Kulsum Nishav.State of UP & Ors

Legal Analysis: Kulsum Nisha V. State of U.P. & Ors

Citation: 2026 INSC 617

Court: Supreme Court of India (Civil Appellate Jurisdiction)

Bench: A Division Bench comprising Justice Alok Aradhe & Justice Jamidighantam Sri Narasimha

Date of Decision: June 02, 2026

Nature of Judgment: Civil Appeal No. 7667 of 2025 arising out of the order dated 05.03.2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench.

Synopsis of the Judgment

The appellant, a married daughter of a deceased fair price shop dealer, sought allotment of the shop on compassionate grounds under the dependent quota. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate rejected her application solely on the ground that she was a married daughter and thus excluded from the definition of "family" under Paragraph IV(10) of Government Order No. 6 of 2019, which defined family to include only "unmarried, legally separated, and widowed daughters." The Allahabad High Court dismissed her writ petition, bound by its Division Bench decisions in Smt. Kusumlata and Saida Begum, but granted a certificate under Article 134-A of the Constitution, holding that the matter involved a substantial question of law of general importance. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the exclusion of married daughters from the definition of "family" fails the test of reasonable classification under Article 14 and violates Article 15(1) as it is founded on gender-based stereotypes. The Court, applying purposive construction, read the expression "daughters" in Clause 2(p) of the Uttar Pradesh Essential Commodities (Regulation of Sale and Distribution Control) Order, 2016 to include married daughters who establish dependency on the deceased dealer, are local residents, and satisfy all other eligibility conditions.

1. Basic Information of the Judgment

Case Title: Kulsum Nisha v. State of U.P. & Ors.

Citation: 2026 INSC 617

Civil Appeal No.: 7667 of 2025

Bench: Division Bench (Justice Alok Aradhe & Justice Jamidighantam Sri Narasimha)

Date of Decision: June 02, 2026

Court: Supreme Court of India (Civil Appellate Jurisdiction)

Impugned Order: Judgment and order dated 05.03.2025 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant.

2. Legal Framework

Major Laws and Provisions Involved

• Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 14 (equality before law), Article 15(1) (prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex), Article 19(1)(g) (right to practice any profession), Article 21 (right to life with dignity), Article 39(a) and (c) (Directive Principles – equal right to means of livelihood and prevention of concentration of wealth).

• Essential Commodities Act, 1955 – Section 3 (power to control production, supply, distribution, etc., of essential commodities).

• Uttar Pradesh Essential Commodities (Regulation of Sale and Distribution Control) Order, 2016 (2016 Order) – Clause 2(p) (definition of "family"), Clause 7 (appointment and regulation of fair price shop), Clause 7(2) (empowerment of State Government to prescribe eligibility conditions).

• Government Order No. 6 of 2019 (G.O.) – Paragraph IV (essential qualifications and conditions for selection in rural areas), Sub-Paragraph 10 (definition of "family" excluding married daughter), Paragraph V (procedure for allotment under dependent quota after death of dealer).

Key Precedents Cited and Applied

• State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) SCR 284 (Seven Judge Bench) – Laid down the two-fold test for reasonable classification under Article 14: intelligible differentia and rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved.

• E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3 – Established that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness; state action that is arbitrary, irrational, or founded on impermissible stereotypes is vulnerable under Article 14.

• Air India v. Nergesh Meerza (1981) 4 SCC 335 – Held that discriminatory service conditions based on gender and marital status violate constitutional guarantees.

• Vimla Srivastava v. State of U.P. (Allahabad High Court) – Recognised that marital status cannot constitute a valid ground for denying welfare benefits to an otherwise eligible daughter.

• Saida Begum v. State of U.P. (Allahabad High Court) – Contrary view (overruled) holding that married daughter excluded from family definition.

• Smt. Kusumlata v. State of U.P. (Allahabad High Court) – Contrary view (overruled) holding that married daughter not entitled to compassionate appointment.

• Bombay High Court, Karnataka High Court, Calcutta High Court decisions – Recognised the principle that marital status alone cannot disqualify a daughter from welfare schemes.

3. Relevant Facts

A fair price shop located at village panchayat Ariyawan, Development Block and Tehsil Tiloi, District Amethi, was allotted to Smt. Badrun Nisha, the mother of the appellant, on 27.10.2012.

