Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd & Anrv.B Gurappa Naidu & Ors

Legal Analysis: Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. & Anr. vs. B. Gurappa Naidu & Ors

Citation: 2026 INSC 434
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Aravind Kumar & Justice N.V. Anjaria  (Division Bench)
Judgment Author: Justice Aravind Kumar
Date of Decision: April 30, 2026
Nature of Judgment: Civil Appeals under Section 125 of the CPC against the High Court’s order modifying the Executing Court’s determination of guideline value of land in execution of a compromise decree.

Synopsis of the Judgment

The dispute arose out of a compromise decree (dated 20.08.2007) between Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises (N.I.C.E.) and the landowner-decree holders. Under the compromise, N.I.C.E. was to exchange alternative land; failing that, it had to pay the “guideline value” of the subject land (3 acres 6 guntas) as on the date of the settlement. N.I.C.E. failed to convey the alternative land. In execution proceedings, the Executing Court fixed compensation at ₹1,000 per sq. ft. based on the Karnataka Gazette Notification dated 17.04.2007 (base value ₹800 + 25% for abutting State Highway). The High Court, in a writ petition under Article 227, reduced it to ₹500 per sq. ft. by applying a 50% reduction under Special Instruction No. 6. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 – it acted as an appellate court, belatedly impleaded the State Government to reinterpret its own notification, and substituted a different view merely because another interpretation was possible. The Executing Court’s interpretation was plausible and reasonable. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, restored the Executing Court’s valuation of ₹1,000 per sq. ft. (total ₹13,72,14,000), and directed N.I.C.E. to pay the balance amount with interest @6% p.a. from the date of the decree.

1. Basic Information of the Judgment

Field Details Case Title Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. & Anr. vs. B. Gurappa Naidu & Ors. (with connected appeal) Civil Appeal Nos.1388 of 2013 (by Judgment Debtors) and 1354 of 2013 (by Decree Holders) Bench Justice Aravind Kumar &  Justice N.V. Anjaria Date of Decision April 30, 2026 Citation 2026 INSC 434 Appeal From Judgment dated 12.09.2012 of the High Court of Karnataka in W.P. No. 21068 of 2012

2. Legal Framework

Laws / Rules Involved

• Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC): Section 89 (settlement/compromise), Order XXIII Rule 3 (compromise decree), Section 47 (execution – questions to be determined by Executing Court), Order XXI (execution of decrees).

• Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957: Guideline value notifications issued thereunder.

• Constitution of India, 1950: Article 227 (supervisory jurisdiction of High Court over subordinate courts).

Precedents Cited

1. Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patli (2010) – Power under Article 227 is plenary but cautious; can be exercised only for unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, gross abuse, or unjustifiable refusal; not to correct every error of fact.

2. Estrella Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. (2001) – High Court’s interference under Article 227 restricted to serious dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice; cannot act as appellate court.

3. Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel (2022) – Supervisory jurisdiction is not a court of first appeal; cannot reappreciate evidence or substitute its own decision; limited to perverse findings or no evidence.

4. Waryam Singh v. Amanath (AIR 1954 SC 215) – Constitution Bench on scope of Article 227.

5. Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division (AIR 1958 SC 398) – Article 227 not to correct errors of fact or law unless manifest injustice.

What the Judgment is About

The case concerns the proper interpretation of a government guideline value notification for land compensation under a compromise decree. The core issue is whether the High Court, in writ proceedings under Article 227, can implead the State Government to obtain an “interpretation” of its own notification and then substitute that interpretation for the Executing Court’s plausible view, effectively acting as an appellate court. The Supreme Court reaffirms the limited, supervisory nature of Article 227 and holds that the Executing Court’s interpretation (₹1,000 per sq. ft.) was reasonable; the High Court erred in replacing it with another possible view (₹500 per sq. ft.).

3. Relevant Facts

A. The Background and the Compromise Decree

• Framework Agreement (03.04.1997): N.I.C.E. entered into an agreement with the Government of Karnataka for the Bangalore‑Mysore Infrastructure Corridor Project (BMICP). The subject land (Survey No. 122/272/2, Kengeri Village) belonging to the decree holders (B. Gurappa Naidu & Smt. Sunitha) was allotted to N.I.C.E. for construction of a ramp.

• Conversion of land (05.11.2004): The land was converted from agricultural to industrial use by the competent authority.

• Suit by N.I.C.E. (O.S. No. 4691/2006): N.I.C.E. sued the decree holders for permanent injunction against interference.

