Jagdish Prasad and Othersv.P M Manoj Kumar and Others

Legal Analysis: Jagdish Prasad and Others vs. P.M. Manoj Kumar and Others

Citation: 2026 INSC 572
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Division Bench comprising Justice S.V.N. Bhatti and Justice Pankaj Mithal
Judgment Author: Justice S.V.N. Bhatti
Date of Decision: May 27, 2026
Nature of Judgment: Civil Appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India against the judgment of the Calcutta High Court (Circuit Bench at Port Blair) in a service matter concerning promotion of police personnel from Head Constable to Assistant Sub-Inspector (Executive).

Synopsis of the Judgment
The dispute arose between two groups of Head Constables in the Andaman & Nicobar Police. The appellants (Head Constables who did not possess matriculation qualification) challenged the 2008 Recruitment Rules and the 2014 Circular that introduced a merit-based selection process (66-2/3% selection quota) and a mandatory matriculation requirement for promotion to ASI-Executive. The Central Administrative Tribunal initially quashed the 2014 Circular and directed promotions on a 100% seniority-cum-fitness basis. However, on writ petitions, the High Court set aside the Tribunal’s order and held that vacancies must be filled under the rules prevailing when the vacancies arose, applying the principle in Marripati Nagaraja. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court, holding that the three-Judge Bench decision in Raj Kumar overruled Y.V. Rangaiah and established that the right to be considered for promotion is governed by the rules in force on the date of consideration, not when vacancies arose. Since the 2016 Rules (which restored 100% seniority-cum-fitness and removed the matriculation requirement) were in force at the time of consideration, the High Court’s direction to apply the old 2010 Rules was illegal. The ad hoc promotions made in 2014 were expressly subject to the outcome of litigation and conferred no vested rights. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s judgment, and directed all vacancies to be filled under the 2016 Rules.

1. Basic Information of the Judgment

• Case Title: Jagdish Prasad and Others vs. P.M. Manoj Kumar and Others

• Civil Appeal No.: 9041 of 2019

• Bench: Justice S.V.N. Bhatti and Justice Pankaj Mithal (Division Bench)

• Date of Decision: May 27, 2026

• Citation: 2026 INSC 572

• Appeal From: Judgment dated 10.08.2016 in WPCT No. 127 of 2016 passed by the High Court at Calcutta, Circuit Bench at Port Blair.

2. Legal Framework

Laws and Rules Involved:

• Andaman & Nicobar Police Manual, 1963: Chapter 5 (preparation of “List B” for promotion from Head Constable to ASI-Executive).

• Standing Order No. 5349 (02.08.1999): Governed preparation of List B; only requirement was successful completion of Police Training College course.

• 2008 Recruitment Rules (31.03.2008): Framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution; introduced matriculation (10th pass) as minimum educational qualification for promotion to ASI-Executive; created 66-2/3% selection (merit) quota and 33-1/3% non-selection (seniority-cum-fitness) quota.

• Standing Order No. 9091 (04.10.2008): Laid down examination procedure for the 66-2/3% selection quota (200 marks test).

• 2010 Recruitment Rules (28.06.2010): Superseded 2008 Rules; retained same framework but changed recruitment channel to “100% by promotion” instead of “promotion failing which by deputation”.

• 2016 Recruitment Rules (21.03.2016): Amended by substitution; abolished the 66-2/3% selection quota and restored 100% promotion on seniority-cum-fitness basis; removed the matriculation requirement for in-service candidates.

• Constitution of India, 1950: Article 309 (recruitment rules for public services), Article 14 (equality), Article 16 (equality in public employment).

• General Clauses Act, 1897: Section 6 (saving of rights accrued under repealed enactments).

Key Precedents Cited and Applied:

• Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao (1983) 3 SCC 211: Held that vacancies arising prior to amendment of recruitment rules must be governed by the old rules. Overruled in Raj Kumar (2019).

