Hamsaanandini Nanduriv.Union of India & Ors

Synopsis

This landmark judgment, delivered by the Supreme Court of India on March 17, 2026, addresses a constitutional challenge to Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020 (in pari materia with Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961), which provided maternity benefit of twelve weeks only to women who legally adopt a child "below the age of three months." The petitioner, an adoptive mother of two children, challenged this provision as being violative of Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, in a exhaustive and path-breaking judgment, struck down the three-month age limit as unconstitutional. It held that the distinction between adoptive mothers based on the age of the child is arbitrary and has no rational nexus with the object of maternity benefit legislation, which is to protect motherhood and ensure the welfare of the child. The Court expansively interpreted "maternity" to include adoptive motherhood, reaffirmed that reproductive autonomy under Article 21 includes the choice to adopt, and applied the principle of the "best interest of the child" to hold that all adopted children, regardless of age, require a period of bonding and integration with their new family. The Court also used a "workability" test to demonstrate that the three-month limit was practically unworkable given the timelines of the legal adoption process under the Juvenile Justice Act and CARA Regulations. Consequently, the Court "read down" the provision, deleting the age limit, and directed that it now be read as entitling any woman who legally adopts a child to twelve weeks of maternity benefit from the date the child is handed over.

1. Basic Information of the Judgment

Case Title: Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India & Ors.

Citation: 2026 INSC 246 (Reportable)

Court: Supreme Court of India

Jurisdiction: Original Civil Jurisdiction (Writ Petition under Article 32)

Case Number: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 960 of 2021

Coram: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan

Nature of Bench: Division Bench

Date of Judgment: March 17, 2026

2. Legal Framework and Relevant Provisions

• Constitutional Provisions:
  Article 14: Right to Equality – prohibits arbitrary and unreasonable classification.
  Article 15: Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.
  Article 19(1)(g): Right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
  Article 21: Right to life and personal liberty – interpreted to include the right to live with dignity, reproductive autonomy, and the best interest of the child.
  Article 42 (Directive Principle): State to make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity relief.

• Statutory Framework:
  Code on Social Security, 2020:
  Section 60(4): "A woman who legally adopts a child below the age of three months or a commissioning mother shall be entitled to maternity benefit for a period of twelve weeks from the date the child is handed over to the adopting mother or the commissioning mother, as the case may be."
  Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (since repealed and subsumed by the 2020 Code):
  Section 5(4) (as amended in 2017) was the pari materia provision.
  Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (JJ Act):
  Sections 32, 35, 37, 38: Procedure for declaring a child legally free for adoption.
  Section 2(9): Definition of "best interest of the child."
  Section 3: General principles to be followed in administration of the Act, including the principle of best interest of the child.
  Adoption Regulations, 2022 (CARA Regulations):
  Regulation 3: Fundamental principles governing adoption, with the child's best interest being of paramount consideration.
  Regulations 6, 7: Detailed timelines and procedures for declaring a child legally free for adoption.

• Key Precedents Relied Upon:
  State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) 1 SCC 1: Classic statement of the law on classification under Article 14.
  State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd. (1974) 4 SCC 656: Explained characteristics of reasonable classification and the concepts of under-inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness.
  B. Shah v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court (1977) 4 SCC 384: Beneficial legislation must be interpreted to advance social justice.
  Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) (2000) 3 SCC 224: Maternity benefit aims to provide dignified conditions for working women.
  Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India (1984) 2 SCC 244: The best interest of the child is paramount in adoption matters.
  Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Admn. (2009) 9 SCC 1: Reproductive autonomy is a dimension of personal liberty under Article 21.
  K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1: Right to privacy includes decisional autonomy in matters of family and reproduction.
  Deepika Singh v. Pgimer, Chandigarh (2023) 13 SCC 681: Maternity leave provisions must be interpreted purposively; atypical families are equally deserving of protection.
  Citizenship Act, 1955, Section 6-A, In re (2024) 16 SCC 105: On the test for under-inclusive classification.
  State of T.N. v. National South Indian River Interlinking Agriculturalist Assn. (2021) 15 SCC 534: On deference to legislative policy and the rational nexus test.
  Werner Van Wyk v. Minister of Employment and Labour [2025] ZACC 20 (South African Constitutional Court): Struck down an age limit (2 years) for adoption leave, holding it discriminatory and contrary to the best interests of the child.
  Topcic-Rosenberg v. Croatia (ECtHR): Difference in treatment between adoptive and biological mothers without justification is discriminatory.
  State of Kerala v. Unni (2007) 2 SCC 365: A law that is unworkable in practice can be struck down.

