Elvish Yadav @ Siddharthv.State of UP & Anr

Legal Analysis: Elvish Yadav @ Siddharth vs. State of U.P. & Anr

Citation: 2026 INSC 329

Court: Supreme Court of India

Coram: Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh (Two‑Judge Bench)

Judgment Author: The judgment is delivered by the Bench collectively (signed by both judges)

Nature of Judgment: This is a judgment by a Two‑Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in its criminal appellate jurisdiction, arising from a Special Leave Petition against an order of the Allahabad High Court dismissing a petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) for quashing of criminal proceedings.

1. Synopsis of the Judgment

This judgment quashes criminal proceedings against the appellant (Elvish Yadav @ Siddharth) arising from FIR No. 461/2023 registered at Noida, Uttar Pradesh, for offences under the IPC, the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The Supreme Court held that the cognizance taken by the Magistrate on the basis of a police chargesheet for offences under the 1972 Act was legally impermissible because Section 55 of that Act mandates that cognizance can only be taken on a complaint made by specified authorities, not on a police report. Further, the Court held that the substance recovered (anti‑bodies to snake venom) is not a “psychotropic substance” under the NDPS Act as it is not included in the Schedule to that Act. The Court also noted that the IPC offences were based on the same allegations as a previous complaint where a closure report had been filed. Consequently, the proceedings were quashed, but liberty was given to the competent authorities under Section 55 of the 1972 Act to take appropriate action in accordance with law.

2. Basic Information of the Judgment

Case Title: Elvish Yadav @ Siddharth vs. State of U.P. & Anr.

Criminal Appeal No.: Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 11480/2025

Bench: Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh

Date of Decision: [April 2026 – specific date not in extract]

Citation: 2026 INSC 329

Appeal From: Judgment and order dated 12.05.2025 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Application U/S 528 BNSS No. 14438/2025.

3. Legal Framework

This judgment involves the interpretation of special statutory provisions regarding cognizance of offences under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, the definition of “psychotropic substance” under the NDPS Act, 1985, and the inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings.

A. Key Provisions of Law:

Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972:

• Section 55: Cognizance of offences – No court shall take cognizance of any offence under the Act except on a complaint made by specified authorities (Director of Wild Life Preservation, Chief Wild Life Warden, authorized officers, or any person after giving 60 days’ notice).

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985:

• Section 2(xxiii): Definition of “psychotropic substance” – any substance, natural or synthetic, or any natural material or any salt or preparation of such substance or material included in the list of psychotropic substances specified in the Schedule to the NDPS Act.

• Sections 8, 22, 29, 30, 32: Offences relating to psychotropic substances, punishment, and abetment.

Indian Penal Code, 1860:

• Section 120-B: Criminal conspiracy.

• Section 284: Negligent conduct with respect to poisonous substance.

• Section 289: Negligent conduct with respect to any animal.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC):

• Section 2(d): Definition of “complaint” – excludes a police report.

• Section 190: Cognizance of offences by Magistrates – can be taken on a police report or complaint.

• Section 173: Police report (chargesheet).

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS):

• Section 528: Inherent powers of the High Court (corresponding to Section 482 CrPC).

B. Related Precedents (Discussed in the Judgment):

• State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, (1988) 4 SCC 655: Held that cognizance of an offence under the Wild Life (Protection) Act can only be taken on a statutory complaint under Section 55, and cognizance upon a police report is legally impermissible.

• Jeewan Kumar Raut & Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2009) 7 SCC 526: Held that under the Transplantation of Human Organs Act (which has a pari materia provision), cognizance cannot be taken except on a complaint by an authorized authority.

• State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772: Held that for contravention of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, the Magistrate shall take cognizance only on a complaint filed by a duly authorized officer, not on a police report.

• Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma, (2021) 12 SCC 674: Distinguished between cognizance under Section 190 CrPC and the special procedure under Section 32 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act; held that a police officer cannot prosecute offenders under Chapter IV of that Act because a distinct mode of institution is provided.

• A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Srinivas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500: Recognized the principle that anyone can set criminal law in motion except where the statute creating an offence indicates to the contrary by providing eligibility criteria for the complainant.

• Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India, (1990) 2 SCC 409: Discussed the scheme of the NDPS Act, noting that stringent provisions require a higher degree of care and caution in investigation.

• Balbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (1987) 1 SCC 533: Emphasized that when drastic provisions are made by a statute, the investigation must be thorough and of a very high order.

• B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7: Quashed criminal proceedings where cognizance was taken incorrectly, holding that power exercised without jurisdiction is void ab initio.