• Memorandum of Settlement (MOS) dated 10.08.2007: The parties compromised. Key terms:
  Decree Holder No. 2 (Smt. Sunitha) acknowledged as absolute owner of Schedule ‘A’ land (6 acres 10 guntas). N.I.C.E. relinquished all rights.
  To facilitate the project, decree holder permitted N.I.C.E. to use 3 acres 6 guntas (Schedule ‘AA’ land) for interchange development. The remaining 3 acres 4 guntas (Schedule ‘AAA’) retained by decree holder.
  In exchange, N.I.C.E. agreed to convey Schedule ‘B’ land (6 acres 10 guntas in Sy. Nos. 164/4, 164/5 & 165) to the decree holder within 24 months.
  Clause (xiii) – the critical contingency clause:
  “In the event of the Plaintiffs not being able to acquire title … and to convey the same … the second defendant shall continue to retain the ownership of the land described in schedule AAA … In such an event, the Plaintiffs shall pay to the second defendant the value of the property described in the Schedule AA at the guideline value fixed by the Government as on today and shall obtain conveyance of the same from the second defendant at the cost of the plaintiffs.”
  N.I.C.E. paid ₹25 lakhs towards trees/crops, and agreed that if clause (xiii) triggered, decree holder would refund ₹12.50 lakhs.

• Compromise Decree (20.08.2007): Suit disposed of in terms of the MOS.

B. Execution Petition and Legal Battles

• N.I.C.E. failed to convey Schedule ‘B’ land. Decree holders filed Execution Petition No. 2237/2009 seeking ₹13,72,14,000 (₹1,000 per sq. ft. based on guideline value) with interest @12% per annum.

• Executing Court initially dismissed the EP (19.03.2010) holding it was not a money decree. Decree holders’ revision (CRP No. 166/2010) was allowed by the High Court (09.12.2010), restoring the EP.

• N.I.C.E. challenged the High Court’s order before the Supreme Court in SLP(C) No. 10633/2012. On 09.04.2012, the Supreme Court dismissed the SLP with a direction:
  “Let the executing court determine the value of the land in terms of clause (xiii) of the Memorandum of Settlement … The petitioners shall pay the amount so determined within eight weeks from the date of determination by the executing court.”

• Executing Court (V Addl. City Civil Judge, Bengaluru) passed order on 31.05.2012 fixing value at ₹1,000 per sq. ft. (total ₹13,72,14,000). It declined interest.

C. High Court’s Impugned Order (12.09.2012)

• N.I.C.E. filed W.P. No. 21068/2012 under Article 227. The High Court impleaded the State of Karnataka, sought its “clarification” on the guideline value notification.

• State filed statement based on a spot inspection (though possession had been handed over years earlier) and contended that the value should be ₹500 per sq. ft. (residential rate ₹800 + 25% for highway = ₹1,000, then reduced by 50% under Instruction No. 6 for industrial land).

• The High Court accepted the State’s interpretation, reduced the value to ₹500 per sq. ft., and modified the Executing Court’s order.

D. Appeals before the Supreme Court

• Civil Appeal No. 1388/2013 by N.I.C.E. (Judgment Debtors) sought further reduction below ₹500.

• Civil Appeal No. 1354/2013 by Decree Holders sought restoration of ₹1,000 per sq. ft.

4. Issues

1. Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India while interfering with the Executing Court’s determination of guideline value?

2. Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the findings recorded by the Executing Court, particularly by impleading the State Government and relying on its post‑litigation interpretation of the notification?

3. Whether the Executing Court’s interpretation of the guideline value notification (₹1,000 per sq. ft.) was plausible and therefore not liable to be upset in supervisory jurisdiction?

4. Whether the decree holders are entitled to interest on the delayed payment of the compensation amount?

5. Ratio Decidendi

A. High Court exceeded Article 227 jurisdiction (Point No. 1) – Paragraphs 30‑36

The Supreme Court reiterated the settled principles governing Article 227:

• The power is supervisory, not appellate. It cannot be used to reappreciate evidence or substitute a different view merely because another view is possible.

• Interference is permitted only in cases of: (a) unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction; (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction; (c) unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction; or (d) a finding so perverse that no reasonable person could have reached it.

• The High Court cannot act as a court of first appeal or reweigh evidence.

Applying these principles, the Court held:

• The Executing Court was duly vested with jurisdiction and had exercised it. No case of gross abuse or refusal was made out.

• The High Court impleaded the State Government belatedly – a step not permissible in a private lis arising solely out of a compromise decree. The State was allowed to interpret its own notification and thereby influence the outcome, which is impermissible (para 36.3.2).