The Uttar Pradesh Government, in exercise of powers under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, notified the Uttar Pradesh Essential Commodities (Regulation of Sale and Distribution Control) Order, 2016 on 10.08.2016. Clause 7(2)(i) of the 2016 Order refers to a "person appointed" to run a fair price shop and does not prescribe any eligibility criteria based on marital status. The power to identify dependents is delegated to the State Government.

The State of Uttar Pradesh issued Government Order No. 6 of 2019 on 05.08.2019 governing the identification, reservation, and appointment of fair price shops in rural areas. Paragraph V describes the procedure for appointment under the dependent quota after the death of the dealer. Paragraph IV prescribes essential qualifications and conditions for selection. Sub-Paragraph 10 of Paragraph IV defines the expression "family" which excludes "married daughter."

On 04.03.2024, the mother of the appellant passed away, leaving the appellant as the sole earning member of the household responsible for her four sisters, one of whom is visually impaired. The appellant, even after her marriage, continued to reside with her mother and sisters.

The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Tiloi, by an order dated 05.03.2024 ordered attachment of the fair price shop on the demise of the dealer. On 19.03.2024, the appellant filed an application before the SDM seeking allotment of the shop in her capacity as a dependent. The SDM, by an order dated 16.07.2024, rejected the application solely on the ground that the appellant is a married daughter and is not covered within the definition of "family" as provided in the G.O.

The Deputy Commissioner, by an order dated 07.01.2025, affirmed the order of the SDM and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant challenged the aforesaid orders before the Allahabad High Court. The High Court, by an order dated 05.03.2025, held that it was bound by the Division Bench decisions in Smt. Kusumlata and Saida Begum and dismissed the writ petition. However, the learned Single Judge noted the contrary view taken by the Bombay High Court and observed that the question raised was of seminal importance, as it concerns the rights of married daughters who are adversely affected solely on the ground of marriage. The High Court granted a certificate under Article 134-A of the Constitution, holding that the matter involves a substantial question of law of general importance.

Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.

4. Issues

Issue No. 1: Whether the exclusion of a married daughter from the definition of "family" under Clause 2(p) of the 2016 Order and Paragraph IV(10) of the G.O. is constitutionally sustainable under Articles 14, 15(1), 19(1)(g), and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Issue No. 2: Whether the words "unmarried, legally separated and widowed daughters" in Clause 2(p) of the 2016 Order can be purposively construed to include married daughters who are dependent on the deceased dealer and satisfy other eligibility conditions.

Issue No. 3: Whether the classification between unmarried daughters, judicially separated daughters, widowed daughters, and married daughters satisfies the test of reasonable classification under Article 14.

Issue No. 4: Whether the High Court was correct in dismissing the writ petition following its Division Bench decisions, despite noting the contrary view of other High Courts and the substantial question of law involved.

5. Ratio Decidendi

A. The exclusion of married daughter from the definition of "family" violates Article 14 and Article 15(1) of the Constitution (Paras 14-23).

The Court applied the two-fold test for reasonable classification under Article 14 as laid down in Anwar Ali Sarkar: (i) the classification must be founded upon an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things grouped together from those left out; (ii) the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute. The Court also relied on E.P. Royappa for the proposition that state action which is arbitrary, irrational, capricious, or founded on impermissible stereotypes is equally vulnerable under Article 14.

The object of allotment under the dependent quota is to provide immediate succour to the family of a deceased dealer facing financial hardship and to ensure continuity in the functioning of the public distribution system. The relevant considerations are dependency, financial need, residence, and the ability of the applicant to discharge the obligations attached to the dealership. Marital status bears no rational nexus to any of these considerations.

The impugned provision proceeds on the assumption that upon marriage a daughter ceases to be a member of, or dependent upon, her parental family. Such an assumption is constitutionally impermissible. Marriage neither extinguishes the bond between a daughter and her parental family nor furnishes a valid basis to presume absence of dependency. Contemporary social realities demonstrate that many married daughters continue to reside with, support, or remain dependent upon their parents.

The scheme does not exclude a married son from consideration. A son continues to remain within the fold of the family irrespective of his marital status, whereas a daughter is excluded solely because she is married. The distinction is founded upon a gender-based stereotype that a daughter, upon marriage, becomes a member of another family and loses all ties with her natal family. Such a presumption is incompatible with the constitutional guarantee of equality and perpetuates historical notions of gender inequality which the Constitution seeks to eradicate.

