Ankit Tomarv.State of Haryana

Synopsis

This judgment, delivered by the Supreme Court of India on February 26, 2026, arises from a criminal appeal challenging the refusal of the Punjab & Haryana High Court to quash an FIR registered under Section 376(2)(n) (rape by a person on promise to marry) and Section 506 (criminal intimidation) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The appellant sought quashing of the FIR based on the principles laid down in Amol Bhagwan Nehul v. State of Maharashtra, where the Supreme Court had quashed similar proceedings on the ground that the relationship was consensual and there was no inducement or misrepresentation. The Supreme Court, after analyzing the facts of the case, found that the allegations in the FIR, even if taken as true, disclosed a consensual relationship between the parties, with the complainant being a married woman and a mother of two children. The appellant had married another woman, and the FIR was filed thereafter. The Court held that there was no element of inducement, coercion, or deception in the promise to marry, and therefore, the continuation of criminal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the FIR was quashed.

1. Basic Information of the Judgment

Case Title: Ankit Tomar v. State of Haryana

Citation: 2026 INSC 262 (Non-Reportable)

Court: Supreme Court of India

Jurisdiction: Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction

Case Number: Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 18044 of 2025

Coram: Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice K. Vinod Chandran

Nature of Bench: Division Bench

Date of Judgment: February 26, 2026

2. Legal Framework and Relevant Provisions

• Substantive Laws:
  Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC):
  Section 376(2)(n): Punishment for rape by a person in a position of control or dominance, or by a person on whom the woman was in a position of trust, or by a public servant, etc. The specific clause (n) deals with a person committing rape on a woman on a promise to marry her, knowing that the promise is false.
  Section 506: Punishment for criminal intimidation.

• Procedural Law:
  Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS):
  Section 528: Saving of inherent powers of High Court – analogous to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Empowers the High Court to quash criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of the process of court or to secure the ends of justice.

• Key Legal Concepts:
  Consent vs. Inducement: The distinction between a genuine, voluntary consent to a sexual relationship and consent obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, or inducement, such as a false promise to marry.
  Promise to Marry as Misrepresentation: For an FIR under Section 376(2)(n) to be sustained, it must be shown that the promise to marry was false from the inception and was used as a device to obtain consent.
  Abuse of Process of Law: The power of the High Court under Section 528 BNSS to quash criminal proceedings that are manifestly groundless, based on no evidence, or where the allegations, even if true, do not constitute an offence.

• Key Precedents Relied Upon:
  Amol Bhagwan Nehul v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2024) : The pivotal precedent in this case. The Supreme Court in Amol Bhagwan Nehul laid down four crucial factors for quashing an FIR under Section 376(2)(n):
  Even if allegations in the FIR are true, there appears to be consent on the part of the complainant.
  The facts and circumstances indicate that the relationship was consensual and involved frequent interactions.
  The consent was not obtained on the basis of "inducement or misrepresentation" or "coercion or threat of injury."
  The complainant's marital status (being married and having a child) makes the possibility of a deception by a promise to marry highly implausible.

3. Relevant Facts of the Case

• The complainant was employed at a massage parlour and was also in charge of its operations. The appellant visited the parlour as a customer.

• It was alleged that the appellant had a physical relationship with the complainant, which continued from August 2023 to March 2024. The complainant claimed that she consented to the relationship only because the appellant promised to marry her.

• On March 12, 2024, the appellant married another woman. On March 15, 2024, the complainant informed the appellant about her pregnancy, leading to a quarrel.

• An FIR was registered on March 28, 2024, under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 IPC. A child was born out of the relationship but later died. An FSL DNA test was pending.

• The appellant was granted bail by the High Court. He later filed an application under Section 528 BNSS to quash the FIR, relying on Amol Bhagwan Nehul.

• The High Court dismissed the quashing petition. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

4. Issues Before the Supreme Court

• Whether the allegations in the FIR, even if taken at face value, disclose the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 376(2)(n) IPC, or whether they indicate a consensual relationship where consent was not vitiated by a false promise to marry?

• Whether the principles laid down in Amol Bhagwan Nehul v. State of Maharashtra are squarely applicable to the facts of this case, warranting the quashing of the FIR?

5. Ratio Decidendi of the Court

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the FIR. The key findings are as follows:

• Applicability of Amol Bhagwan Nehul Principles: The Court held that the dictum in Amol Bhagwan Nehul was "squarely applicable" to the facts of the case. It applied the four-pronged test from that precedent:
  Consent on Part of Complainant: The allegations in the FIR itself showed that the relationship was consensual. It commenced in August 2023 and continued until March 2024. This prolonged consensual interaction was inconsistent with a claim of rape.
  No Inducement or Misrepresentation: The facts and circumstances did not suggest that consent was obtained by "inducement or misrepresentation" or by "coercion or threat of injury."
  Implausibility of Deception by Promise to Marry: This was the most crucial factor. The complainant was a married woman and a mother of two children at the time of the relationship. The FIR itself indicated this marital status. The Court held that given her own marital status, the possibility of her being deceived by a promise to marry from the appellant was highly implausible. There was no allegation that she was divorced or even separated from her husband.

• Consent Demolishes the Case: The Court emphatically stated that even if the pending FSL report confirmed the appellant's paternity of the deceased child, it would not change the outcome. The existence of consent, as evident from the FIR, "demolishes the case of the complainant that there was rape on the promise of marriage."

• No Reason to Wait for FSL Report: The Court found no reason to delay the proceedings pending the FSL report, as the core issue was consent, which was determinable from the allegations themselves.