• The High Court accepted the State’s interpretation merely because an alternative interpretation was possible, and substituted its own view for that of the Executing Court – exactly what an appellate court does, not a supervisory court (para 36.3.3).

• The Executing Court’s interpretation was plausible and reasonable. Even if another view was possible, the High Court could not supplant it under Article 227 (para 36.3.4).

B. Executing Court’s interpretation was correct (Point No. 2) – Paragraphs 37‑40

The Court independently examined the Karnataka Gazette Notification dated 17.04.2007:

• Column 6 prescribed a base guideline value of ₹800 per sq. ft. for sites within BBMP / City Municipal Council limits. The subject land fell within Kengeri City Municipal Council (later BBMP).

• Special Instruction No. 2 added 25% for land abutting a State Highway → ₹800 + ₹200 = ₹1,000 per sq. ft.

• Special Instruction No. 6 states: “The rate for residential sites has to be followed for the industrial areas as already been notified in the guideline. Excluding this area, for all other industrial sites, 50% of the residential sites value has to be fixed.”

• The opening part (“as already been notified”) means where a specific rate is already prescribed for industrial areas under municipal limits, that rate applies. The exclusionary phrase “excluding these areas” means the 50% reduction is a residual fallback for industrial sites not covered by the specific rates.

• Since Column 6 already gave a specific rate (₹800 for lands within municipal limits – which included the subject land), Instruction No. 6 did not apply. Applying it would lead to an absurd result: valuing converted urban industrial land (₹500) lower than agricultural land (₹1.25 crore per acre ≈ ₹350 per sq. ft. – though numerically less, the absurdity is in comparing different bases; the Court’s point was that the notification’s scheme did not intend a 50% cut for lands already specifically rated).

Thus, the Executing Court’s valuation of ₹1,000 per sq. ft. was the correct and plausible interpretation.

C. Interest

• The compromise decree did not provide for interest. However, the Supreme Court had directed on 09.04.2012 that N.I.C.E. pay the amount determined by the Executing Court within eight weeks from determination (31.05.2012). N.I.C.E. only deposited ₹4,92,18,750 (their own calculation) instead of the full ₹13,72,14,000.

• The High Court in a separate writ petition (W.P. No. 25158/2012) had already granted interest @6% per annum from the date of the decree (20.08.2007). That order was not challenged/set aside. Hence, the decree holders were entitled to interest as per that order.

• The Supreme Court directed N.I.C.E. to pay the balance amount (₹13,72,14,000 – ₹4,92,18,750 = ₹8,79,95,250) together with interest @6% p.a. as ordered in W.P. No. 25158/2012.

6. New Legal Principles Established / Reiterated

1. High Court cannot implead the State Government in a private lis under Article 227 to reinterpret a statutory notification. The executive cannot be allowed to “explain away” or reinterpret its own notification post‑litigation to the prejudice of a party. Doing so violates the separation of functions and turns the High Court into a facilitator of executive adjudication.

2. In exercising Article 227, where the subordinate court’s interpretation of a notification is plausible and reasonable, the High Court must not substitute its own view merely because another interpretation is possible. Supervisory jurisdiction is not an appellate roving commission to correct every legal error; it is reserved for patent perversity or jurisdictional excess.

3. Guideline value notifications – interpretation of “residual” clauses (like Instruction No. 6): When a specific value is prescribed for a category (e.g., lands within municipal limits), a general reduction clause intended for “all other” areas (where no specific value is prescribed) does not apply. The specific governs the general.

4. Interest on delayed payment under a compromise decree: Even if the decree is silent on interest, if the Supreme Court directs payment within a fixed period and the judgment debtor fails to comply, and if a separate order awarding interest has become final, the interest liability stands.

7. Court’s Analysis and Examination of Concepts

A. Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 – re‑examined

The Court traced the evolution of Article 227 from Waryam Singh to Garment Craft. It emphasised that the High Court’s power is “to keep inferior courts within bounds of their authority” – not to correct every wrong decision. It quoted Garment Craft: “The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts … Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported.”

Applying this, the Court found that the Executing Court had carefully considered the notification, the evidence of conversion, municipal limits, highway abuttal, and the presence of industrial licences, power connection, tax assessments, etc. Its conclusion was well‑reasoned. The High Court, by impleading the State and accepting its interpretation, effectively conducted a de novo hearing – which is impermissible.

B. The danger of “executive interpretation” during litigation

The Court noted that the State was not a party to the compromise decree. The lis was purely between private parties. The High Court called upon the State to “clarify” its own notification. The State then conducted a spot inspection (though possession had been handed over years earlier) and produced a report that was ultimately rejected by the High Court – yet the High Court still accepted the State’s interpretive submission. This, the Supreme Court held, allowed the executive to become the rule‑maker, interpreter, and adjudicator simultaneously, which is “impermissible” (para 36.3.2).