The State's submission that a married daughter may not satisfy the requirement of local residence is equally untenable. Residence constitutes an independent eligibility criterion under Paragraph IV(5) of the G.O. Whether an applicant satisfies that requirement must be determined on the facts of each case. A blanket exclusion of all married daughters cannot be justified on the speculative assumption that every married daughter necessarily resides elsewhere.

Therefore, the exclusion of married daughters from the definition of "family" fails the test of reasonable classification and is manifestly arbitrary, violating Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution.

B. Purposive construction of Clause 2(p) of the 2016 Order includes married daughters who establish dependency (Paras 24-27).

The Court held that the literal meaning of the words "unmarried, legally separated and widowed daughters" in Clause 2(p) of the 2016 Order produces a result incompatible with constitutional guarantees of equality. Therefore, a purposive interpretation is required.

The Court provided the following reasons for reading the expression "daughters" to include married daughters:

(i) The words "unmarried, legally separated and widowed daughters" illustrate specific categories of daughters expressly included, but there is no express language of exclusion. The enumeration is illustrative, not exhaustive.

(ii) The 2016 Order in Clause 2(p) itself defines one category of family members as "Adult children who are fully dependent on the head of the family," without any qualification of marital status or gender.

(iii) The object of the dependent quota is unambiguously welfare-oriented – to provide immediate financial relief to dependent family members of the deceased dealer and to ensure continuity of the public distribution system. Dependency, not marital status, is the governing criterion.

(iv) The descriptive categories – unmarried, legally separated, or widowed – share a common characteristic: they remain or have returned to their natal family. A married daughter who has not departed from the natal household and is dependent upon it shares the same functional characteristic.

(v) The submission that a married daughter necessarily fails to satisfy the local residence requirement needs a factual inquiry in every case. A blanket exclusion on such a speculative presumption is unjustified.

(vi) To read the words literally would produce a result inconsistent with Articles 14 and 15(1) as it would amount to exclusion of a married daughter on a gender-based stereotype, which is constitutionally impermissible.

(vii) The exclusion of a married daughter who is dependent upon the deceased dealer, resides with the family, and is capable of running the fair price shop would directly frustrate the purpose of the provision.

C. The contrary view in Saida Begum and Smt. Kusumlata is overruled (Para 27).

The Court expressed agreement with the view taken in Vimla Srivastava by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court and the decisions of the Bombay, Karnataka, and Calcutta High Courts, which recognised that marital status cannot constitute a valid ground for denying the benefit of a welfare measure to an otherwise eligible daughter. To the extent the contrary view expressed in Saida Begum and Smt. Kusumlata held that married daughters are excluded, those decisions do not lay down the correct law and stand overruled.

D. The appellant is entitled to allotment (Paras 28-31).

The material on record establishes that the appellant continued to reside in the same village even after her marriage and actively assisted her mother in the operation of the fair price shop. Upon her mother's demise, the appellant assumed responsibility for maintaining her sisters, including a visually impaired sister. Therefore, the orders of the High Court, Deputy Commissioner, and SDM were quashed and set aside, and the competent authority was directed to issue the necessary allotment order in favour of the appellant within four weeks.

6. New Legal Principles Established / Reiterated

First, the judgment reiterates that the test of reasonable classification under Article 14 is not merely about intelligible differentia and rational nexus; state action founded on impermissible stereotypes, even if facially neutral, is equally vulnerable to challenge. Marriage does not create a constitutional presumption of non-dependency.

Second, the Court establishes that a daughter’s marital status is constitutionally irrelevant to her eligibility for welfare schemes that are based on dependency and financial need. Any provision that excludes married daughters solely on the ground of marriage is presumptively violative of Articles 14 and 15(1).

Third, the judgment lays down that in welfare schemes, the enumeration of categories (such as "unmarried, legally separated and widowed daughters") is illustrative and not exhaustive where the object of the scheme is to benefit dependents. Courts must adopt a purposive construction to avoid constitutional infirmity.

Fourth, the Court reiterates that residence is an independent factual criterion and cannot be used as a proxy to exclude an entire class of persons based on marital status. A blanket exclusion based on a speculative presumption that all married daughters reside elsewhere is constitutionally untenable.