• State of Himachal Pradesh & Others v. Raj Kumar & Others (2019) 10 SCC 546 (Three-Judge Bench): Overruled Y.V. Rangaiah. Held that there is no universal rule that vacancies must be filled under the rules existing when they arose. Public servants do not have a vested right to be considered under old rules. The right to be considered for promotion is governed by the rules in force on the date consideration takes place. The Government is entitled to take a policy decision not to fill vacancies and to apply amended rules.

• State of Odisha & Ors. v. Sreepati Ranjan Dash (2021): Applied Raj Kumar; held that for selection posts, the Government is competent to change the selection method. The employee only has the right to be considered under the rules in force on the date of actual consideration.

• Marripati Nagaraja v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (2007) 11 SCC 522: Held that vacancies must be filled under rules prevailing when vacancies accrued. This principle was expressly overruled/sub silentio in Raj Kumar and was held to be incorrect by the present judgment.

• Gottumukkala Venkata Krishamraju v. Union of India: “Substitution” in an amendment deletes the old provision and makes the new provision operative. The earlier rule ceases to exist.

• Zile Singh v. State of Haryana: Substitution results in repeal of the earlier provision and its replacement with a new provision. The old rule is not kept alive.

What the Judgment is About: The judgment resolves a dispute over the applicable recruitment rules for promotion from Head Constable to ASI-Executive in the Andaman & Nicobar Police. The core question is whether promotions must be governed by the rules in force when the vacancies arose (old 2010 Rules requiring matriculation and a selection quota) or by the rules in force at the time of actual consideration for promotion (new 2016 Rules requiring only seniority-cum-fitness with no matriculation requirement). The Supreme Court, following the three-Judge Bench decision in Raj Kumar, held that the latter view is correct. The judgment also clarifies that ad hoc promotions made subject to litigation do not create vested rights.

3. Relevant Facts

• The appellants entered service as Constables with educational qualification of 8th standard. They were promoted to Head Constables. They did not possess matriculation (10th pass) qualification.

• On 31.03.2008, the Administration notified the 2008 Recruitment Rules under Article 309, introducing a mandatory matriculation requirement for promotion to ASI-Executive and creating a 66-2/3% selection (merit-based) quota and 33-1/3% seniority-cum-fitness quota.

• On 04.10.2008, Standing Order No. 9091 was issued, laying down a 200-mark examination for the selection quota.

• On 28.06.2010, the 2010 Recruitment Rules were notified, superseding the 2008 Rules but retaining the same framework (matriculation requirement and quota bifurcation). The promotion channel was changed to “100% by promotion.”

• On 06.06.2014, a Circular was issued inviting applications from eligible Head Constables for promotion to ASI-Executive under the 2010 Rules.

• The appellants filed O.A. No. 351/2014 before the Central Administrative Tribunal challenging the 2008/2010 Rules, the matriculation requirement, and the 2014 Circular. They sought 100% promotion on seniority-cum-fitness basis.

• On 13.11.2014, while the O.A. was pending, the Administration issued an ad hoc promotion order promoting 44 Head Constables (including respondent Nos. 1 to 28) to ASI-Executive for six months, expressly stating that the promotion was “purely ad-hoc,” that they could be reverted at any time, and that it was “subject to the outcome of OA No. 351/2014.”

• On 23.04.2015, the Tribunal allowed O.A. No. 351/2014, quashed the 2014 Circular, and directed that promotions be made on seniority-cum-fitness basis.

• The Administration and the promotees filed writ petitions (WPCT Nos. 235/2015 and 241/2015). On 26.11.2015, the High Court set aside the Tribunal’s order and remanded the matter for fresh consideration.

• On 21.03.2016, the Administration issued the 2016 Recruitment Rules (amending by substitution), abolishing the selection quota and the matriculation requirement, and restoring 100% seniority-cum-fitness promotion.

• On 19.04.2016, the Tribunal disposed of O.A. No. 351/2014 as infructuous, holding that the 2016 Rules had already granted the relief sought by the appellants.

