Meenakshi Natarajanv.Election Commission of India & Anr

Legal Analysis : Meenakshi Natarajan v. Election Commission of India & Anr

Citation: 2026 INSC 643

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: A Division Bench comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra & Justice Atul S. Chandurkar

Date of Decision: June 11, 2026

Nature of Judgment: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 766 of 2026 filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India challenging the order of the Returning Officer rejecting the petitioner's nomination for a Rajya Sabha seat from the State of Madhya Pradesh.

Synopsis of the Judgment

The petitioner, a candidate belonging to the Indian National Congress, submitted her nomination for a Rajya Sabha seat in the biennial election from Madhya Pradesh. Her nomination was rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that in her Form-26 Affidavit, she did not disclose the pendency of a criminal case against her, thereby suppressing material information. The petitioner approached the Election Commission of India, but no orders were passed. She then filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court, challenging the rejection of her nomination. The Supreme Court held that Article 329(b) of the Constitution bars interference by courts in electoral matters except by an election petition presented after the election is over. Following the landmark decision in N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, the Court reiterated that the word "election" in Article 329(b) is used in the wide sense to connote the entire process culminating in a candidate being declared elected, and that the improper rejection of a nomination paper can only be challenged by way of an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The writ petition under Article 32 was dismissed as not maintainable, without any observation on the merits of the rejection, leaving the petitioner free to file an election petition before the concerned High Court.

1. Basic Information of the Judgment

Case Title: Meenakshi Natarajan v. Election Commission of India & Anr.

Citation: 2026 INSC 643

Writ Petition No.: Writ Petition(s) (Civil) No(s). 766/2026

Bench: Division Bench (Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra & Justice Atul S. Chandurkar)

Date of Decision: June 11, 2026

Court: Supreme Court of India (Civil Original Jurisdiction)

Impugned Order: Order dated 09.06.2026 passed by the Returning Officer rejecting the petitioner's nomination for a Rajya Sabha seat from the State of Madhya Pradesh.

2. Legal Framework

Major Laws and Provisions Involved

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 32 (right to move Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights), Article 329(b) (bar to interference by courts in electoral matters – no election to Parliament or State Legislature shall be called in question except by an election petition presented as provided by law).

Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Section 33A (right to information – candidate to disclose pending criminal cases where charge has been framed), Section 80 (no election to be called in question except by election petition), Section 100 (grounds for declaring election void, including improper rejection of nomination paper), Section 105 (finality of Tribunal orders), Section 170 (jurisdiction of civil courts barred).

Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 – Rule 4A (affidavit to be filed in Form 26), Form 26 Clause (5) (disclosure of pending criminal cases – requires details of all pending cases, not only those where charges have been framed).

Key Precedents Cited and Applied

N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency & Ors., AIR 1952 SC 64 (1952) – The foundational decision on Article 329(b). Held that the word "election" in Article 329(b) is used in the wide sense to connote the entire procedure to be gone through to return a candidate to the legislature. The improper rejection of a nomination paper is a ground to call the election in question and must be raised by election petition after the election, not by writ petition during the election process. Article 329(b) ousts the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and the Supreme Court under Article 32 in respect of matters arising during the progress of an election.

Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors. (1978) 1 SCC 405 – The Constitution does not contemplate a complete bar for entertaining an election-related dispute when the relief claimed is not for obstructing the process of election but for its smooth completion. (Cited by petitioner, but distinguished by the Court.)

Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar & Ors. (2000) 8 SCC 216 – Similar principle regarding maintainability of writ petitions during election process.

Manda Jaganath v. K.S. Rathnam & Ors. (2004) 7 SCC 492 – Reiterated the principle that Article 329(b) bars interference at intermediate stages.

Poonam v. Dule Singh & Ors. (2026) – A recent judgment authored by Justice Atul S. Chandurkar (one of the Members of the Bench) dealing with non-disclosure of previous conviction under Section 138 NI Act, holding that the requirement to furnish information in the prescribed format is mandatory.

3. Relevant Facts

The petitioner, Meenakshi Natarajan, a candidate belonging to the Indian National Congress, submitted her nomination for a Rajya Sabha seat in the biennial election for the Rajya Sabha seats of the State of Madhya Pradesh.