4. Relevant Facts of the Case

• Information and Raid (02.11.2023): The complainant (Respondent No. 2, Mr. Gaurav Gupta), an Animal Welfare Officer with the NGO ‘People for Animals’, received information about the appellant’s alleged involvement in organizing rave parties where snakes were used. The complainant contacted one Mr. Rahul Sapera, who confirmed his association with the appellant and agreed to bring snakes to a Banquet Hall in Noida.

• Recovery: A team arrived at the Banquet Hall with snakes. Police and Forest Department officials recovered 20 millilitres of light‑yellow coloured liquid and nine snakes (including five cobras, one ghoda pachhad, two dumohi snakes, and one python).

• FIR (03.11.2023): FIR No. 461/2023 was registered at P.S. Noida Sector 49, District Gautam Buddha Nagar, U.P., for offences under Sections 120-B, 284, 289 IPC; Sections 9, 39, 48-A, 49, 50, 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972; and Sections 8, 22, 29, 30, 32 of the NDPS Act, 1985.

• Forensic Report (29.11.2023): The State Forensic Science Laboratory, Jaipur, reported that the 20 ml liquid tested positive for antibodies of snake venom for four common snakes: Cobra, Krait, Russell’s, and Saw‑scaled Viper.

• Remand Order (20.03.2024): The Principal Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate opined that Sections 27 and 27-A of the NDPS Act were not made out.

• Chargesheet (05.04.2024): Chargesheet No. 1/2024 was filed against the appellant as accused No. 1.

• Cognizance Order (31.07.2024): The 1st Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance and issued summons.

• Quashing Petition before High Court: The appellant filed a petition under Section 528 BNSS before the Allahabad High Court seeking to quash the FIR, chargesheet, and summoning order.

• High Court Order (12.05.2025): The High Court dismissed the petition.

• Appeal to Supreme Court: The appellant challenged the High Court’s order.

5. Issues Identified by the Supreme Court

• First Issue: Whether the cognizance of offences under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 taken by the Magistrate on the basis of a police chargesheet is legally permissible in view of the mandatory requirement under Section 55 of that Act that cognizance can only be taken on a complaint made by specified authorities.

• Second Issue: Whether “snake venom” or “anti‑bodies to snake venom” fall within the definition of a “psychotropic substance” under Section 2(xxiii) of the NDPS Act, 1985, given that these substances are not included in the Schedule to the NDPS Act.

• Third Issue: Whether the invocation of Sections 284 and 289 IPC is sustainable when the same allegations were the subject matter of a previous complaint where a closure report was filed.

6. Ratio Decidendi (The Reasoning and Decision of the Court)

A. Cognizance under Section 55 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act – Mandatory Complaint, Not Police Report

The Court held that Section 55 of the 1972 Act is a special procedural mandate that excludes the general provisions of the CrPC. It provides that no court shall take cognizance of any offence under the Act except on a complaint made by the authorities listed therein (Director, Chief Wild Life Warden, authorized officers, or any person after 60 days’ notice). The term “complaint” as defined in Section 2(d) of the CrPC expressly excludes a police report (chargesheet under Section 173 CrPC). (Paras 19-20)

The Court reiterated the principle that when a special statute provides a specific mode of taking cognizance, that mode must be strictly adhered to. The exercise of power by an authority not competent/authorized results in nullity – a “ripple effect” where an initial void action vitiates all subsequent proceedings. (Paras 21-23)

Relying on State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, the Court held that prosecution under the 1972 Act must be initiated strictly on the basis of a statutory complaint, and cognizance taken upon a police report is legally impermissible. (Para 24)

The Court drew analogy from pari materia provisions in other special statutes:

• Section 32 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (Ashok Kumar Sharma)

• Section 22 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (Sanjay)

• Section 22 of the Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994 (Jeewan Kumar Raut)

In all these cases, the Court held that cognizance cannot be taken on a police report; only a complaint by the specified authority is valid. (Paras 25-30)

The Court invoked the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant – general things do not derogate from special things. The special procedure under Section 55 overrides the general provisions of the CrPC. (Para 31)

B. “Psychotropic Substance” under the NDPS Act – Schedule Mandatory

The Court examined Section 2(xxiii) of the NDPS Act, which defines a “psychotropic substance” as any substance included in the list of psychotropic substances specified in the Schedule to the Act. The Court noted that the legislature had consciously omitted snake venom and anti‑bodies to snake venom from the Schedule. Therefore, the recovered substance (anti‑bodies of snake venom) could not be construed as a psychotropic substance, and the provisions of the NDPS Act (Sections 8, 22, 29, 30, 32) could not be invoked. (Paras 35-36)

