Lokendra Kumar Tiwariv.Union of India and Others

Legal Analysis: Lokendra Kumar Tiwari vs. Union of India and Others

Citation: 2026 INSC 487
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice S.V.N. Bhatti (Division Bench)
Date of Decision: May 13, 2026
Nature of Judgment: Civil Appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the writ petition challenging contractual appointment.

Synopsis of the Judgment

The Indian Institute of Information Technology (IIIT), Allahabad (Respondent No.2) issued an advertisement inviting applications for regular posts of Professor, Associate Professor and Assistant Professor. The appellant applied for the post of Assistant Professor, was shortlisted, and appeared for the interview. The Selection Committee recommended thirteen candidates for regular appointments, but recommended the appellant and one other candidate for contractual appointments (one year, fixed pay of ₹40,000 per month). The appellant accepted the contractual appointment under economic compulsion. When the Institute cancelled all appointments due to procedural irregularities, the matter was litigated. After a remand by the Supreme Court, the Institute reinstated the appointments of the regular candidates but again offered the appellant a contractual appointment. The appellant challenged this differential treatment. The High Court dismissed his writ petition, holding that he had accepted the contractual terms and could not later challenge them. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the advertisement was for a regular vacancy, the selection process was common, and the appellant was found suitable. The denial of a regular appointment without any recorded reason was arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Court directed the Institute to appoint the appellant as a regular Assistant Professor, with continuity of service but without any financial benefits for the past period, and placed him at the bottom of the seniority list.

1. Basic Information of the Judgment

• Case Title: Lokendra Kumar Tiwari vs. Union of India and Others

• Civil Appeal No.: 5307 of 2024

• Bench: Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice S.V.N. Bhatti (Division Bench)

• Date of Decision: May 13, 2026

• Citation: 2026 INSC 487

• Appeal From: Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Petition No. 7099 of 2018 and connected appeal

2. Legal Framework

Laws and Provisions Involved

• Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14 (equality before law), 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment)

• Recruitment and Service Rules of IIIT-Allahabad, 1999: Rules 9 and 9A (separate procedures for regular and contractual appointments)

• Service Jurisprudence: Principles of judicial review in selection matters, doctrine of acquiescence/estoppel, legitimate expectation

Key Precedents Cited

The judgment does not cite specific case names but relies on the general principle that arbitrariness in state action violates Article 14. The Court emphasises that the Selection Committee’s decision to treat the appellant differently without any recorded reason is “patently illegal and unconstitutional.”

What the Judgment is About

The judgment addresses the question whether a Selection Committee, in a recruitment process advertised exclusively for regular vacancies, can arbitrarily recommend a candidate for contractual appointment while recommending others for regular appointments, without assigning any reason. The Court holds that such differential treatment violates Articles 14 and 16. The fact that the candidate accepted the contractual appointment under economic duress does not estop him from challenging the arbitrariness, especially when the advertisement itself did not mention any contractual appointment and the selection process was common.

3. Relevant Facts

• Advertisement (January 2013): Respondent No. 2 (IIIT, Allahabad) issued Advertisement No. FS-01/2013 calling for applications for regular posts of Professor, Associate Professor and Assistant Professor in Pay Bands III and IV. No mention of contractual appointments was made.

• Appellant’s qualifications: The appellant possessed a Ph.D. in Information Security, an M.S. in Cyber Law with First Division (CGPA 9.02/10), and teaching experience as Lecturer from 21.07.2008 to 05.04.2013.

• Selection process: The appellant applied for Assistant Professor in Information Security. He was shortlisted and appeared for the interview on 18.03.2013 before a Selection Committee. Thirteen candidates (including the appellant) were recommended.

• Differential treatment (06.04.2013): Twelve candidates were recommended for regular appointment. The appellant and Dr. Ranjana Vyas were recommended for contractual appointment for one year at a fixed pay of ₹40,000 per month. No reasons were recorded for this distinction.

• Appellant’s acceptance: The appellant accepted the contractual appointment under economic compulsion, claiming he orally protested at the time of joining. He worked for nearly a year.

• Cancellation of appointments (26.03.2014): The Institute cancelled all appointments made pursuant to the Selection Committee’s recommendations, citing procedural irregularities.

• Litigation: The affected candidates filed writ petitions. The High Court on 11.12.2015 directed reconsideration. The Supreme Court on 24.03.2017 remanded the matter.

• Reconsideration and re-appointment (27.06.2017): The Institute, after reconsideration, issued fresh appointment letters. All other candidates were appointed on a regular basis. The appellant was again offered a contractual appointment (to complete the remaining contract period).

• Writ Petition (2018): The appellant challenged the contractual nature of his appointment, arguing violation of Articles 14 and 16. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on 12.02.2019, holding that the appellant had accepted the contractual terms and could not later challenge them.

• Division Bench: Dismissed the appeal, holding that acquiescence disentitled the appellant from relief.

• Supreme Court: Allowed the appeal.