The Returning Officer, by order dated 09.06.2026, rejected the petitioner's nomination. The ground for rejection was that in the Form-26 Affidavit filed along with the nomination paper, the petitioner did not disclose the pendency of a criminal case against her, thereby suppressing material information by filing an incomplete affidavit. The order also noted that the Court had taken cognizance of the criminal complaint filed against the petitioner and summons had been issued to her to appear before the Court, and that the petitioner had filed her statement before the Court.

After the impugned order was passed, the petitioner approached the Election Commission of India. She filed a written representation and also argued in person before the Election Commission on 10.06.2026. However, no orders were passed by the Election Commission.

The petitioner then filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before the Supreme Court, challenging the order of the Returning Officer.

The petitioner's counsel, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel, submitted that the bar under Article 329(b) is not attracted because the petitioner desired completion of the election process in a fair and transparent manner, and the writ petition was not intended to thwart the election process. He further submitted, referring to Section 33A of the 1951 Act, that the requirement of disclosure applies only where a candidate is accused of an offence punishable with imprisonment for two years or more in a pending case in which a charge has been framed. Since in the pending case against the petitioner, cognizance was yet to be taken and charges were yet to be framed, there was no violation of Section 33A, and the rejection of nomination was ex facie illegal and manifestly arbitrary.

Per contra, the respondents (Election Commission of India, private respondents, and the State of Madhya Pradesh as intervenor) argued that the right to contest election is a statutory right, not a fundamental right, and therefore a petition under Article 32 is not maintainable. They relied on the settled law starting from Ponnuswami that when a nomination paper is rejected, the only remedy is an election petition, and the Supreme Court under Article 32 has no jurisdiction to entertain such a dispute.

4. Issues

Issue No. 1: Whether a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India is maintainable challenging the rejection of a nomination paper for a Rajya Sabha election, given the bar contained in Article 329(b) of the Constitution.

Issue No. 2: Whether the bar under Article 329(b) applies to disputes arising at the pre-polling stage, including the scrutiny and rejection of nomination papers, or only to disputes after the declaration of results.

Issue No. 3: Whether the petitioner's contention that the rejection of nomination was ex facie illegal and manifestly arbitrary can be examined by the Supreme Court under Article 32 notwithstanding the bar under Article 329(b).

Issue No. 4: Whether the requirement of disclosure under Section 33A of the 1951 Act and Form 26 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 mandates disclosure of all pending criminal cases regardless of whether charges have been framed.

5. Ratio Decidendi

A. The word "election" in Article 329(b) is used in the wide sense to connote the entire process culminating in the declaration of a candidate, and includes the scrutiny and rejection of nomination papers

Following the authoritative pronouncement in N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, the Court held that the word "election" in Article 329(b) has been used in Part XV of the Constitution in the wide sense, that is, to connote the entire procedure to be gone through to return a candidate to the legislature. The use of the expression "conduct of elections" in Article 324 specifically points to the wide meaning. Therefore, the rejection of a nomination paper, which is a part of the election process, falls within the ambit of Article 329(b). (Paras 9-12, quoting Ponnuswami)

B. Article 329(b) bars the jurisdiction of courts, including the Supreme Court under Article 32 and the High Court under Article 226, to entertain any dispute arising during the progress of an election; the only remedy is an election petition after the election is over

The Court held that the words "notwithstanding anything in this Constitution" in Article 329(b) are apt to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court to deal with any matter which may arise while elections are in progress. The scheme of Part XV of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1951 is that any matter which has the effect of vitiating an election should be brought up only at the appropriate stage in an appropriate manner before a Special Tribunal (by way of an election petition) and should not be brought up at an intermediate stage before any court. Section 80 of the 1951 Act is drafted in almost the same language as Article 329(b). Section 100 provides that improper rejection of a nomination paper is a ground for declaring an election void. Section 170 bars the jurisdiction of civil courts. Therefore, the only remedy is an election petition. (Paras 9-10, 12, quoting Ponnuswami)