3. Relevant Facts of the Case

• The petitioner, Hamsaanandini Nanduri, is an adoptive mother of two children. She filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution in public interest, challenging the constitutional validity of Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (as amended in 2017).

• The impugned provision entitled only those women who legally adopt a child below the age of three months to maternity benefit for a period of twelve weeks from the date the child is handed over.

• During the pendency of the petition, the Code on Social Security, 2020, came into effect on November 21, 2025, consolidating and repealing the Maternity Benefit Act. Section 60(4) of the 2020 Code is the pari materia provision. The petitioner was permitted to amend the petition to challenge this new provision on the same grounds.

• The petitioner argued that the three-month age limit created an unreasonable and discriminatory classification between adoptive mothers, had no rational nexus with the object of the legislation, and violated the rights of both adoptive mothers and adopted children under Articles 14, 19, and 21.

• The respondents (Union of India) defended the provision, arguing that it struck a balance between the rights of adoptive mothers and employers' concerns, and that a child older than three months does not have the same intensive dependency on a caregiver.

4. Issues Before the Supreme Court

• Whether the age limit of three months stipulated under Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020, is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, being discriminatory against women who adopt a child aged three months or above?

• Whether the impugned provision violates the right to reproductive autonomy of adoptive mothers and the right of the adopted child to holistic care and development under Article 21 of the Constitution?

• Whether the provision is practically unworkable given the mandatory timelines under the Juvenile Justice Act and CARA Regulations for declaring a child legally free for adoption?

5. Ratio Decidendi of the Court

The Supreme Court allowed the writ petition and struck down the three-month age limit in Section 60(4) of the 2020 Code. The key findings and principles are as follows:

• Maternity Protection as a Basic Human Right: The Court reaffirmed that maternity benefit is not merely a statutory entitlement but a basic human right, rooted in the recognition of the physical, emotional, and social dimensions of motherhood. It is essential to ensure that women are not disadvantaged in the workplace due to their role as mothers.

• Adoptive Motherhood is Motherhood: The Court held that the commonly drawn distinction between a biological mother and an adoptive mother is based on a narrow, biological lens. An adoptive mother has the same rights and obligations towards the child and experiences the same need for bonding, nurturing, and care. The components of maternity leave—physical recovery, emotional bonding, and child integration—apply with equal force to adoptive mothers, with the first component (physical recovery) being the only one absent.

• Violation of Article 14 – Unreasonable and Under-Inclusive Classification: The Court applied the two-pronged test for permissible classification. It held that:
  No Intelligible Differentia: The distinction between a woman adopting a child below three months and one adopting a child above three months is artificial and lacks a reasonable basis. The need for bonding, care, and family integration does not magically cease when a child turns three months old. Both categories of adoptive mothers are similarly situated in terms of their roles, responsibilities, and caregiving obligations.
  No Rational Nexus with the Object: The object of the 2020 Code is to provide social security and protect motherhood. The age limit of three months has no rational nexus with this object. The need for economic security and institutional support does not diminish merely because the adopted child is older. The classification is under-inclusive, as it leaves out a large class of similarly situated women without justification.

• Violation of Article 21 – Reproductive Autonomy and Best Interest of the Child:
  Reproductive Autonomy Includes Adoption: Relying on Suchita Srivastava and K.S. Puttaswamy, the Court held that reproductive autonomy under Article 21 is not confined to the biological act of giving birth. The choice to adopt and nurture a child is a fundamental aspect of personal liberty and decisional autonomy.
  Best Interest of the Child is Paramount: Drawing on Lakshmi Kant Pandey and the JJ Act, the Court held that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration in all matters concerning children. The period immediately following adoption is critical for the child's integration into the new family, regardless of the child's age. Denying maternity benefit to mothers of older adopted children deprives those children of the opportunity to bond with their new parent and develop emotional security, directly violating their best interests.

• Unworkability of the Provision: The Court conducted a detailed analysis of the mandatory timelines under the JJ Act and CARA Regulations for declaring a child legally free for adoption. It demonstrated that, given the required safeguards and procedures (reconsideration period for surrendered children, efforts to trace biological parents, etc.), a child is unlikely to be legally free for adoption within the first three months of life. Therefore, the three-month age limit renders the benefit practically illusory and incapable of being availed by most adoptive parents. A law that is unworkable in practice fails to serve its social purpose.