Citing Raj Kumar Karwal and Balbir Singh, the Court reiterated that where a statute contains stringent provisions (as the NDPS Act does), a higher degree of care and caution is cast upon investigating authorities. The investigation must be thorough and conducted with great circumspection. However, the fundamental issue was not the quality of investigation but the complete absence of statutory basis for invoking the NDPS Act. (Paras 37-38)

C. IPC Offences – Prior Complaint and Closure Report

The Court noted that the offences under Sections 284 and 289 IPC were based on a video showing the appellant handling snakes in a dangerous manner. However, an earlier complaint on the same issue had been filed by Mr. Saurabh Gupta (brother of the complainant in the present case, and also cited as PW-3) under Section 156(3) CrPC before a court in Gurugram, Haryana (FIR No. 146/2024). In that complaint, a closure report was filed on 21.11.2024, stating that cognizable offences could not be established because no cruelty was meted out to the snakes and possession of exotic species would not constitute an offence. The Court held that the same allegations cannot form the basis of criminal proceedings initiated by a different agency without jurisdiction. The apparent connection between the complainants in both cases also could not be ignored. (Paras 39-40)

Relying on B.N. John v. State of U.P., the Court held that where a power is exercised without jurisdiction, it is void ab initio, and any subsequent action or proceedings stemming from it are likewise rendered void. (Paras 41-42)

D. Conclusion and Liberty to Competent Authorities

The Court set aside the High Court’s order and quashed the criminal proceedings arising from FIR No. 461/2023 and Chargesheet No. 1/2024. However, the Court gave liberty to the Competent Authorities under Section 55 of the 1972 Act to take appropriate measures against the appellant in accordance with law, if so advised, taking note of the facts of the case. (Paras 44-46)

7. New Legal Principles Established / Reiterated

• Mandatory complaint requirement under Section 55, Wild Life (Protection) Act: A police chargesheet cannot be treated as a complaint for the purpose of taking cognizance of offences under the 1972 Act. The Magistrate must insist on a complaint from the specified authorities. Cognizance taken on a police report is void ab initio.

• “Psychotropic substance” definition is exhaustive, not illustrative: For a substance to be a “psychotropic substance” under the NDPS Act, it must be expressly included in the Schedule. The courts cannot expand the definition by implication or analogy. Snake venom and its antibodies are not psychotropic substances under the Act.

• Principle of “ripple effect” in jurisdictional nullity: An initial action taken without jurisdiction (e.g., cognizance on a police report where a special statute requires a complaint) renders all subsequent proceedings null and void.

• Reiteration of generalia specialibus non derogant: Special statutes with specific procedural mandates override general procedural laws like the CrPC.

• Closure report in a previous complaint bars subsequent proceedings on the same allegations: If a competent court has accepted a closure report in respect of certain allegations, the same allegations cannot be re‑agitated in a different jurisdiction without fresh material.

8. The Court’s Analysis and Examination of Concepts

A. The “Ripple Effect” – Jurisdictional Nullity

The Court introduced (or reiterated) the concept of the “ripple effect” – where an initial action is void for want of jurisdiction, all subsequent actions emanating therefrom also result in nullity. This is distinct from a mere procedural irregularity, which may be curable. A fundamental illegality (complete absence of authority) cannot be cured. (Paras 21-23)

B. Distinction Between “Complaint” and “Police Report”

The Court emphasized that Section 2(d) CrPC defines “complaint” as any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, but expressly excludes a police report. Section 55 of the 1972 Act uses the word “complaint”, not “police report” or “chargesheet”. The legislature’s choice of language is deliberate. Therefore, a chargesheet under Section 173 CrPC cannot be treated as a complaint for the purposes of Section 55. (Para 11, 20)

C. Legislative Omission in the NDPS Schedule

The Court applied the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one thing is the exclusion of another). The NDPS Act contains a detailed Schedule listing psychotropic substances. The legislature has amended this Schedule from time to time. The fact that snake venom or its antibodies are not listed indicates a conscious legislative decision not to bring them within the purview of the NDPS Act. The courts cannot supply this omission. (Para 36)

D. Prior Litigation – Abuse of Process

The Court noted that the complainant in the present case (Gaurav Gupta) and the complainant in the earlier Gurugram complaint (Saurabh Gupta) are brothers. Saurabh Gupta is also a prosecution witness (PW-3) in the present case. The closure report in the Gurugram case, which found no cognizable offence, strongly suggested that the present proceedings were an abuse of process – an attempt to re‑litigate the same issue before a different forum. (Paras 39-40)