C. The right to stand as a candidate for election is not a fundamental right but a statutory right, and a petition under Article 32 is not maintainable to enforce a statutory right in the face of an express constitutional bar

The Court noted that the right to vote or stand as a candidate for election is not a civil right but is a creature of statute or special law and must be subject to the limitations imposed by it. Article 32 is invokable only when a fundamental right of a citizen is infringed. Since the petitioner's grievance arose from the rejection of her nomination, which is a statutory right governed by the election law, and since Article 329(b) expressly bars interference by courts in electoral matters except by election petition, a writ petition under Article 32 is not maintainable. (Para 12, citing Ponnuswami)

D. There is no exception to the bar under Article 329(b) for cases where the rejection of nomination is alleged to be "glaring" or "manifestly arbitrary"; such an exception would be in direct conflict with the settled law

The petitioner argued that in a case where the illegality in rejection of nomination is glaring and manifest, this Court must step in to curb the injustice. The Court rejected this argument, holding that if this Court were to accept such an argument and try to distinguish between "glaring" cases and other cases, it would be reading a principle that is not provided for under Article 329(b). Any such interpretation would be in direct conflict with the law laid down in Ponnuswami. The bar under Article 329(b) is absolute and does not admit of any exception based on the perceived gravity of the error. (Para 12)

E. The question of whether the petitioner was required to disclose the pending criminal case under Section 33A and Form 26 is a matter to be decided in the election petition, and not in the writ petition

The Court refrained from making any observations on the merits of the rejection, including the interpretation of Section 33A (whether disclosure is required only when charges are framed) or Form 26 (which requires disclosure of all pending cases). The Court clarified that any observations made in the order concerning the basis of rejection were only for the purpose of appreciating the facts and would not affect the election petition, should the petitioner file one. (Paras 13-14)

6. New Legal Principles Established / Reiterated

First, the Court reiterates the absolute nature of the bar under Article 329(b) of the Constitution. The bar applies to the Supreme Court under Article 32 as much as it applies to High Courts under Article 226. The words "notwithstanding anything in this Constitution" give Article 329(b) overriding effect over other provisions, including Article 32.

Second, the Court clarifies that there is no exception to the Article 329(b) bar based on the alleged gravity of the error committed by the Returning Officer. Even if the rejection of nomination is claimed to be "ex facie illegal" or "manifestly arbitrary", the constitutional remedy by way of an election petition is the exclusive forum. Courts cannot create a carve-out for "glaring" cases without undermining the entire scheme of electoral law.

Third, the Court reaffirms that the right to contest an election is a statutory right, not a fundamental right. Therefore, a petition under Article 32, which is meant for the enforcement of fundamental rights, cannot be invoked to challenge the rejection of a nomination paper. The existence of an alternative statutory remedy (election petition) and the express constitutional bar under Article 329(b) render the writ petition unsustainable.

Fourth, the Court reiterates the principle from Ponnuswami that the word "election" in Article 329(b) bears a wide meaning, encompassing the entire process from the issuance of the notification of election to the declaration of results. Consequently, any dispute arising at any stage of this process, including the scrutiny and rejection of nomination papers, falls within the ambit of Article 329(b).

7. Court's Examination and Analysis of Concepts

The Court first examined the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 32. It noted that the petitioner had called in question the order of the Returning Officer dated 09.06.2026 rejecting her nomination. The respondents raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition was barred by Article 329(b) and that the only remedy was an election petition under the 1951 Act.

The Court then traced the law from N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, a landmark decision of a Constitution Bench. It quoted extensively from Ponnuswami, including the observations that the word "election" in Article 329(b) is used in the wide sense to connote the entire procedure culminating in a candidate being declared elected; that the rejection of a nomination paper is a ground for calling the election in question under Section 100 of the 1951 Act; that the scheme of Part XV of the Constitution and the 1951 Act is that all matters affecting elections should be brought up only by way of an election petition after the election is over, not at an intermediate stage; and that Article 329(b) ousts the jurisdiction of courts, including the High Court under Article 226, to deal with matters arising while elections are in progress.