Fifth, the judgment clarifies that compassionate appointment under welfare schemes is not a matter of inheritance or succession but a measure to provide immediate financial relief to dependent family members. Therefore, the governing criterion must be dependency, not lineage, gender, or marital status.

7. Court’s Examination and Analysis of Concepts

The Court first examined the factual background of the case, noting that the appellant was the sole earning member of her household after her mother’s death, caring for four sisters including one who is visually impaired. She had continued to reside in the same village even after marriage and had actively assisted her mother in running the fair price shop.

Thereafter, the Court analysed the constitutional framework, emphasising that Articles 14, 15(1), and 21 must be interpreted in light of the Directive Principles of State Policy, particularly Article 39(a) which mandates that men and women equally have the right to an adequate means of livelihood, and Article 39(c) which directs that the economic system should not result in concentration of wealth.

The Court then examined the provisions of the 2016 Order and the G.O. It noted that Clause 7(2)(i) of the 2016 Order does not prescribe any eligibility criteria based on marital status, and the power to identify dependents is delegated to the State Government. The G.O. defines "family" in Paragraph IV(10) by reference to Clause 2(p) of the 2016 Order, which includes only "unmarried, legally separated and widowed daughters."

The Court applied the two-fold test for reasonable classification. It observed that the object of the dependent quota is to provide immediate financial relief to the family of a deceased dealer and to ensure continuity in the functioning of the public distribution system. The classification excluding married daughters is founded on the assumption that marriage severs the daughter’s connection with her parental family. This assumption lacks an intelligible differentia because a married daughter who continues to reside with and support her parental family is identically situated to an unmarried, legally separated, or widowed daughter. The differentia (marital status) bears no rational nexus to the object of the scheme, which is dependency and financial need.

The Court further analysed the gender dimension, noting that the scheme does not exclude a married son. This distinction is founded on a gender-based stereotype – that a daughter upon marriage becomes a member of another family and loses all ties with her natal family. The Court held that such a presumption perpetuates historical notions of gender inequality and is incompatible with the constitutional guarantee of equality.

Addressing the State’s argument regarding local residence, the Court held that residence is an independent eligibility criterion under Paragraph IV(5) of the G.O. Whether an applicant satisfies that requirement must be determined on the facts of each case. A blanket exclusion of all married daughters cannot be justified on the speculative assumption that every married daughter necessarily resides elsewhere.

Finally, the Court applied purposive construction to Clause 2(p) of the 2016 Order. It reasoned that the literal meaning produces a result incompatible with constitutional guarantees. The enumeration of categories is illustrative, not exhaustive. The object of the provision is welfare-oriented, and dependency is the governing criterion. Therefore, the expression "daughters" includes married daughters who establish dependency, local residence, and satisfy all other eligibility conditions.

8. Critical Analysis

Strengths: The judgment is a significant step forward in advancing gender equality in the context of welfare schemes. By striking down the exclusion of married daughters solely on the ground of marriage, the Court has dismantled a patriarchal assumption deeply embedded in administrative law. The judgment correctly recognises that marriage does not extinguish a daughter’s bond with her parental family and that dependency is a question of fact, not a legal presumption based on marital status.

The Court’s purposive construction of Clause 2(p) is particularly commendable. Instead of striking down the provision entirely, the Court read it harmoniously with constitutional guarantees, thereby preserving the legislative scheme while removing its discriminatory effect. This approach respects the separation of powers while fulfilling the Court’s constitutional role as the guardian of fundamental rights.

The judgment also provides clear guidance for other High Courts that had taken divergent views on the issue. By overruling the contrary decisions of the Allahabad High Court in Saida Begum and Smt. Kusumlata and expressing agreement with the Bombay, Karnataka, and Calcutta High Courts, the Court has ensured uniformity in the application of fundamental rights across the country.

Potential Concerns: The judgment leaves open the question of what constitutes sufficient "dependency" for a married daughter to qualify. While the Court states that dependency is a factual inquiry, it does not provide specific guidelines or evidentiary standards. This may lead to inconsistent application by subordinate authorities. Future litigation may be required to clarify the burden and standard of proof for establishing dependency.

Another concern is that the judgment does not explicitly address the possibility of a married daughter who resides in a different village but is still financially dependent on her parental family. The Court emphasises the local residence requirement as an independent criterion. However, in many cases, a married daughter may reside elsewhere but still be the primary caregiver or financial supporter of her ageing parents. The judgment’s reliance on local residence as a factor may inadvertently exclude such genuinely dependent married daughters. The Court could have clarified that local residence is not a proxy for dependency and that exceptional circumstances may warrant relaxation of the residence requirement.