4. Issues

1. Whether the Selection Committee’s decision to recommend the appellant for a contractual appointment (while recommending other similarly situated candidates for regular appointments) without assigning any reason, in a recruitment process advertised exclusively for regular vacancies, violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

2. Whether the appellant’s acceptance of the contractual appointment under economic compulsion and his subsequent continuation in service operates as a waiver or estoppel, barring him from challenging the arbitrariness of the selection process.

3. Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of acquiescence, without examining the fundamental illegality of the differential treatment.

5. Ratio Decidendi

A. The advertisement was for regular appointments – no mention of contractual posts (Paras 12A-12B):

The Court noted that the advertisement called for applications for regular posts in Pay Band III and IV. There was no indication that any appointment would be made on a contractual basis. The appellant applied, was shortlisted, and appeared for the interview as a candidate for a regular post.

B. Common selection process – differential treatment without reasons is arbitrary (Paras 12C-12D, 13):

The Selection Committee considered all candidates through the same process. It found the appellant suitable (otherwise he would not have been recommended even on contract). However, without recording any reason, it recommended the appellant for a contractual appointment while recommending other similarly placed candidates for regular appointments. This differential treatment, the Court held, is “patently illegal and unconstitutional” and violative of Articles 14 and 16.

C. The absence of a justifiable reason is fatal (Para 13):

The Court observed: “To justify a singular treatment, at least the record must disclose reasons. The record does not disclose any reason for denying the post for which the Appellant was shortlisted and interviewed.” The Court acknowledged that in judicial review, courts do not sit as appellate authorities over the views of a Selection Committee. However, the point here is not the correctness of the reasons, but the complete absence of any reason to justify the arbitrary distinction.

D. Acquiescence does not cure illegality (Paras 8-9, 14):

The High Court’s reasoning that the appellant’s acceptance of the contractual appointment (without written protest) amounted to acquiescence was rejected. The Court implicitly accepted that the appellant accepted the offer under economic compulsion. Moreover, an unconstitutional act (violation of Articles 14 and 16) cannot be validated by mere acceptance. The appellant had been litigating continuously to challenge the arbitrary treatment.

E. Relief moulded – regular appointment with limited benefits (Para 14):

Having found that the appellant was entitled to a regular appointment, the Court moulded the relief. It directed the Institute to issue a regular appointment order within four weeks. The appellant shall be placed at the bottom of the seniority list of Assistant Professors. He is entitled to continuity of service (for purposes of seniority) but without any financial benefits for the past period (no back wages). All impugned orders were set aside.

F. Other arguments not considered (Para 14):

The Court clarified that it was not examining the legality of the selection process for the other candidates (as they were not parties) nor was it adjudicating any other illegality.

6. New Legal Principles Established / Reiterated

• In a recruitment process advertised exclusively for regular vacancies, the Selection Committee cannot arbitrarily recommend a candidate for a contractual appointment while recommending others for regular appointments, without recording reasons. Such differential treatment violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

• The mere fact that a candidate accepted a contractual appointment under economic compulsion does not estop him from challenging the arbitrariness of the selection process. Acquiescence cannot cure a constitutional violation.

• The principle of judicial review in service matters extends to examining whether a Selection Committee has acted arbitrarily or without reasons. Even though courts do not sit as appellate authorities over the merits of selection, the complete absence of reasons to justify a discriminatory treatment is a ground for interference.

7. Court’s Analysis and Examination of Concepts

The Court meticulously examined the chronology and the admitted facts. It noted that the advertisement was for regular appointments; the appellant was shortlisted through the same process as all other candidates; the Selection Committee found him suitable for appointment (as evidenced by the fact that he was recommended even on contract); and the record contained no explanation why he was denied a regular appointment while others were granted regular appointments.

The Court rejected the Institute’s defence that the Selection Committee had “discretion” to recommend contractual appointments. The Court held that discretion must be exercised fairly and in a non‑arbitrary manner. When the advertisement itself did not provide for contractual appointments, and when the Rules provided a separate procedure for contractual appointments (which was not followed), the exercise of discretion to pick and choose some candidates for regular appointments and others for contractual appointments, without recorded reasons, was arbitrary.

The Court also rejected the High Court’s reasoning on acquiescence. It held that a party cannot be estopped from challenging a violation of fundamental rights merely because he accepted a benefit under compulsion. The appellant had consistently pursued his grievance (filing writ petitions and appeals). The fact that he worked for a period under the contractual offer did not waive his right to challenge the illegality.

Finally, the Court exercised its discretion to mould the relief. While granting regular appointment, it denied back wages and placed the appellant at the bottom of the seniority list to avoid disturbing the rights of other employees who had been appointed earlier. This balanced the equities.

8. Critical Analysis

Strengths: The judgment is a clear articulation of the principle that arbitrariness in public employment selection cannot be tolerated. It firmly states that the absence of reasons for differential treatment is itself a violation of Article 14. The rejection of the “acquiescence” defence is important – it prevents employers from forcing candidates to accept illegal terms under economic duress and then using that acceptance to defeat their constitutional claims. The moulding of relief (regular appointment without back wages) is pragmatic and fair.

