K Rajaiahv.High Court for the State of Telangana

Synopsis

This judgment arises from a disciplinary action initiated against a court attender, K. Rajaiah, who was dismissed from service on charges of unauthorised absence and submission of a fabricated medical certificate. The Supreme Court, while reiterating the limited scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters, held that the finding of forgery was based on no evidence and was perverse. The Court emphasised that in cases involving grave charges such as fabrication of documents, inquiry officers must adopt a higher degree of caution, including, where necessary, referring disputed documents to a handwriting expert. The judgment restores the employee to service with full consequential benefits and underscores that mandatory penalty rules cannot supplant the requirement of legally sustainable findings.

1. Basic Information of the Judgment

Case Title K. Rajaiah v. The High Court for the State of Telangana Citation2026 INSC 142 

Jurisdiction Civil Appellate Jurisdiction, Supreme Court of India 

Coram Justice K.V. Viswanathan and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi 

Bench Strength Division Bench 

Civil Appeal No.1560 of 2026 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 11965 of 2024)

Date of Judgment February 10, 2026 

Impugned Order Judgment dated 12.02.2024 of the Division Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in WP No. 40486 of 2022

2. Legal Framework and Precedents

A. Statutes and Rules

1. Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (APCS (CC&A) Rules)
   Rule 20: Procedure for imposition of penalties.
   Rule 20(5)(d): Entitlement of a government servant to take the assistance of another government servant in the inquiry.
   Proviso to Rule 9(x): Mandates dismissal from service in all proved cases of forgery, misappropriation, bribery, corruption, moral turpitude, bigamy, and outraging the modesty of women.

2. Constitution of India, 1950
   Article 226: Writ jurisdiction of High Courts.
   Article 136: Special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

B. Precedents Relied Upon

CasePrincipleV.M. Saudagar (Dead) through Legal Heirs v. Divisional Commercial Manager, Central Railway & Anr. (Date not specified in judgment)In a charge of forgery, mere denial by the alleged issuer of the document is insufficient; the department must adduce positive evidence, and if the document is disputed, reference to a handwriting expert is a prudent and often necessary step.Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1986)Where the charge involves forgery and the handwriting expert’s evidence is crucial but unavailable, the department cannot rely on an incomplete investigation; fairness in departmental enquiries, especially when the penalty is loss of livelihood, requires that investigations be consistent with the gravity of the charge.Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. (2024)Findings of a disciplinary authority can be interfered with in judicial review if they are perverse — i.e., not supported by any evidence on record or such that no reasonable person would have arrived at them.Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (1999)Reiterates that although a writ court does not sit in appeal over findings of fact, it can intervene when the findings are perverse or based on no evidence.

C. Doctrinal Concepts Applied

• Perversity: A finding unsupported by any evidence, or one that ignores relevant evidence, or draws conclusions that are impossible on the materials.

• Fair Play in Action: In disciplinary proceedings leading to loss of livelihood, the employer must act fairly and the inquiry must be thorough and consistent with the requirements of the situation.

• Burden of Proof: In disciplinary inquiries, the employer bears the burden of proving the charges; the standard is preponderance of probabilities, but the evidence must be rationally probative.

• Mandatory Penalty vs. Proof of Charge: A rule prescribing mandatory dismissal for certain misconduct does not dispense with the requirement of first proving that the misconduct has occurred.

3. Basic Relevant Facts

Chronology of Events

• 09.11.1998: Appellant K. Rajaiah appointed as Attender in the Court of Additional Senior Civil Judge, Karimnagar.

• 03.08.2017 – 07.08.2017: Appellant absent from duty. He claimed he was suffering from high fever, vomiting, and motion, and telephonically informed the Office Superintendent.

• 05.08.2017: Additional Senior Civil Judge wrote to the Principal District & Sessions Judge reporting unauthorised absence and requesting action.

• 07.08.2017: Principal District Judge directed initiation of proceedings under the CCA Rules.

• 09.08.2017: Explanation called from appellant.

• 22.08.2017: Appellant submitted explanation along with a medical certificate dated 07.08.2017 from Dr. Bommaraveni Swamy Mudiraj, a medical practitioner at Manakondur. He also applied for casual leave for 3–5 August and 7 August 2017. Salary for the absence period was deducted.

• Post‑22.08.2017: Appellant requested the Presiding Officer to drop further proceedings. The Presiding Officer kept the file aside and orally warned the appellant not to repeat such absence.