The Court noted that the principles laid down in Ponnuswami have been followed consistently in all election-related disputes, and every attempt to invoke writ jurisdiction during the conduct of elections has been rejected. The Court referred to a recent judgment in Poonam v. Dule Singh & Ors., authored by one of the Members of the Bench (Justice Atul S. Chandurkar), which dealt with non-disclosure of previous conviction and held that the requirement to furnish information in the prescribed format is mandatory.

The Court then addressed the petitioner's argument that the bar under Article 329(b) is not attracted because the petitioner desired completion of the election process and not its obstruction. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the nature of the relief claimed (setting aside the rejection of nomination and allowing the petitioner to contest) would necessarily interject the election process. The Court also rejected the argument that this Court should interfere in "glaring" cases of illegality, holding that such an exception would be in direct conflict with Ponnuswami and would require reading something into Article 329(b) that is not there.

The Court concluded that the writ petition was not maintainable under Article 32 in view of the express bar contained in Article 329(b). The writ petition was dismissed. However, the Court clarified that nothing in the order would affect any election petition that the petitioner may file before the concerned High Court, and any observations made were only for appreciating the facts of the case.

8. Critical Analysis

Strengths: The judgment is a straightforward and faithful application of the long-settled principle in Ponnuswami. It correctly holds that the bar under Article 329(b) is absolute and admits of no exceptions based on the perceived gravity of the error. The Court wisely refrains from creating a carve-out for "glaring" cases, which would have opened the floodgates to writ petitions challenging every nomination rejection, thereby disrupting the time-bound election schedule. The judgment also correctly distinguishes between fundamental rights (enforceable under Article 32) and statutory rights (governed by the election law). The right to contest an election is not a fundamental right; it is a statutory right created by the Representation of the People Act. Therefore, Article 32 is not the appropriate remedy.

The judgment also correctly leaves the merits of the rejection open to be decided in an election petition. The Court does not pronounce on whether the petitioner was required to disclose the pending criminal case under Section 33A (which requires charge framing) or under Form 26 (which requires disclosure of all pending cases). This preserves the jurisdiction of the Election Tribunal/High Court to decide the election petition on its own merits without being bound by any observations of the Supreme Court.

Potential concerns: The judgment does not explicitly address the fact that the petitioner had approached the Election Commission of India before filing the writ petition, and the Election Commission had not passed any orders. The petitioner argued that she wanted the election process to be completed smoothly and fairly. However, the Court did not examine whether the Election Commission had any role or whether the petitioner could have sought a remedy from the Commission. This is not a significant omission because the constitutional bar under Article 329(b) is independent of whether the petitioner exhausted other remedies.

Another subtle issue: The judgment states that the right to stand as a candidate is a statutory right, not a fundamental right. However, it could be argued that the rejection of nomination, if based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, could affect the petitioner's right to equality under Article 14. But the Court does not engage with this argument, relying instead on the absolute bar under Article 329(b). This is consistent with the settled position that Article 329(b) prevails over Article 14 in the context of election disputes at the pre-polling stage.

The judgment also does not discuss the distinction between Rajya Sabha elections (indirect elections by members of State Legislative Assemblies) and direct elections to the Lok Sabha or State Assemblies. Article 329(b) applies to "election to either House of Parliament" – which includes Rajya Sabha. The same principles apply. The Court correctly does not make any distinction.

Practical impact: This judgment will be cited in every case where a candidate whose nomination is rejected attempts to challenge it by way of a writ petition under Article 32 or Article 226. It reaffirms that the only remedy is an election petition after the election is over. It will discourage litigants from seeking urgent interim relief from the Supreme Court or High Courts during the pendency of elections, thereby ensuring that the election schedule is not disrupted. The judgment also provides clarity that there is no "glaring error" exception to the Article 329(b) bar. Candidates must exhaust the statutory remedy of an election petition, even if they believe the Returning Officer's decision is manifestly arbitrary.

9. Final Outcome

The writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India was dismissed as not maintainable.

The Court held that in view of the express bar contained in Article 329(b) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to the rejection of a nomination paper for an election to Parliament. The only remedy available to a candidate whose nomination is rejected is to file an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, after the election is concluded.

