Dr Lokesh B H & Orsv.State of Karnataka & Anr

Supreme Court Extends Section 498A Protection to Live-in Relationships in the Nature of Marriage

Case Snapshot

Case Name: Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

Citation: 2026 INSC 784

Bench: Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh

Date of Judgment: August 3, 2026

Area of Law: Criminal Law, Matrimonial Law, Constitutional Law, Interpretation of Statutes

The Judgment in One Line

Section 498A IPC applies to live-in relationships qualifying as "relationships in the nature of marriage" where the intent to marry is established.

Why This Judgment Matters

This landmark judgment expands the protective umbrella of Section 498A IPC to women in live-in relationships that are "in the nature of marriage." The Court held that excluding such women from the protection of criminal law against cruelty violates Article 14, as the distinction between married women and those in marriage-like relationships has no rational nexus with the object of preventing domestic cruelty. The judgment also recognizes that the civil remedies under the DV Act are insufficient as they lack criminal deterrence. This is a significant step toward ensuring equal legal protection for women irrespective of the form their relationship takes.

Background

The appellant, Dr. Lokesh B.H., was in a live-in relationship with respondent No. 2, Theertha. The respondent alleged that they were married as per Hindu customs on October 17, 2010. The appellant contended that no valid marriage existed and that Section 498A IPC could not apply. The respondent filed complaints leading to charges under Section 498A IPC. The High Court of Karnataka rejected the appellant's petition to quash the proceedings, holding that the expression "husband" in Section 498A must be given a purposive construction and extends to live-in relationships in the nature of marriage. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues Before the Court

1. Whether a man in a live-in relationship can be prosecuted under Section 498A IPC.

2. Whether the word "husband" in Section 498A IPC should be interpreted strictly or purposively.

3. Whether the exclusion of women in live-in relationships from the protection of Section 498A violates Article 14 of the Constitution.

4. Whether the remedies under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 are sufficient protection for women in live-in relationships.

What Did the Supreme Court Hold?

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Section 498A IPC applies to live-in relationships that qualify as "relationships in the nature of marriage" with the intent to marry being established as an intrinsic part thereof. The Court's reasoning was multi-faceted:

Purposive Interpretation Over Strict Literalism: While penal statutes are to be construed strictly, the Court held that this does not mean literal interpretation divorced from legislative intent. The mischief rule (from Heydon's case) applies—the Court must suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. The object of Section 498A is to prevent cruelty in domestic settings, and this object is not served by excluding women in marriage-like relationships.

Article 14 Violation: The Court found that the distinction between married women and women in "relationships in the nature of marriage" has no rational nexus with the object of preventing domestic cruelty. Both categories face similar risks of cruelty; denying protection to one while granting it to another is discriminatory. The right to choose one's partner is an intrinsic part of personal liberty under Article 21, and the law cannot discriminate based on the form the relationship takes.

DV Act Remedies Insufficient: The Court rejected the argument that the DV Act provides adequate protection. The DV Act is primarily civil in nature, providing monetary relief and protection orders, with criminal consequences only for breach of such orders. Section 498A provides criminal deterrence directly against cruelty, which is qualitatively different.

Safeguards Against Misuse: The Court acknowledged the well-documented misuse of Section 498A and imposed safeguards. The extended protection applies only to "relationships in the nature of marriage" with the intent to marry. The initial burden of proof lies on the woman to establish the intent. The safeguards laid down in Arnesh Kumar (against automatic arrest) must be strictly followed in such cases.

Limitation to Section 498A Only: The Court clarified that this extended interpretation is limited to Section 498A IPC and shall not affect any other provision.

Key Legal Principles

1. Section 498A applies to live-in relationships in the nature of marriage — provided the relationship has the essential characteristics of marriage and the intent to marry is established.

2. Purposive construction over strict literalism — penal statutes must be construed to advance the legislative intent and suppress the mischief, not to defeat the object of the law.

3. Article 14 prohibits discrimination against women in live-in relationships — the distinction between married women and those in marriage-like relationships has no rational nexus with the object of preventing domestic cruelty.

4. DV Act remedies are not a substitute for Section 498A — the civil nature of the DV Act does not provide the same criminal deterrence as Section 498A.

5. Burden of proof on the woman — the initial burden lies on the woman to establish that the relationship was "in the nature of marriage" with the intent to marry.

6. Safeguards against misuse apply — the Arnesh Kumar safeguards against automatic arrest must be strictly followed in such cases.

7. Limited application — this extended interpretation is limited to Section 498A IPC only and does not affect other provisions.

Important Precedents

Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam, (2004) 3 SCC 199

• Held that Section 498A must be interpreted purposively; a person who enters into a marital arrangement cannot take shelter behind the smokescreen of an invalid marriage.

Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477

• Approved the purposive interpretation of Section 498A, affirming that the term "husband" can cover a person who enters into a marital relationship.

D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469

• Laid down the criteria for a "relationship in the nature of marriage" under the DV Act: holding out as spouses, legal age, unmarried, and significant period of cohabitation.

Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755

• Distinguished between live-in relationships and relationships in the nature of marriage; provided eight illustrative guidelines for testing the same.

Sunder v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 211 (Constitution Bench)

• Cited for the principle that statutory benefits are integral to compensation; though not directly on point, the Court relied on its purposive interpretation methodology.

Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273

• Laid down safeguards against automatic arrest under Section 498A; the Court directed strict compliance with these safeguards in live-in relationship cases.

K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (Nine-Judge Bench)

• Recognized the right to choose one's partner as an intrinsic part of personal liberty and dignity under Article 21.

Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M., (2018) 16 SCC 368

• Affirmed that the right to choose one's partner is a facet of individual autonomy and dignity.

Practical Impact

For advocates: This judgment is a game-changer for matrimonial and criminal law practitioners. When defending or prosecuting Section 498A cases, advocates must now consider whether the relationship qualifies as a "relationship in the nature of marriage" with intent to marry. The burden of proof on the woman to establish these elements will be a critical battleground. Advocates must also ensure the Arnesh Kumar safeguards are invoked to prevent automatic arrests in such cases.

For future litigation: This judgment will lead to an increase in Section 498A cases involving live-in relationships. Courts will need to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a relationship meets the criteria. The judgment also provides a strong constitutional argument against discrimination in other contexts where women in non-marital relationships are denied protection.

May be cited: In any case involving the applicability of Section 498A to live-in relationships, in constitutional challenges to discriminatory provisions affecting women in non-marital relationships, and in arguments for purposive interpretation of penal statutes.

Lawcurb Quick Insight

The Court's reliance on Article 14 to strike down the distinction between married women and those in marriage-like relationships is significant. This reasoning could have ripple effects beyond Section 498A, potentially influencing other areas where the law discriminates based on marital status.

Lawcurb Practice Note

When advising a client in a live-in relationship who has faced cruelty, ensure that the relationship meets the Indra Sarma criteria and that the client can establish the intent to marry. Conversely, when defending such cases, challenge the existence of the relationship and the intent to marry at the earliest stage.

Remember This Ratio

Section 498A IPC applies to live-in relationships in the nature of marriage with established intent to marry; the distinction from marriage violates Article 14.

Exam Lens

Q: What is the difference between a "live-in relationship" and a "relationship in the nature of marriage" under Indian law? A: A live-in relationship is a broader category where two individuals cohabit. A "relationship in the nature of marriage" is a subset that meets specific criteria: holding out as spouses, legal age, being unmarried, significant period of cohabitation, pooling of resources, domestic arrangements, sexual relationship, children, socialisation, and the intent to marry. Not all live-in relationships qualify.

Q: Why did the Supreme Court hold that the distinction between married women and women in live-in relationships violates Article 14? A: The Court held that the distinction has no rational nexus with the object of preventing domestic cruelty. Both categories face similar risks of cruelty, and denying protection to one while granting it to the other is discriminatory. The right to choose one's partner is a fundamental aspect of personal liberty under Article 21.

Q: What safeguards did the Court impose to prevent misuse of Section 498A in live-in relationship cases? A: The Court held that the initial burden of proof lies on the woman to establish the relationship was "in the nature of marriage" with the intent to marry. The Arnesh Kumar safeguards against automatic arrest must be strictly followed, and no arrest shall be made without preliminary enquiries.

Final Outcome

• Appeal dismissed — the High Court's judgment refusing to quash the proceedings is upheld.

• Section 498A extended — the provision applies to live-in relationships that qualify as "relationships in the nature of marriage" with the intent to marry.

• Constitutional validity affirmed — the extended interpretation is consistent with Articles 14, 15, and 21.

• Safeguards imposed — the Arnesh Kumar safeguards must be strictly followed; the burden of proof lies on the woman to establish the nature of the relationship.

• Limited application — this interpretation is limited to Section 498A IPC only.

• Trial to proceed — the Trial Court shall proceed in accordance with law.

Lawcurb Verdict

This judgment is a progressive and constitutionally sound expansion of the protective umbrella of Section 498A. By recognizing that women in live-in relationships face the same risks of domestic cruelty as married women, the Court has taken a significant step toward ensuring equal protection under the law. The judgment is carefully crafted—it extends protection while imposing safeguards against misuse, and limits the interpretation to Section 498A alone. A balanced and forward-looking decision that responds to changing social realities while respecting the rule of law.

This report is prepared by Lawcurb for educational and informational purposes only. It is a concise summary of the judgment and should not be construed as legal advice. Readers are encouraged to refer to the original judgment before relying on any legal proposition.