Potential concerns: The judgment does not explicitly discuss whether the other contractual appointee (Dr. Ranjana Vyas) was also granted relief or whether she was a party. It also does not examine the possibility that the Institute might have had valid reasons (e.g., the appellant’s performance in the interview was lower) but failed to record them. However, the Court’s point is that the record must show the reasons; it cannot be left to guesswork. The judgment also does not set a precedent for all contractual appointments – it turns on the fact that the advertisement was for regular posts and the process was common.

Practical impact: This judgment will be cited by candidates who are offered contractual appointments in recruitment processes advertised for regular posts, especially when other candidates from the same process receive regular appointments. It will compel Selection Committees to record reasons for any differential treatment and to ensure that contractual appointments are not used to arbitrarily bypass regular recruitment rules. It also protects candidates who accept unfavourable terms under economic pressure.

9. Final Outcome

• Civil Appeal allowed.

• The impugned judgments and orders of the High Court (learned Single Judge and Division Bench) are set aside.

• The appellant is held entitled to a regular appointment as Assistant Professor in Respondent No. 2/Institute (IIIT, Allahabad).

• Respondent No. 2 shall issue an order of regular appointment within four weeks from the date of the judgment.

• The appellant shall be placed at the bottom of the seniority list of Assistant Professors.

• The appellant is entitled to continuity of service (for seniority purposes) but no financial benefits (back wages) for the period prior to this judgment.

• No order as to costs.

• Pending applications disposed of.

10. Practical Application (Use in Court)

• For candidates in recruitment processes: If you apply for a regular post advertised as such, and the Selection Committee offers you a contractual appointment while others from the same process receive regular appointments, immediately raise an objection in writing. Do not rely on an oral protest. File a writ petition challenging the contractual nature of the offer, citing this judgment. Emphasise that the advertisement was for regular posts, the process was common, and no reasons were recorded for the differential treatment.

• For employers/public authorities: When conducting recruitment for regular posts, ensure that the advertisement clearly states the nature of the appointment. If you intend to make contractual appointments, either issue a separate advertisement or explicitly mention that possibility. If you differentiate between candidates (some regular, some contract) in the same selection process, record specific reasons for each decision. Failure to do so may result in the court converting the contractual appointment into a regular one.

• For courts: When examining a challenge to a contractual appointment arising from a regular recruitment process, ask: (i) Was the advertisement for regular posts? (ii) Was the selection process common? (iii) Were other candidates from the same process given regular appointments? (iv) Are there any recorded reasons for the differential treatment? If the answer to (i)-(iii) is yes and (iv) is no, the appointment is arbitrary and liable to be set aside or regularised.

11. Court Lines

“The real controversy in the Civil Appeal is not whether a contractual appointee is entitled to regularisation, but whether issuing a contractual appointment against an advertisement meant for a regular vacancy, subjecting it to the regular process and arbitrarily granting a contractual appointment, is sustainable.” (Para 12)

“To justify a singular treatment, at least the record must disclose reasons. The record does not disclose any reason for denying the post for which the Appellant was shortlisted and interviewed.” (Para 13)

“We are aware that in Judicial Review, the court will not sit as a court of appeal on the views recorded by the Selection Committee. The point in the case at hand is not whether the reasons recorded are right or untenable, but whether, even by the most liberal approach to the primacy of appointment, educational institutions have, in these matters, the denial of regular appointment justified?” (Para 13)

“Denying a regular appointment is patently illegal and unconstitutional.” (Para 14)

“Having perused the record, we are unable to discern a just and real reason for denying the Appellant a regular appointment.” (Para 14)

12. Legal Strategy Insight

• For the appellant/employee: In similar cases, immediately after receiving a contractual offer from a process advertised for regular posts, send a written representation to the appointing authority requesting regular appointment. If refused, file a writ petition citing this judgment. Emphasise that the advertisement did not mention contractual appointments, the selection process was common, and you have been treated arbitrarily. Also, argue that acceptance under economic duress does not constitute waiver of constitutional rights. Request the court to mould relief by granting regular appointment without back wages to avoid prejudice to other employees.

• For the employer/Institute: Before issuing an advertisement, decide whether the appointment will be regular or contractual. If contractual, state it clearly in the advertisement. If you intend to have both regular and contractual appointments from the same process, provide a clear rationale and record reasons for each candidate’s status. Ensure that the Selection Committee’s minutes include justification for any differential treatment. Also, ensure that the recruitment rules are followed – if there is a separate procedure for contractual appointments, do not mix it with the regular recruitment process.

• For courts: When a candidate challenges a contractual appointment arising from a regular recruitment process, first examine whether the advertisement or the rules permitted contractual appointments. If not, the very act of offering a contract may be illegal. Then examine whether the candidate was treated differently from others without reasons. If yes, grant relief. The relief can be moulded – regular appointment may be granted without back wages to balance equities.