• October 2017: Appellant allegedly remained absent for 2–3 days. No record of this absence being unauthorised, nor any action taken.

• 26.10.2017: Notice issued to Dr. Bommaraveni, requiring him to confirm issuance of the medical certificate.

• 28.10.2017: Dr. Bommaraveni appeared and gave a statement (Ex. P‑9) that the medical certificate was not issued by him; that he had no nursing home to admit patients; and that the certificate might have been fabricated using his old letterhead. No mention in this statement of the appellant having consulted him.

• 15.12.2017: The Presiding Officer wrote to the Principal District & Sessions Judge, narrating the events and seeking action.

• 03.03.2018: Articles of charge and statement of imputation served on appellant.
  Article I: Unauthorised absence from 03.08.2017 to 07.08.2017, causing inconvenience, delayed explanation.
  Article II: Submission of a fabricated medical certificate (Ex. P‑7) with the explanation.

• Departmental Inquiry:
  Appellant’s request for a lawyer denied (Presenting Officer not a legal practitioner). He was permitted assistance of another government servant, but none volunteered.
  PW‑1 (V. Radha Krishna Sharma, Office Superintendent): Confirmed deduction of salary, that Presiding Officer had initially kept the file aside, and that absence in October triggered the notice to the doctor. He could not recall whether appellant telephonically informed him on 03.08.2017.
  PW‑2 (Dr. Bommaraveni): Admitted that appellant approached him and received tablets, though he did not remember the date. Denied issuing Ex. P‑7. Stated that his signature on Ex. P‑7 was not his. Suggested that someone took away a blank letterhead and fabricated the certificate. Did not produce any patient register.
  PW‑3 and PW‑4: Judicial officers.

• Inquiry Officer’s Report: Both charges held proved.
  On Article I: Appellant failed to disprove absence without intimation.
  On Article II: PW‑2 categorically denied issuing Ex. P‑7; therefore the certificate was not genuine.

• 13.11.2018: Disciplinary Authority imposed penalty of dismissal from service, invoking the proviso to Rule 9(x) (mandatory penalty for forgery).

• 08.01.2021: Appellate Authority (High Court, administrative side) dismissed the appeal.

• Writ Petition No. 40486 of 2022: Dismissed by the High Court on 12.02.2024.

• SLP before Supreme Court: Leave granted; appeal heard.

4. Issues Before the Supreme Court

The Court framed the following question for consideration (para 27):

“Whether the appellant has made out a case for interference with the order passed in the disciplinary proceedings, as upheld by the High Court?”

This overarching issue encompassed the following sub‑issues:

1. Whether the finding of fabrication of the medical certificate (Ex. P‑7) was based on any legally acceptable evidence.

2. Whether the Inquiry Officer, in the face of conflicting evidence (doctor admitting treatment but denying issuance), ought to have referred the disputed document to a handwriting expert.

3. Whether the principles of natural justice and fair play were violated, particularly when the doctor’s preliminary statement (Ex. P‑9) was recorded behind the appellant’s back.

4. Whether the penalty of dismissal was proportionate and sustainable given the mandatory penalty rule.

5. Whether the High Court erred in its exercise of judicial review by affirming a perverse finding.

5. Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the dismissal. The ratio can be distilled into the following propositions:

1. Burden of proof in disciplinary inquiries: When a charge of forgery/fabrication is levelled, the employer must prove, by cogent evidence, that the document in question is not genuine. Mere denial by the alleged issuer, without more, does not automatically establish fabrication — especially when the issuer admits that the recipient consulted him and received treatment.

2. Duty of the Inquiry Officer in cases of disputed handwriting/signatures:
   Where a document is fully handwritten and both signature and handwriting are disputed, and the alleged issuer does not deny that the letterhead and rubber stamp belong to him, the Inquiry Officer cannot simply accept the oral denial.
   Prudence and common sense dictate that, unless the denial is conclusively corroborated by independent material (e.g., contemporaneous registers), the matter should be referred to a handwriting expert.
   Failure to do so, especially when the consequences are as grave as mandatory dismissal, renders the finding of forgery perverse and unsustainable.

3. Judicial review of disciplinary findings: While the writ court does not sit in appeal, it is not powerless to interfere when the finding is based on no evidence or is so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at it. The existence of a mandatory penalty rule does not immunise an unreasoned or evidence‑starved finding from judicial scrutiny.

