisdiction.
b) Because it did not consider the earlier three‑Judge Bench decision in Pradeep Kumari (1995) 2 SCC 736.
c) Because it was based on a misinterpretation of Section 28‑A.
d) Because it was decided after the Land Acquisition Act, 2013 came into force.

3. In the present case, the first Section 28‑A application of the appellants was allowed on 02.04.2013. The High Court enhanced compensation on 22.07.2013. The Court held that:?
a) The appellants cannot file a second application because they already accepted compensation.
b) The Collector should have stayed the first application pending the appeals, and the second application based on the High Court award is maintainable.
c) The High Court award does not apply to the appellants because they did not appeal.
d) The limitation for filing the second application began from the date of the Reference Court award.

4. Which of the following principles was NOT a basis for the Supreme Court’s decision?
a) The doctrine of merger.
b) The beneficial construction of Section 28‑A.
c) The principle that a landowner cannot receive compensation more than once for the same land.
d) The principle that the Collector must stay the Section 28‑A application during pendency of appeals.