The Court clarified that any observations made in the order concerning the basis of rejection of the petitioner's nomination were only for the purpose of appreciating the facts of the case and would not affect any election petition that may be filed by the petitioner or any other person before the concerned High Court. The election petition shall be decided on its own merits, in accordance with law.

Pending applications, if any, stood disposed of.

10. Practical Application

First, for any candidate whose nomination paper is rejected by the Returning Officer, the immediate remedy is not to file a writ petition under Article 32 of the Supreme Court or Article 226 of the High Court. Article 329(b) of the Constitution expressly bars such interference. The candidate must wait for the election to be completed (i.e., after the results are declared) and then file an election petition before the concerned High Court under Section 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Second, the election petition can be filed on the ground that the rejection of the nomination paper was improper, as provided under Section 100(1)(c) of the 1951 Act. The election petition must be presented within the time limit prescribed (usually 45 days from the date of declaration of results). The High Court has the jurisdiction to try the election petition and, if it finds that the rejection was improper, can declare the election void and order a fresh election or declare the petitioner as duly elected.

Third, for legal practitioners advising candidates, it is crucial to note that the bar under Article 329(b) applies even if the Returning Officer's decision is alleged to be "ex facie illegal", "manifestly arbitrary", or "perverse". The Supreme Court has categorically held that there is no exception to the bar based on the gravity of the error. Therefore, any attempt to file a writ petition challenging the rejection during the election process is likely to be dismissed on the ground of maintainability, without any examination of the merits.

Fourth, for candidates filing nomination papers, the judgment highlights the importance of meticulous compliance with the disclosure requirements under Section 33A of the 1951 Act and Form 26 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. Even if Section 33A requires disclosure only where charges have been framed, Form 26 requires disclosure of "pending criminal cases" without limiting to cases where charges have been framed. The interplay between the two was not decided in this judgment, but candidates should err on the side of caution and disclose all pending criminal cases, regardless of the stage, to avoid rejection.

Fifth, for courts adjudicating such matters, the judgment reaffirms that the preliminary issue of maintainability under Article 329(b) must be decided first. If the writ petition challenges any action taken during the progress of an election (from the notification of election to the declaration of results), the court must dismiss it as barred, without going into the merits of the case. The court should not entertain arguments about the "glaring" nature of the error or the urgency of the matter, as the constitutional bar is absolute.

Sixth, for the Election Commission and Returning Officers, this judgment reinforces that their decisions on nomination papers are subject to challenge only by way of election petition after the election. This allows them to proceed with the election schedule without fear of interim injunctions from courts. However, they must still act fairly and in accordance with law, as their decisions can be examined in the election petition.

11. Court Lines

Line 1 (Definition of "election" in wide sense – Para 9, quoting Ponnuswami):

"It seems to me that the word 'election' has been used in Part XV of the Constitution in the wide sense, that is to say, to connote the entire procedure to be gone through to return a candidate to the legislature. The use of the expression 'conduct of elections' in Article 324 specifically points to the wide meaning, and that meaning can also be read consistently into the other provisions which occur in Part XV including Article 329(b)."

Line 2 (Bar to interference at intermediate stage – Para 10, quoting Ponnuswami):

"It seems to me that under the election law, the only significance which the rejection of a nomination paper has consists in the fact that it can be used as a ground to call the election in question. Article 329(b) was apparently enacted to prescribe the manner in which and the stage at which this ground and other grounds which may be raised under the law to call the election in question, could be urged. I think it follows by necessary implication from the language of this provision that those grounds cannot be urged in any other manner, at any other stage and before any other court."

Line 3 (No exception for "glaring" cases – Para 12):

"It is vehemently put forth by Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi that in a case of this nature where the illegality in rejection of nomination is glaring and manifest, this Court must step in to curb the injustice, otherwise the very sanctity of the election process would be affected. However, this argument cannot be accepted in view of the law laid down in Ponnuswami (supra). If this Court accepts such argument to find out such glaring cases, which are required to be interfered with under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India and the other set of cases in which the rejection is not so improper prima facie relegating them to avail the remedy of filing election petition, this Court would be reading some principle which is not provided for under Article 329 of the Constitution of India."