Additionally, while the Court overrules the contrary Division Bench decisions of the Allahabad High Court, it does not expressly overrule any other High Court decisions that may have taken a similar exclusionary approach. This may lead to continued confusion in other jurisdictions until those decisions are specifically challenged.

Practical impact: This judgment will be cited in all cases where welfare schemes, compassionate appointment policies, or family definitions exclude married daughters on the ground of marriage. It will be particularly influential in cases involving public distribution system dealerships, government employment on compassionate grounds, and other welfare benefits where family definitions are determinative. The judgment also has implications for inheritance and succession laws, although those are governed by separate statutory regimes.

The judgment reinforces the constitutional principle that stereotypes cannot form the basis of classification. It will serve as a powerful tool for challenging gender-based discrimination in a wide range of contexts beyond fair price shop dealerships.

9. Final Outcome

The Civil Appeal was allowed.

The orders dated 05.03.2025 (High Court), 07.01.2025 (Deputy Commissioner), and 16.07.2024 (SDM) were quashed and set aside.

The competent authority (SDM, Tiloi) was directed to issue the necessary allotment order in favour of the appellant within a period of four weeks.

The expression "daughters" in Clause 2(p) of the Uttar Pradesh Essential Commodities (Regulation of Sale and Distribution Control) Order, 2016 was held to include a married daughter who furnishes a dependency certificate along with No Objection Certificates from other adult family members of the deceased dealer, is a local resident, and satisfies all other eligibility conditions prescribed in the G.O.

The contrary view expressed in Saida Begum v. State of U.P. and Smt. Kusumlata v. State of U.P. was overruled.

No order as to costs.

The Court placed on record its appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by the learned Amicus Curiae, Ms. Rukhmini Bobde.

10. Practical Application

First, a married daughter seeking appointment on compassionate grounds under a welfare scheme that defines "family" to exclude married daughters should not be deterred by the literal language of the provision. Following this judgment, she can assert her right to be considered based on proof of dependency, residence, and other eligibility criteria. The exclusion solely on the ground of marriage is constitutionally invalid.

Second, State governments and public authorities must revisit all family definitions in welfare schemes, compassionate appointment policies, and public distribution system regulations that exclude married daughters. Such exclusions must be removed or read to include married daughters subject to proof of dependency. Failure to do so may result in legal challenges and liability for costs.

Third, while drafting new schemes or amending existing ones, authorities should define "family" or "dependent" based on functional criteria such as actual dependency, shared residence, and financial support, rather than status-based criteria like marital status. A gender-neutral definition that focuses on the relationship of dependency will withstand constitutional scrutiny.

Fourth, for legal practitioners challenging similar exclusions, the judgment provides a strong precedent. The arguments should focus on: (i) the absence of rational nexus between marital status and the object of the scheme; (ii) the gender-based stereotype underlying the exclusion; (iii) the fact that married sons are not excluded; and (iv) the need for a factual inquiry into dependency rather than a blanket presumption.

Fifth, for authorities considering applications from married daughters, the following evidentiary requirements may be considered: (i) a dependency certificate certifying that the married daughter was fully or substantially dependent on the deceased dealer; (ii) proof of residence in the same village or locality, if required by the scheme; (iii) No Objection Certificates from other adult family members; and (iv) any other eligibility conditions prescribed by the scheme (e.g., educational qualifications, financial capability, character certificate). The authority must not reject the application solely on the ground of the applicant’s marital status.

Sixth, High Courts dealing with writ petitions challenging similar exclusions should not dismiss them summarily on the ground of binding precedent that excludes married daughters. Following this judgment, the correct position is that such exclusions are constitutionally invalid. High Courts should either follow this judgment or, if there is a conflicting Division Bench decision, refer the matter to a larger Bench or directly apply the Supreme Court’s ruling.

11. Court Lines

Line 1 (Test of reasonable classification – Para 17, citing Anwar Ali Sarkar and E.P. Royappa):
"A classification, however, must satisfy two conditions, firstly, it must be founded upon an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and secondly the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The doctrine of equality has, over time, evolved beyond a narrow classification test. State action, which is arbitrary, irrational, capricious, or founded on impermissible stereotypes is equally vulnerable to challenge under Article 14."