E. Liberty to Competent Authorities – A Balanced Approach

While quashing the proceedings, the Court did not grant a complete clean chit to the appellant. It expressly gave liberty to the competent authorities under Section 55 of the 1972 Act to take appropriate action. This means that if those authorities (e.g., the Chief Wild Life Warden or the Director of Wild Life Preservation) find that an offence under the 1972 Act has been committed, they can file a proper complaint before the Magistrate. The quashing is only of the proceedings initiated on the invalid police chargesheet; it does not bar a fresh complaint by the correct authority. (Para 46)

9. Critical Analysis of the Judgment

Strengths

• Strict adherence to statutory mandates: The judgment correctly enforces the legislative choice to restrict cognizance under the 1972 Act to complaints by specified authorities. This prevents executive overreach by police officers who may lack the specialized knowledge required for wildlife offences.

• Clarity on NDPS Act applicability: By holding that only substances listed in the Schedule can be treated as psychotropic substances, the Court prevents the executive from expanding criminal liability through creative interpretation. This is a significant safeguard against arbitrary prosecution.

• Protection against double vexation: The recognition that a closure report in a previous complaint on the same allegations bars subsequent proceedings (absent fresh material) upholds the principle of finality and prevents harassment.

• Balanced relief: Granting liberty to competent authorities under Section 55 ensures that genuine wildlife offences are not left unpunished; only the procedurally flawed prosecution is quashed, not the substantive law.

Potential Concerns / Critiques

• May lead to procedural technicality defeating substantive justice: If the competent authorities under Section 55 do not act (or act belatedly), the appellant may escape prosecution even if there was a genuine wildlife offence. However, the Court’s approach is consistent with the rule of law – procedure is the handmaid of justice, not its mistress.

• Ambiguity regarding “anti‑bodies to snake venom”: The judgment holds that the substance is not a psychotropic substance because it is not in the Schedule. However, one could argue that “snake venom” itself (not merely antibodies) might have psychotropic properties, and the legislature may not have contemplated such novel substances. The judgment correctly leaves it to the legislature to amend the Schedule if desired.

• Lack of detailed analysis on IPC offences: The judgment’s treatment of Sections 284 and 289 IPC is brief, relying primarily on the prior closure report. A more detailed analysis of whether the video evidence made out those offences would have been useful, but the Court’s approach is pragmatic.

Impact

• Wildlife prosecutions: Police officers across India can no longer file chargesheets for offences under the 1972 Act; they must refer the matter to the competent authorities (Wild Life Warden, Director, etc.) to file a complaint. This will streamline prosecutions and ensure that only properly authorized persons initiate proceedings.

• NDPS Act litigation: Accused persons charged with possessing or trading in substances not listed in the NDPS Schedule can now seek quashing of proceedings. This will prevent misuse of the stringent NDPS provisions.

• Quashing petitions: The judgment will be cited in quashing petitions where the prosecution is based on a police report for an offence under a special statute that requires a complaint from a specified authority.

10. Final Outcome

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. The impugned judgment and order dated 12.05.2025 passed by the Allahabad High Court in Application U/S 528 BNSS No. 14438/2025 was set aside. Consequently, the criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No. 461/2023 dated 03.11.2023 registered at P.S. Noida Sector 49, District Gautam Buddha Nagar, Uttar Pradesh, and Chargesheet No. 1/2024 dated 05.04.2024, for offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 284, 289 IPC; Sections 9, 39, 48-A, 49, 50, 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972; and Sections 8, 22, 29, 30, 32 of the NDPS Act, 1985, were quashed.

However, liberty was granted to the Competent Authorities under Section 55 of the 1972 Act to take appropriate measures against the appellant in accordance with law, if so advised. Pending applications were disposed of.

11. Practical Application, Court Lines, and Legal Strategy

Use in Court (Practical Application)

• For the Accused (Defence): If you are charged with an offence under a special statute that requires a complaint from a specified authority (e.g., Wild Life Protection Act, Mines and Minerals Act, Drugs and Cosmetics Act, Transplantation of Human Organs Act), and the Magistrate has taken cognizance on a police chargesheet, file a quashing petition. Cite Section 55 of the 1972 Act and this judgment. Argue that the cognizance is void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction.

• For the Accused under NDPS Act: If the alleged “psychotropic substance” is not listed in the Schedule to the NDPS Act, argue that the prosecution is fundamentally flawed. Cite Section 2(xxiii) and this judgment. The court cannot expand the definition.