4. Fair play in departmental proceedings:
   Charges involving loss of livelihood require a higher degree of procedural fairness.
   An inquiry that fails to investigate crucial aspects (here, verification of the disputed signature) falls short of the standard of fair play in action.

5. Inexplicable peculiarities: The Court noted that the matter had been closed by the Presiding Officer after the appellant’s explanation and was reopened only because of a subsequent, un‑explained absence in October 2017. While not a ground to quash the proceedings, this background underscores the need for a deeper scrutiny of the evidence.

6. Legal Framework Established / Clarified

This judgment does not create a new statutory framework but clarifies and reinforces several existing principles, particularly in the context of disciplinary proceedings involving charges of forgery:

1. Reference to handwriting expert – not discretionary but necessary in certain situations:
   Earlier decisions (V.M. Saudagar, Sawai Singh) suggested that in forgery charges, expert evidence is desirable. This judgment goes a step further: it holds that when the disputed document is fully handwritten, the letterhead and stamp are admitted, and the doctor admits treatment but denies issuance, the inquiry officer is duty‑bound to consider referring the matter to a handwriting expert. Failure to do so vitiates the finding of fabrication.

2. Mandatory penalty does not obviate proof:
   The proviso to Rule 9(x) mandates dismissal for proved forgery. The Court clarifies that this rule does not lower the standard of proof. The charge must first be proved; the rule only operates at the penalty stage. A disciplinary authority cannot rely on the mandatory nature of the penalty to shortcut the evidentiary process.

3. Scope of judicial review in the face of “no evidence”:
   The judgment reaffirms that perversity is a ground for interference even in disciplinary matters. It provides a clear example of what constitutes a perverse finding: a conclusion of forgery drawn without comparing signatures, without seeking expert opinion, and despite the witness’s admission of treatment and the absence of any independent corroboration.

4. Relevance of “fair play” in grave charges:
   The Court, quoting Sawai Singh, emphasises that when the consequence is loss of livelihood, the investigation must be consistent with the gravity of the charge. This imposes an affirmative obligation on the inquiry officer to adopt thorough methods of proof.

7. Supreme Court’s Examination and Analysis

The Court’s analysis proceeded in the following stages:

A. Undisputed Facts

• Appellant was absent; he submitted a medical certificate.

• Doctor (PW‑2) admitted that the appellant consulted him and received tablets.

• Doctor did not deny that the letterhead and rubber stamp on Ex. P‑7 were his.

• The certificate was fully handwritten, not a printed form.

B. Discrepancies in the Doctor’s Evidence

• In his preliminary statement (Ex. P‑9), the doctor did not mention that the appellant had consulted him.

• In his deposition before the Inquiry Officer, he admitted the consultation.

• He did not produce any register to show when the appellant visited him.

• He claimed the signature on Ex. P‑7 was not his, yet the signature on Ex. P‑9 (undisputed) and the signature on the acknowledgement of notice were themselves not identical (the Court observed this after perusing the original file).

C. Failure of the Inquiry Officer

• The Inquiry Officer mechanically accepted the doctor’s oral denial without:
  Comparing the disputed signature with the admitted signatures.
  Calling for the doctor’s treatment register.
  Examining whether the handwriting on Ex. P‑7 matched the doctor’s handwriting.
  Referring the matter to a handwriting expert.

D. Perversity of the Finding

• The finding that Ex. P‑7 was “fabricated” rested solely on the doctor’s self‑serving denial, which was contradicted by his admission of treatment.

• In the absence of any independent evidence (e.g., proof that the letterhead was stolen, or that someone else forged the document), the conclusion was not supported by any evidence and hence perverse.

E. The “Inexplicable Peculiarities”

• The Presiding Officer had closed the matter in August 2017 after the appellant’s explanation.

• The reopening in October 2017 was triggered by an unexplained and un‑penalised absence.

• The doctor was summoned through a police constable, and his statement was recorded behind the appellant’s back. Though the Court did not decide the case on this ground, it noted the procedural oddity.

F. Mandatory Penalty Rule – Not an Escape from Proof

• The respondent argued that once forgery is alleged, the proviso to Rule 9(x) leaves no option but dismissal.

• The Court held that the rule only applies after the charge is proved. Since the charge was not proved, the rule had no application.

G. Judicial Review – When Interference is Justified

• Relying on Nirbhay Singh Suliya and Yoginath D. Bagde, the Court held that the High Court erred in affirming the disciplinary orders without recognising the perversity of the finding.