Line 2 (Constitutional impermissibility of the assumption underlying exclusion – Para 19):
"The impugned provision proceeds on the assumption that upon marriage a daughter ceases to be a member of, or dependent upon, her parental family. Such an assumption is constitutionally impermissible. Marriage neither extinguishes the bond between a daughter and her parental family nor furnishes a valid basis to presume absence of dependency."

Line 3 (Gender-based stereotype – Para 20):
"The distinction is founded upon a gender-based stereotype that a daughter, upon marriage, becomes a member of another family and loses all ties with her natal family. Such a presumption is incompatible with the constitutional guarantee of equality and perpetuates historical notions of gender inequality which the Constitution seeks to eradicate."

Line 4 (Blanket exclusion unjustified – Para 21):
"A blanket exclusion of all married daughters cannot be justified on the speculative assumption that every married daughter necessarily resides elsewhere. Constitutional adjudication cannot be founded on presumptions that are overbroad and disconnected from lived realities."

Line 5 (Purposive construction – Para 25):
"Bearing in mind the object of the provision, that is to provide immediate financial relief to the dependent family of the deceased dealer and to ensure continuity of public distribution system, on purposive interpretation, the words 'unmarried, legally separated and widowed daughters' in Clause 2(p) of 2016 Order, have to be read so as to include married daughters provided they fulfil other eligibility conditions laid down in G.O."

Line 6 (Dependency as governing criteria – Para 25(iii)):
"The object of dependent quota is unambiguously welfare oriented, that is to provide for immediate financial relief to dependent family member of deceased dealer and to ensure continuity of public distribution system. Dependency and not the marital status is the governing criteria of the G.O."

12. Legal Strategy Insight

For an applicant (married daughter) seeking compassionate appointment or welfare benefits:

Do not accept rejection based solely on marital status. File an application clearly stating your dependency on the deceased family member, providing documentary evidence of shared residence (if applicable), financial support, and any other relevant facts. If the application is rejected on the ground of marital status, challenge the rejection before the appropriate forum (appellate authority, then High Court) citing this judgment. Emphasise that the exclusion violates Articles 14 and 15(1) and that dependency is a factual question requiring consideration on merits.

If the scheme requires local residence, provide proof of residence (voter ID, ration card, Aadhaar, etc.) and, if you reside in a different village due to marriage, argue that the residence requirement is independent of marital status and that you may still satisfy it if you have maintained a residence in the village or if the scheme permits exceptions for genuine dependents.

For a State authority or legal adviser defending a scheme that excludes married daughters:

This judgment has clearly declared such exclusions constitutionally invalid. Continuing to enforce the exclusion will expose the State to legal challenges and potential liability for costs. The advisable course is to amend the scheme or issue administrative instructions to include married daughters subject to proof of dependency. Pending amendment, authorities should construe the scheme in light of this judgment and consider applications from married daughters on merits.

If the State wishes to impose a local residence requirement, it must apply that requirement equally to all applicants (sons, unmarried daughters, widowed daughters, and married daughters) without any presumption that married daughters automatically fail the requirement. Each applicant’s residence must be determined on facts.

For a lawyer drafting a public interest litigation challenging similar exclusions in other states or schemes:

Frame the challenge under Articles 14 and 15(1). Cite this judgment as binding precedent. Also cite Air India v. Nergesh Meerza and E.P. Royappa to establish that gender-based stereotypes are impermissible. Argue that the exclusion fails the reasonable classification test and is manifestly arbitrary. Request the Court to read down the definition of "family" to include married daughters who establish dependency, or to strike down the exclusionary clause as unconstitutional.

If the scheme defines "family" differently (e.g., in employment compassionate appointment rules, housing schemes, education scholarships), the same principles apply. The governing criterion must be dependency, not marital status.

For a High Court judge dealing with a writ petition against such exclusion:

The correct approach is to follow this judgment. If there is a conflicting Division Bench decision of the same High Court, the matter should be referred to a larger Bench for resolution, but the Supreme Court’s judgment being later in time and binding under Article 141, it may be directly applied. The writ petition should not be dismissed on the ground that the exclusion is part of the scheme and the court cannot rewrite it – purposive construction to avoid constitutional infirmity is not only permissible but obligatory.