• Rejection of Respondents' Defenses: The Court rejected the argument that creche facilities could substitute for maternity leave, noting that creches are not a statutory entitlement for all establishments and cannot replace the mother's presence. It also dismissed the justification based on a child's "intensive dependency," noting that the need for care and integration is not limited to infancy.

• Final Direction (Reading Down): The Court held that the three-month age limit is severable from the rest of the provision. It directed that Section 60(4) be now read as:
  "(4) A woman who legally adopts a child or a commissioning mother shall be entitled to maternity benefit for a period of twelve weeks from the date the child is handed over to the adopting mother or the commissioning mother, as the case may be."

• Call for Paternity Leave: The Court concluded by urging the Union to consider enacting a provision for paternity leave, recognizing the importance of a father's role in early childhood development and in dismantling gendered parenting roles.

6. Legal Framework Established / Clarified

This judgment is a landmark in several areas of constitutional and social security law:

• Expansive Definition of Motherhood: The judgment authoritatively establishes that for the purpose of social welfare legislation like maternity benefit, "motherhood" is not limited to biological motherhood. It includes adoptive motherhood, which involves the same emotional and caregiving responsibilities and is equally deserving of legal protection. This is a significant step towards recognizing diverse family structures.

• Reproductive Autonomy Includes Adoption: The Court expanded the scope of reproductive autonomy under Article 21 to include the decision to adopt. This affirms that the constitutional right to make intimate personal choices about family formation extends beyond procreation to encompass non-biological modes of parenthood.

• Application of "Best Interest of the Child" to Welfare Legislation: The judgment firmly applies the principle of the best interest of the child, derived from the JJ Act and international law, to the interpretation of social security laws. It holds that welfare legislation affecting children must be interpreted in a manner that promotes their holistic development and well-being. Denying a benefit to a parent directly impacts the child, and this must be a relevant consideration.

• Strengthened Test for Under-Inclusive Classification: The Court provided a powerful example of striking down a provision for being under-inclusive under Article 14. It demonstrated that once the purpose of the law is identified, the classification must include all who are similarly situated with respect to that purpose. Excluding a group without a rational basis renders the law arbitrary.

• Workability as a Test of Constitutional Validity: Relying on Unni, the Court used the practical unworkability of the provision as a further ground to strike down the age limit. This affirms that a law that is structurally incapable of delivering its intended benefit to its intended beneficiaries can be struck down as illusory.

7. Court's Examination and Analysis

The Court's analysis was exhaustive and multi-layered, spanning nearly 100 pages:

• Exposition of Maternity as a Human Right: The Court began by tracing the recognition of maternity protection in international law (UDHR, ICESCR, ILO Conventions, CEDAW, CRC) and Indian statutory law (from the Bombay Maternity Benefit Act, 1929 to the 2020 Code). This established the fundamental importance of the right being claimed.

• Judicial Precedents on Maternity Benefit: The Court reviewed a wide range of Indian judgments, from B. Shah to Deepika Singh and K. Umadevi, extracting the core principles: maternity benefit is a social justice measure, must be interpreted purposively, and applies to all women workers. It also cited various High Court judgments that had extended maternity benefits to adoptive mothers.

• Dissecting the Components of Maternity Leave: The Court identified three components of maternity leave: (i) physical recovery, (ii) emotional bonding, and (iii) child integration. It held that while component (i) is absent for adoptive mothers, components (ii) and (iii) are fully present and equally important.

• Applying the Classification Test: The Court methodically applied the two-pronged test for permissible classification under Article 14. It first identified the object of the 2020 Code (social security for motherhood). It then examined whether the differentia (age of the child) was intelligible, finding it was not. Finally, it held there was no rational nexus between the age limit and the object of protecting motherhood.

• Examining Adoption Procedure Timelines: The Court painstakingly set out the statutory timeline under the JJ Act and CARA Regulations for declaring a child legally free for adoption. It used a detailed table to show that the process inevitably takes longer than three months, making the age limit unworkable.

• Comparative Constitutional Jurisprudence: The Court drew heavily on international precedents, particularly the South African Constitutional Court's decision in Werner Van Wyk and the European Court of Human Rights' decision in Topčić-Rosenberg, which had struck down similar age limits for adoption leave as discriminatory and contrary to the child's best interests.

• Addressing Institutional Invisibility of Care Work: The Court wove in a sociological and economic analysis, discussing the "Wollstonecraft Dilemma" and ILO studies on unpaid care work to highlight the structural disadvantages faced by women, which maternity benefit is designed to mitigate.

• Advocating for Paternity Leave: In a significant obiter, the Court urged the government to consider paternity leave, emphasizing the importance of a father's role and the need to dismantle gendered assumptions about caregiving.