• For the Prosecution (State): To avoid quashing, ensure that for offences under the 1972 Act, the complaint is filed by an officer specified in Section 55, not by a police officer. If a police officer has conducted the investigation, the final report should be forwarded to the competent authority, who should then file a complaint. Do not rely on a chargesheet under Section 173 CrPC.

• For the Complainant (Wildlife NGO or Individual): If you have information about a wildlife offence, do not simply file an FIR. Instead, approach the Chief Wild Life Warden or the Director of Wild Life Preservation and request them to file a complaint under Section 55. Alternatively, you can give a 60‑day notice under Section 55(c) and then file a complaint yourself.

Court Lines

“A bare perusal of the provision makes it clear that under Section 55 of the 1972 Act, cognizance of an offence can be taken by a Court only on the basis of a Complaint made by the officers/authorities mentioned therein. It is trite law that when a statute provides for a special procedural mechanism to be followed, the same shall be adhered to, by excluding the general statutory provisions.” (Para 20)

“The exercise of power by an authority who is not competent/authorised to do so, results in vitiation of its foundation. … A power exercised without jurisdiction results in nullity, and further proceedings emanating therefrom, also stand nullified. Therefore, the action becomes non est in the eyes of law. This can be understood as the principle of ripple effect, wherein, an initial action which is void for want of jurisdiction would lead to the inevitable consequence that all subsequent actions, thereafter, would also result in a nullity.” (Paras 21-22)

“We find force in the submission made by the learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant that what is required to be presented under Section 55 of the 1972 Act is a private complaint by a competent ‘authorized officer’ who is empowered to do so by the provision itself. This is based upon the concept that other authorities who lack complete jurisdiction cannot deprive the authorities that very well have the jurisdiction to set criminal prosecution in motion.” (Para 34)

“From a bare reading of the aforesaid provision, the definition of a psychotropic substance under Section 2(xxiii) of the NDPS Act has a clear import that any substance or any natural material or any salt or preparation of such substance or such substance or material has to be included in the list of substances which are specified under the Schedule of the NDPS Act. The conscious omission of the legislature in not placing snake venom or anti‑bodies to snake venom under the Schedule of the NDPS Act, would clearly mean that the said substances could not have been construed as psychotropic substances, by any stretch of imagination, warranting application of the provisions under the NDPS Act.” (Para 36)

“We are in agreement with the observations of this Court in Balbir Singh v. State of Haryana … that where a statute contains stringent provisions, a higher degree of care and caution is cast upon the investigating authorities. The investigation, therefore, must be thorough and be conducted with great circumspection.” (Para 38)

“We would like to reiterate that once a power is exercised without jurisdiction, it is void ab initio, and any subsequent action or proceedings which stems from it, would likewise be rendered void.” (Para 42)

Legal Strategy Insight

For the Defence (Quashing Strategy):

• Step 1 – Identify the special statute: Determine whether the offence falls under a statute that contains a “cognizance” provision similar to Section 55 (e.g., Section 32 of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, Section 22 of MMDR Act, Section 22 of TOHO Act, Section 55 of Wild Life Act).

• Step 2 – Examine the cognizance order: If the Magistrate has taken cognizance on a police report (chargesheet) and not on a complaint by the specified authority, the cognizance is void.

• Step 3 – File quashing petition: Argue that the entire proceeding is a nullity from inception – “ripple effect”. Cite Murad Ali Khan and this judgment.

• Step 4 – For NDPS Act: Check the Schedule. If the substance is not listed, argue that no offence under the NDPS Act is made out. The definition is exhaustive.

For the Prosecution (Saving the Case):

• After investigation, do not file a chargesheet under Section 173 CrPC for offences under the 1972 Act. Instead, prepare a report and forward it to the Chief Wild Life Warden or Director. Request them to file a complaint under Section 55. Then the Magistrate can take cognizance on that complaint.

• For NDPS Act: If a novel substance is encountered, consider whether it can be treated as an “analogue” or “derivative” of a scheduled substance. If not, the only remedy is to approach the Central Government to amend the Schedule.

For the High Court (While Deciding Quashing Petitions):

• When a petitioner challenges cognizance under a special statute, first examine whether the complaint was filed by a person authorized under that statute. If the cognizance was taken on a police report, quash the proceedings – do not merely stay them.

• However, quashing of proceedings based on a police report does not bar a fresh complaint by the competent authority. The Court may give liberty to the competent authority to file a proper complaint.