Line 4 (Statutory right vs fundamental right – Para 12, quoting Ponnuswami):

"The right to vote or stand as a candidate for election is not a civil right but is a creature of statute or special law and must be subject to the limitations imposed by it."

Line 5 (Article 329(b) ousts writ jurisdiction – Para 10, quoting Ponnuswami):

"It will be noticed that the language used in that article and in Section 80 of the Act is almost identical, with this difference only that the article is preceded by the words 'notwithstanding anything in this Constitution'. I think that those words are quite apt to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with any matter which may arise while the elections are in progress."

Line 6 (Observations not to affect election petition – Para 14):

"Needless to say, any observation made herein concerning the basis of rejection of petitioner's nomination is only for the purpose of appreciating the facts of the case and nothing contained in this Order shall affect the election petition, should any such election petition is filed by the petitioner or any other person before the concerned High Court and the same shall be decided on its own merits, in accordance with law."

12. Legal Strategy Insight

For a candidate whose nomination is rejected:

Do not file a writ petition under Article 32 or Article 226. The Supreme Court has made it clear that such a petition will be dismissed as not maintainable, regardless of how strong your case is on the merits. Instead, wait for the election to conclude. If you believe the rejection was improper, file an election petition before the High Court under Section 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, within the prescribed limitation period (45 days from the date of declaration of results). In the election petition, you can challenge the rejection as a ground to declare the election void under Section 100(1)(c). If the election was won by a candidate who would have been defeated if your nomination had been accepted, the court may declare the election void and order a fresh election or declare you as duly elected.

For a candidate filing nomination papers (preventive strategy):

Disclose all pending criminal cases, regardless of the stage, in your Form-26 affidavit. Even if Section 33A of the 1951 Act requires disclosure only where charges have been framed, Form 26 is broader and requires disclosure of "pending criminal cases" without qualification. To avoid the risk of rejection, err on the side of caution. If you have a pending case where cognizance has been taken but charges are not yet framed, disclose it. If you have a case where only an FIR has been registered, disclose it. The Returning Officer may reject your nomination for non-disclosure, and the bar under Article 329(b) will prevent you from challenging it during the election.

For a legal practitioner advising a candidate whose nomination is rejected:

Immediately advise the client not to file a writ petition. Explain that Article 329(b) creates an absolute bar, and any such petition will be dismissed on maintainability without examining the merits. Instead, advise the client to preserve all documents, including the nomination paper, the Form-26 affidavit, the order of rejection, and any correspondence with the Election Commission. Prepare an election petition to be filed after the results are declared. The election petition must be filed before the High Court having jurisdiction over the constituency. The grounds include the improper rejection of the nomination paper. If the election has not yet taken place, the client may also consider supporting a different candidate from the same party, as the client cannot contest in that election.

For a Returning Officer dealing with nomination papers:

You have the power to reject nomination papers for non-compliance with the requirements of the 1951 Act and the Rules. Your decision is subject to challenge only by way of an election petition after the election. However, you should act fairly and in accordance with law. Give the candidate an opportunity to explain any defects if the law permits. Record your reasons in writing. Your decision will be scrutinised in the election petition, and if found to be improper, the election may be declared void. Therefore, you must be careful and consistent in applying the law.

For a High Court judge dealing with a writ petition challenging rejection of nomination:

First, examine the maintainability under Article 329(b). If the writ petition challenges any action taken during the progress of an election (from the notification of election to the declaration of results), dismiss it as barred, without going into the merits. Do not entertain arguments that the error is "glaring" or "manifest". The bar is absolute. The only exception is if the election process has already concluded (i.e., results declared), in which case Article 329(b) does not bar a writ petition challenging the election itself? But note: even then, the proper remedy is an election petition, and writ jurisdiction is not ordinarily exercised. The safer course is to relegate the petitioner to the election petition remedy.

For a litigant seeking to enforce the right to information in elections:

The judgment does not bar election petitions. If you believe that a candidate has suppressed material information (such as pending criminal cases), you can file an election petition after the election challenging the election on the ground of improper acceptance of nomination (if the candidate was elected) or on the ground that the candidate was disqualified. The election petition is the appropriate forum to examine whether the non-disclosure amounted to a corrupt practice or affected the election.