• Respondent Nos. 1 to 28 (the ad hoc promotees) filed WPCT No. 127/2016 before the High Court challenging the Tribunal’s order. On 10.08.2016, the High Court allowed the writ petition, holding that vacancies must be filled under the rules prevailing when they arose (i.e., the old 2010 Rules) and directed the Administration to fill all accumulated vacancies under those rules within three months.

• The appellants filed the present Civil Appeal before the Supreme Court.

4. Issues

1. Whether the High Court was correct in directing that promotions to the post of ASI-Executive must be governed by the Recruitment Rules prevailing at the time the vacancies arose (i.e., the 2010 Rules) rather than the Rules in force at the time of consideration for promotion (i.e., the 2016 Rules).

2. Whether the principle in Y.V. Rangaiah (that vacancies are governed by the rules existing when they arose) is still good law in light of the three-Judge Bench decision in Raj Kumar which overruled it.

3. Whether the ad hoc promotion orders dated 13.11.2014, which were expressly made subject to the outcome of O.A. No. 351/2014, created any vested right in the promotees (respondent Nos. 1 to 28) to be confirmed or to be considered under the old rules.

4. Whether the 2016 Recruitment Rules (amended by substitution) operate retrospectively or prospectively, and whether they extinguish any rights under the earlier rules.

5. Ratio Decidendi

A. The High Court’s reliance on Marripati Nagaraja (and the principle in Y.V. Rangaiah) is incorrect and is overruled by the three-Judge Bench decision in Raj Kumar (Paras 23-26).

The Court held that the three-Judge Bench in Raj Kumar (2019) expressly overruled the statement in Y.V. Rangaiah that “vacancies which occurred prior to the amended Rules would be governed by the old Rules and not by the amended Rules.” The Raj Kumar decision established the following principles (para 24, quoting from the judgment):

• There is no rule of universal application that vacancies must be filled on the basis of the law existing on the date when they arose. Rangaiah must be understood in the context of the rules involved therein.

• The Government is entitled to take a conscious policy decision not to fill up vacancies arising prior to the amendment of the rules. The employee does not acquire any vested right to being considered for promotion in accordance with the repealed rules.

• When there is no statutory duty cast upon the State to consider appointments to vacancies that existed prior to the amendment, the State cannot be directed to consider those cases.

• A candidate has a right to be considered in the light of the existing rule – that is, the rule in force on the date the consideration takes place.

• Therefore, the applicable rule for promotion is the one prevailing on the date of actual consideration (when the DPC meets or the selection process is initiated), not the date when vacancies arose.

Applying this principle to the present case, the Court held that the High Court’s direction to apply the 2010 Rules to vacancies that accrued prior to 2016 was legally unsustainable. The 2016 Rules were in force at the time of the Tribunal’s final consideration and at the time of the High Court’s order. The Administration had also accepted the appellants’ prayers by issuing the 2016 Rules. Hence, the impugned judgment was set aside.

B. The ad hoc promotion orders dated 13.11.2014 conferred no vested rights on the respondent promotees (Paras 27-29).

The Court examined the promotion order and noted that it contained the following explicit conditions:

• “Promoted on ad-hoc basis for a period of six months.”

• “This promotion being purely ad-hoc, they can be reverted to their substantive rank of Head Constable at any time.”

• “Will not have any claim or right to seniority in the rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector.”

• “The above promotions are subject to the outcome of OA No. 351/00078/AN/2014 (Shri Jagdish Prasad and Others Vs. Union of India & others).”

The Court held that such ad hoc promotions, made during the pendency of litigation and expressly subject to its outcome, do not create a “completed act” or any vested right. The promotees were aware that their promotions were precarious and liable to be reversed depending on the final decision. Therefore, they cannot claim that their promotions are protected despite the 2016 Rules or that the 2016 Rules should not apply to them.

C. The word “substituted” in the 2016 amendment means that the old 2010 Rules ceased to exist, and the new 2016 Rules apply to all future promotions, including those under consideration (Paras 28-30).