• The judgment emphasises that judicial review is not an appellate review, but it is not toothless either. Where the finding is based on “no evidence”, interference is not only permissible but obligatory.

8. Critical Analysis and Final Outcome

Critical Analysis

Strengths of the Judgment:

1. Evidentiary Rigour: The Court rightly insists that serious charges like forgery cannot be proved on the basis of a bare denial, especially when the alleged forger admits the foundational facts (consultation, use of his letterhead). The judgment places a healthy burden on the disciplinary authority to conduct a fair and thorough investigation.

2. Protection of Livelihood: By setting aside the dismissal and ordering reinstatement with full back‑wages, the Court affirms the constitutional value of livelihood and the principle that procedural fairness must match the gravity of the consequences.

3. Clarity on “No Evidence”: The judgment provides a concrete illustration of what constitutes a perverse finding, thereby guiding lower courts and disciplinary authorities.

4. Handwriting Expert – Not an Optional Extra: The ruling that in cases of disputed handwriting on a material document, reference to an expert is a matter of prudence — indeed, almost a necessity — will prevent mechanical acceptance of oral denials.

Potential Concerns:

1. Fact‑Specificity: The decision is heavily fact‑dependent (admission of treatment, identical letterhead and stamp, failure to compare signatures). It may not be invoked as a universal rule that every forgery charge requires expert evidence. The Court itself uses phrases like “prudence would dictate” and “common sense would command”, leaving some discretion to the inquiry officer.

2. Delay and Multiplicity: The appellant’s dismissal occurred in 2018; the Supreme Court’s judgment is in 2026. The employee has been out of service for nearly eight years. While the Court grants full consequential benefits, the systemic delay in justice is a concern that the judgment does not address.

3. Limited Precedent on the Mandatory Penalty Rule: The Court did not examine whether the proviso to Rule 9(x) could be read down or held directory in appropriate cases. The judgment simply states that the rule does not apply because the charge was not proved. In future cases where forgery is proved but the penalty of dismissal is challenged as disproportionate, the question may arise again.

Overall Assessment:
The judgment is a well‑reasoned, fact‑sensitive intervention that corrects a manifest injustice. It balances the employer’s need for discipline with the employee’s right to a fair inquiry. It reinforces the well‑settled but often‑ignored principle that findings without evidence cannot stand regardless of the gravity of the misconduct alleged or the mandatory nature of the prescribed punishment.

Final Outcome

1. The Civil Appeal is allowed.

2. The impugned judgment of the High Court dated 12.02.2024 in WP No. 40486 of 2022 is set aside.

3. The order of dismissal dated 13.11.2018 and the appellate order dated 08.01.2021 are quashed.

4. The appellant shall be reinstated in service forthwith with all consequential benefits, including full arrears of salary and emoluments for the entire period of non‑employment, on the ground that the non‑employment was not attributable to his fault.

5. Compliance must be effected within three weeks from the date of the judgment.

6. No order as to costs.

(MCQs)

1. Under the proviso to Rule 9(x) of the APCS (CC&A) Rules, 1991, which of the following misconducts mandates the penalty of dismissal from service upon proof?
a) Unauthorised absence for five days.
b) Gross negligence.
c) Forgery.
d) Insubordination.

2. In the present judgment, the Supreme Court held that the finding of forgery was perverse primarily because?
a) The Inquiry Officer denied the appellant the assistance of a lawyer.
b) The appellant was absent only for a short period and had informed the office.
c) The doctor admitted that the appellant had consulted him and received treatment, and the Inquiry Officer failed to refer the disputed document to a handwriting expert.
d) The High Court had dismissed the writ petition without giving reasons.

3. Which of the following precedents was relied upon by the Supreme Court for the proposition that in a charge of forgery, the department must adduce positive evidence and, if the document is disputed, reference to a handwriting expert is prudent?
a) State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao.
b) V.M. Saudagar v. Divisional Commercial Manager.
c) Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal.
d) State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh.

4. According to the Supreme Court, what is the scope of judicial review of a disciplinary inquiry finding?
a) The Court can re‑appreciate the evidence as if it were an appellate court.
b) The Court can interfere only if there is a procedural irregularity.
c) The Court can interfere if the finding is perverse, i.e., based on no evidence or such that no reasonable person would arrive at it.
d) The Court cannot interfere even if the finding is based on no evidence.