8. Critical Analysis and Final Outcome

• Outcome: The Supreme Court allowed the writ petition. It declared that the three-month age limit in Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020, is unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14 and 21. The provision was "read down" to remove the age limit, effectively entitling all women who legally adopt a child to twelve weeks of maternity benefit from the date the child is handed over. The Court also urged the government to consider enacting paternity leave provisions.

• Critical Perspectives:
  Strengths: The judgment is a monumental and progressive interpretation of the Constitution. It is a triumph for gender justice, child rights, and the recognition of diverse family forms. By expansively defining motherhood, the Court has dismantled a harmful and arbitrary distinction that penalized adoptive parents. The use of a "workability" test, combined with a detailed analysis of adoption procedure, shows a deep understanding of the real-world context in which the law operates. The judgment is a model of how constitutional courts can use purposive interpretation, comparative law, and empirical reality to advance fundamental rights.
  Recognition of Non-Biological Families: The judgment powerfully affirms that love, care, and responsibility, not biology, are the foundations of family. This is a crucial message in a society where adoption and other non-traditional family structures are often stigmatized or undervalued.
  Child-Centric Approach: By centering the best interest of the child, the judgment ensures that the welfare of the most vulnerable party in the adoption triad is paramount. It recognizes that denying a parent leave harms the child, and that all children, regardless of the age at which they are adopted, need time to form secure attachments.
  Deterrence Against Arbitrary Legislation: The judgment serves as a strong warning to the legislature that provisions which create arbitrary classifications, especially those that affect fundamental rights and the welfare of children, will be struck down. It reinforces the need for law-making to be informed by empirical reality, not just abstract assumptions.
  Potential Criticism: One could argue that the Court engaged in judicial law-making by effectively deleting the age limit and reading in a new entitlement. However, this is a classic example of "reading down" a provision to save it from unconstitutionality by severing the offending part. The Court did not create a new benefit; it removed an arbitrary restriction from an existing one, which is a well-established judicial function.
  Impact on Employers and Government: The judgment will have financial implications for establishments that employ adoptive mothers. However, the cost is a necessary and justifiable part of providing social security and upholding constitutional rights. The Court's call for paternity leave also puts the onus on the government to proactively expand the social security framework.
  Guidance for Future Litigation: The judgment provides a comprehensive framework for challenging similar arbitrary classifications in social welfare laws. The combination of Article 14 analysis, Article 21 rights (including reproductive autonomy and best interest of the child), and a "workability" test offers a powerful template for constitutional challenges.

• Core Final Directive: The right to maternity benefit under social security legislation is a fundamental aspect of the right to life with dignity and is rooted in the constitutional guarantee of equality. This right extends to all mothers, including adoptive mothers. An arbitrary age limit for the adopted child, which has no rational nexus with the purpose of providing for maternal care and child welfare, and which is practically unworkable given the legal procedures for adoption, is unconstitutional and must be struck down. The state must ensure that its social welfare framework recognizes the realities of modern families and the paramount importance of the child's best interests.

(MCQs)

1. The primary constitutional challenge in Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India was directed against which provision?
A) Section 60(1) of the Code on Social Security, 2020, relating to the rate of maternity benefit.
B) Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020, which limited maternity benefit for adoptive mothers to children below the age of three months.
C) Section 67 of the Code on Social Security, 2020, regarding creche facilities.
D) The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.

2. The Supreme Court held that the three-month age limit for adopted children to claim maternity benefit was violative of Article 14 primarily because:?
A) It discriminated against male adoptive parents.
B) It created an unreasonable and under-inclusive classification between adoptive mothers based on the child's age, with no rational nexus to the object of protecting motherhood.
C) It was not approved by Parliament.
D) It conflicted with the provisions of the Companies Act.

3. In concluding that the impugned provision was also violative of Article 21, the Court relied on which two interconnected rights?
A) The right to free legal aid and the right to a speedy trial.
B) The right to reproductive autonomy of the adoptive mother and the best interest of the adopted child.
C) The right to education and the right to health.
D) The right to freedom of speech and the right to assemble.

4. The Supreme Court used the principle of "workability" to strike down the age limit by demonstrating that:?
A) Employers would find it difficult to implement the provision.
B) The provision was too expensive for the government to fund.
C) The mandatory statutory procedures under the JJ Act and CARA Regulations for declaring a child legally free for adoption would almost always exceed the three-month limit, making the benefit illusory.
D) The provision was poorly drafted.