The Court quoted from Gottumukkala Venkata Krishamraju and Zile Singh to explain the effect of a substitution amendment. The process of substitution consists of two steps: first, the old rule is made to cease to exist; second, the new rule is brought into existence in its place. The earlier rule is deleted as if it never existed for future operations. The Court held that the 2016 Rules, having been substituted for the 2010 Rules, became the sole governing framework for promotions to ASI-Executive from the date of their notification (21.03.2016). Since the consideration for promotion (the DPC or selection process) was still pending or was being re-evaluated in light of the litigation, the 2016 Rules applied. The contention that the 2014 selection process was a “past and closed transaction” was rejected because the promotions were ad hoc and subject to litigation.

D. The Tribunal was correct in disposing of O.A. No. 351/2014 as infructuous (Paras 29-30).

The Court noted that the appellants’ prayer in O.A. No. 351/2014 was substantially accepted by the Administration when it issued the 2016 Rules (which restored 100% seniority-cum-fitness and removed the matriculation requirement). Therefore, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the original application no longer survived for consideration. The High Court erred in interfering with that finding.

6. New Legal Principles Established / Reiterated

• Overruling of Y.V. Rangaiah reaffirmed: The three-Judge Bench decision in Raj Kumar is the binding law. There is no vested right to be considered under the rules prevailing at the time vacancies arose. The right to be considered for promotion is governed exclusively by the statutory rules in force on the date the consideration for promotion takes place.

• Government’s prerogative to not fill vacancies: The State can take a policy decision not to fill vacancies that arose under old rules, especially when restructuring or amending rules. No employee can compel the State to fill those vacancies under the old rules.

• Effect of “substitution” in service rules: When recruitment rules are amended by substitution, the old rules cease to exist, and the new rules alone govern all future promotions. There is no savings clause or continuing operation of the old rules unless expressly provided.

• Ad hoc promotions subject to litigation create no rights: Promotions made on an ad hoc basis, with explicit conditions that they are subject to the outcome of pending litigation, confer no vested right, no claim to seniority, and no protection against reversion. Such promotions are not “completed acts” and can be undone based on the final judgment.

7. Court’s Examination and Analysis of Concepts

• Analysis of the conflict between Y.V. Rangaiah and Raj Kumar (Paras 23-26): The Court traced the history of the two lines of authority. It noted that for decades, Y.V. Rangaiah had been followed for the proposition that vacancies must be filled under the rules existing when they arose. However, a series of decisions carved out exceptions, and finally, a three-Judge Bench in Raj Kumar expressly overruled the statement in Rangaiah. The Court held that the High Court’s reliance on Marripati Nagaraja (which followed Rangaiah) was therefore misplaced. The Court quoted extensively from Raj Kumar to demonstrate that the correct test is the “consideration date test” – the date when the DPC meets or the selection process is initiated – not the vacancy accrual date.

• Analysis of the ad hoc promotion order (Paras 27-29): The Court scrutinised the language of the promotion order. It highlighted the phrases “purely ad-hoc,” “can be reverted at any time,” “no claim or right to seniority,” and “subject to the outcome of OA No. 351/2014.” The Court held that these conditions were clear and unambiguous. The respondent promotees accepted the promotions with full knowledge of these conditions. Therefore, they cannot now turn around and claim that their promotions have become final or that they have acquired a vested right to be considered under the old rules. The pendency of O.A. No. 351/2014 meant that the entire selection process was provisional.

• Analysis of “substitution” (Paras 28-30): The Court applied the well-settled principle of statutory interpretation that “substitution” deletes the old provision and inserts a new one. The old rule is not kept alive for any purpose unless the amending Act expressly provides a saving clause. Since the 2016 Rules were a substitution amendment, the 2010 Rules ceased to exist from 21.03.2016. Consequently, any promotion consideration after that date could only be under the 2016 Rules. The High Court’s direction to apply the 2010 Rules was, in effect, directing the Administration to act under repealed rules, which is impermissible.