6. Legal Framework Clarified / Reaffirmed

This judgment does not establish new law but provides a strong and clear reaffirmation of the principles governing the quashing of FIRs in "promise to marry" rape cases:

• Consent is the Decisive Factor: The judgment reiterates that the presence of genuine, voluntary consent is a complete defense to a charge of rape. If the allegations themselves, read as a whole, indicate a consensual relationship, the FIR is liable to be quashed.

• Complainant's Marital Status as a Critical Factor: The judgment highlights that the complainant's own marital status is a highly relevant and often determinative factor in assessing the plausibility of a "false promise to marry" claim. If the complainant is married, the claim that she was deceived by a promise of marriage is inherently suspect and requires a much higher threshold of proof.

• "Promise to Marry" Cannot Be a Blanket Tool: The Court warns against using the provision of Section 376(2)(n) to convert a consensual relationship that has soured into a criminal offence. The promise must be proven to be false from the very beginning and the sole basis for the consent.

7. Court's Examination and Analysis

The Supreme Court's analysis was concise and directly applied the precedent to the facts:

• Comparison with Amol Bhagwan Nehul: The Court first summarized the four key grounds from the Amol Bhagwan Nehul decision.

• Factual Analysis: It then meticulously applied these grounds to the allegations in the FIR:
  It noted the prolonged duration of the relationship (August 2023 to March 2024), indicating consent.
  It highlighted the location of the initial encounter (the massage parlour where the complainant was in charge) as a context that did not suggest coercion.
  Most importantly, it seized upon the complainant's marital status and the fact that she was a mother of two, which was stated in the FIR itself. This was the clinching factor that made the allegation of deception by a promise to marry completely implausible.

• Rejection of State's Arguments: The Court dismissed the State's contention that the trial should proceed and the FSL report awaited. It reasoned that even if the DNA evidence proved the appellant was the father, it would only prove the physical relationship, which was not in dispute. It would not alter the fact that the relationship was consensual.

• Conclusion: Finding that all four grounds from Amol Bhagwan Nehul were satisfied, the Court concluded that the criminal proceedings were an abuse of the process of law and liable to be quashed.

8. Critical Analysis and Final Outcome

• Outcome: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. It set aside the order of the High Court and quashed the criminal proceedings arising from FIR No. 127 dated March 28, 2024, registered at Police Station Kheripul, District Gurugram, Haryana. The appellant, who was on bail, was discharged.

• Critical Perspectives:
  Strengths: The judgment is a powerful and necessary check on the misuse of criminal law to settle personal scores arising from failed relationships. It correctly draws a clear line between consensual sex and rape by false promise to marry. By applying the Amol Bhagwan Nehul framework, it provides clarity and consistency. The reliance on the complainant's own marital status is a pragmatic and realistic assessment of human behavior. It prevents the legal system from being used to penalize a person for a relationship where both parties were consenting adults.
  Protection Against Vexatious Litigation: The judgment protects individuals from being subjected to the ordeal of a criminal trial for years based on allegations that are inherently implausible. It upholds the principle that the criminal law is not a tool for revenge.
  Clarity on "Promise to Marry": The judgment provides much-needed clarity on the scope of Section 376(2)(n). It reinforces that a mere breach of a promise to marry, without proof of a false promise from the inception, does not constitute rape. It requires a clear finding that the consent was obtained solely on the basis of that promise and that the promisor never intended to fulfill it.
  Potential Criticism: Some might argue that the Court gave undue weight to the complainant's marital status, potentially discriminating against married women who may genuinely be deceived by a false promise. However, the Court's reasoning is not that a married woman can never be deceived, but that in the absence of any allegation of separation or divorce, the claim of deception based on a promise of marriage becomes highly improbable and requires much stronger corroboration. The judgment does not create a blanket rule but applies the principle of plausibility to the specific facts.
  Guidance for Lower Courts: The judgment provides clear guidance to High Courts on how to handle similar quashing petitions. It sets out a clear checklist based on Amol Bhagwan Nehul: (i) assess the nature of the relationship (was it consensual?); (ii) look for factors indicating inducement or coercion; (iii) critically examine the plausibility of the "promise to marry" given the social and personal circumstances of the parties, including their marital status.

• Core Final Directive: A criminal prosecution under Section 376(2)(n) IPC based on a promise to marry cannot be sustained where the allegations in the FIR, read as a whole, clearly indicate a prolonged, consensual relationship between the parties, and where the complainant's own marital status renders the claim of being deceived by a promise of marriage inherently implausible. In such cases, the continuation of criminal proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of law, and the FIR is liable to be quashed in exercise of the High Court's inherent powers under Section 528 of the BNSS. The mere fact that a child was born out of the relationship or that a DNA test is pending does not alter the fundamental position if consent is established.

(MCQs)

1. Under Section 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for an allegation of rape based on a promise to marry to be sustained, it must be proven that:?
A) The promise to marry was subsequently broken.
B) The promise to marry was false from the very inception and was the basis for obtaining consent.
C) The parties had a long-term relationship.
D) The complainant was unmarried.

2. In Ankit Tomar v. State of Haryana, the Supreme Court quashed the FIR primarily because:?
A) The FSL report was inconclusive.
B) The appellant had already been granted bail.
C) The allegations, even if true, showed a consensual relationship, and the complainant's own marital status made the claim of deception by a promise to marry implausible.
D) The complainant had filed the FIR after a long delay.

3. The Supreme Court relied heavily on which precedent to quash the proceedings?
A) State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
B) Amol Bhagwan Nehul v. State of Maharashtra
C) Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar
D) Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission

4. The Court held that even if the pending FSL report confirmed the appellant's paternity of the child, it would not affect the outcome because:?
A) The child had already passed away.
B) The FSL report was not relevant to the case.
C) The DNA evidence would only prove the physical relationship, which was not in dispute, but it would not alter the fact that the relationship was consensual.
D) The appellant had already admitted to the relationship.