• Conclusion on the appeal (Paras 31-32): The Court held that the impugned judgment of the High Court was unsustainable. The Civil Appeal was allowed. The Court directed that existing vacancies of ASI-Executive be filled under the 2016 Rules within two months.

8. Critical Analysis

Strengths: The judgment provides a clear and authoritative application of the Raj Kumar principle, which overruled the long-standing Y.V. Rangaiah rule. By doing so, it brings certainty to service law: the applicable rules for promotion are those in force on the date of consideration, not the date of vacancy. This prevents the administrative chaos that would arise if old rules continued to apply to old vacancies years after they have been repealed. The judgment also correctly respects the principle that ad hoc promotions made subject to litigation do not create vested rights. The analysis of the “substitution” amendment is sound and follows established statutory interpretation.

Potential concerns: The judgment does not explicitly discuss the fate of the ad hoc promotees who were reverted and then later participated in the 2017 selection process under the 2016 Rules. It notes that some succeeded and some did not, and that this is another complication. The Court leaves that issue unresolved, stating that those promotions “are not the subject matter of this O.A.” This may lead to further litigation by those who were not selected. Additionally, the Court does not address the argument that the 2016 Rules might be challenged by those who had acquired qualifications under the 2010 Rules. However, since the 2016 Rules were never challenged, the Court correctly proceeded on the basis that they are valid and in force.

Practical impact: This judgment will be cited in all service disputes where the question arises whether old vacancies should be filled under old rules or new rules. It makes clear that the Rangaiah principle is no longer good law. High Courts must now apply the “consideration date test” as laid down in Raj Kumar and reaffirmed in this judgment. It also provides a strong precedent for the proposition that ad hoc promotions made pending litigation do not give the promotees any vested rights. Government departments can now confidently fill vacancies under newly amended rules without having to worry about “old vacancies” that arose years ago.

9. Final Outcome

• Civil Appeal No. 9041 of 2019: Allowed.

• The impugned Judgment dated 10.08.2016 of the High Court at Calcutta, Circuit Bench at Port Blair in WPCT No. 127 of 2016 was set aside.

• The Tribunal’s order dated 19.04.2016 disposing of O.A. No. 351/2014 as infructuous was restored in principle.

• The Court held that the 2016 Recruitment Rules (which restored 100% promotion on seniority-cum-fitness basis and removed the matriculation requirement) are the sole governing rules for promotion to the post of ASI-Executive.

• The existing vacancies of ASI-Executive were directed to be filled under the 2016 Rules within two months from the date of the judgment (i.e., by 27.07.2026).

• The ad hoc promotions made on 13.11.2014 conferred no vested rights and were subject to the outcome of the litigation.

• Pending application(s), if any, were disposed of.

• No order as to costs.

10. Practical Application

For employees (like the appellants) who are aggrieved by the application of old rules to old vacancies: File a writ petition or approach the CAT arguing that the correct rule is the one in force on the date of consideration for promotion, not the date of vacancy. Cite Raj Kumar (2019) and this judgment. Argue that the Rangaiah principle has been overruled. If the recruitment rules have been amended by substitution, argue that the old rules have ceased to exist and cannot be applied to any pending selection process.

• For employees (like the respondent promotees) who were promoted under old rules: To protect your promotion, argue that the selection process was completed before the new rules came into force. Show that the DPC met, the list was published, and promotions were given effect to before the amendment. Rely on the “consideration date test” – if the consideration took place under the old rules, and the new rules came into force afterwards, you may argue that the old rules apply. However, if your promotion was ad hoc or subject to litigation, your position is weak. The better argument is that the selection process was a “completed act” and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act protects it. But note that this judgment holds that ad hoc promotions subject to litigation are not “completed acts.”

• For government departments/employers: When amending recruitment rules by substitution, ensure that the notification clearly states the effective date. If you wish to protect ongoing selection processes, include a saving clause in the amendment. If not, the new rules will apply to all promotions from the effective date, even for vacancies that arose earlier. Also, when making ad hoc promotions pending litigation, always include an explicit condition that the promotion is subject to the outcome of the case. This judgment confirms that such conditions are effective and prevent the promotees from acquiring vested rights.

• For courts/tribunals: Apply the “consideration date test” as laid down in Raj Kumar. Determine the date on which the DPC met or the selection process was initiated. If the recruitment rules were amended before that date, the new rules apply. If the amendment came into force after the DPC met and finalised the select list, the old rules may apply. However, if the selection process was subject to a stay or pending litigation, and the final consideration (after the stay was lifted) takes place after the amendment, the new rules apply.

11.  Court Lines

• “The statement in Y.V. Rangaiah that, ‘the vacancies which occurred prior to the amended Rules would be governed by the old Rules and not by the amended Rules’, does not reflect the correct proposition of law governing services under the Union and the States under Part XIV of the Constitution. It is hereby overruled.” (Para 24, quoting Raj Kumar)

• “There is no rule of universal application that vacancies must be necessarily filled on the basis of the law which existed on the date when they arose. Rangaiah case must be understood in the context of the rules involved therein.” (Para 24)

• “The reading of the ad hoc Order of promotion as ASI-Executive does not permit the conclusion that the promotions in favour of Respondent Nos. 1 to 28 either became final or create a vested right in them. Hence, it cannot be treated as a ‘completed act’.” (Para 29)

• “Substitution of a provision results in repeal of the earlier provision and its replacement by the new provision… the substitution would have the effect of amending the operation of law during the period in which it was in force.” (Para 29, quoting Zile Singh)

• “The word ‘substituted’, even if given its logical and consistent effect, means that the consideration for promotion took place only under the 2016 Rules. The consideration initiated in 2014 is the subject matter of litigation, and further steps would be in accordance with the outcome in O.A. No. 351/2014.” (Para 30)

12. Legal Strategy Insight

• For the appellants (non-matriculate Head Constables seeking 100% seniority promotion): Your strongest argument is that the 2016 Rules have been substituted and are now the only governing rules. The Rangaiah principle is dead. The High Court’s order was based on an overruled precedent. The ad hoc promotions of the respondents were expressly subject to the outcome of the litigation. Therefore, you should demand that all vacancies (including those that arose between 2008 and 2016) be filled under the 2016 Rules. However, be prepared for the counter-argument that some vacancies were filled permanently (not ad hoc) before 2016 – you may need to distinguish those. In this case, since the Court found all promotions were ad hoc, your path is clear.

• For the respondents (ad hoc promotees who were reverted): Your best defence after this judgment is to argue that you have already been considered and selected under the 2014 process, and that the 2016 Rules should not be given retrospective effect to undo a completed selection. However, this judgment explicitly holds that your promotion was ad hoc and subject to litigation. Therefore, your argument is likely to fail. A better strategy is to participate in the fresh selection under the 2016 Rules. Since you have already passed the merit test earlier, you may have an advantage in seniority. Also, consider arguing that the 2016 Rules themselves are arbitrary or violate Article 14 – but that challenge was not raised in this case.

• For the Administration: Comply with the judgment immediately. Issue a fresh circular under the 2016 Rules for all pending vacancies. Give due weight to seniority as per the 2016 Rules (100% seniority-cum-fitness). For the ad hoc promotees who were reverted, treat them as having no preferential right, but allow them to participate in the fresh process. To avoid further litigation, consider conducting a one-time special drive to fill all accumulated vacancies expeditiously.

• For a lawyer drafting a service rule amendment: If you want to protect pending selection processes, do not use the word “substituted” without a saving clause. Use language such as “Notwithstanding the substitution, any selection process initiated prior to the date of notification shall be completed under the old rules.” Alternatively, use an amendment by “insertion” or “modification” rather than “substitution” if you wish to keep the old rules alive for past vacancies. If you use “substitution,” be aware that the old rules cease to exist entirely for future purposes, and courts will apply the new rules to all promotions after the effective date.