C. Correct construction of the guideline value notification

The Court conducted its own plain reading:

• Step 1: Locate the land in the notification. Survey No. 122 is listed under “BBMP / City Municipal Council limits” with a value of ₹800 per sq. ft. (Column 6).

• Step 2: Apply Instruction No. 2 (25% addition for highway abuttal) → ₹1,000.

• Step 3: Consider whether Instruction No. 6 applies. Instruction No. 6 has two parts: (i) “The rate for residential sites has to be followed for the industrial areas as already been notified in the guideline” – meaning where an industrial area already has a notified guideline, that residential rate (or the rate already notified) applies. (ii) “Excluding this area, for all other industrial sites, 50% of the residential sites value has to be fixed.” – This is a fallback for industrial sites not covered by any specific guideline.

Because the subject land fell within the specific entry (Survey No. 122 with a notified rate), the exclusionary phrase applied, and the 50% reduction never triggered.

The Court observed that applying the 50% reduction would produce an “anomalous and absurd outcome” (para 37) – a converted urban industrial land would be valued lower than agricultural land with conversion benefits, which cannot be the intention.

D. Interest analysis

The Court noted the dichotomy: the Executing Court denied interest; the High Court in a separate writ petition (W.P. No. 25158/2012) granted 6% interest from the decree date. That order was not challenged and remained binding. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s own order dated 09.04.2012 required payment within eight weeks of determination – N.I.C.E. failed to comply. Therefore, interest was rightly awarded.

8. Critical Analysis

Strengths: The judgment is a robust reaffirmation of the limits of Article 227. It correctly identifies the High Court’s error in converting a supervisory proceeding into a de facto appellate review. The reasoning that the State should not be impleaded to reinterpret its own notification in a private lis is sound – it prevents executive overreach and maintains the neutrality of the adjudicatory process. The interpretation of Instruction No. 6 as a residual clause is logically compelling and avoids absurd results.

Potential concerns: The Court’s observation that the Executing Court’s view was “plausible” does not necessarily mean it was the only plausible view. While the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction, the underlying valuation dispute (₹1,000 vs ₹500) was a genuine interpretative question. Some may argue that the Supreme Court itself then went on to decide the merits (i.e., it held that ₹1,000 was correct, not just plausible). In doing so, the Supreme Court acted as an appellate court – the very thing it criticised the High Court for. However, the distinction is that the Supreme Court was exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Section 125 CPC, not supervisory power. The point is valid: the Court could have simply remanded for fresh consideration by the High Court, but it chose to settle the matter finally given the long history (since 2007) and the fact that the Executing Court’s order was already reasonable.

Practical impact: This judgment will be cited by litigants seeking to challenge High Court interventions under Article 227 that go beyond jurisdictional errors into merits re‑appreciation. It will also discourage High Courts from impleading government departments to obtain “clarifications” on statutory instruments during pending proceedings between private parties. For execution matters involving guideline values, the judgment provides a clear interpretative framework: specific entries override general reduction clauses.

9. Final Outcome

• Civil Appeal No. 1388 of 2013 (filed by Judgment Debtors / N.I.C.E.): Dismissed.

• Civil Appeal No. 1354 of 2013 (filed by Decree Holders): Allowed.

Consequent orders:

(a) The impugned judgment and order dated 12.09.2012 passed by the High Court of Karnataka in W.P. No. 21068 of 2012 is set aside.

(b) The order passed by the V Additional City Civil Judge, Bengaluru (Executing Court) dated 31.05.2012 is restored.

(c) The value of the Schedule Land (AA Schedule Property) is determined at ₹1,000 per square foot, aggregating to a total sum of ₹13,72,14,000 (Rupees Thirteen Crore Seventy‑Two Lakh Fourteen Thousand Only).

(d) The judgment debtors (N.I.C.E.) are directed to pay the balance amount:
₹13,72,14,000 – ₹4,92,18,750 = ₹8,79,95,250 (Rupees Eight Crore Seventy‑Nine Lakh Ninety‑Five Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Only) with interest @6% per annum as ordered in W.P. No. 25158 of 2012 dated 11.06.2013 (subject to observations in para 39.3 – i.e., if that interest order is challenged, the parties will be bound by the result).

(e) Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. Parties to bear their own costs.

10. Practical Application (Use in Court)

By Judgment Debtors / Defendants in execution

• Challenge High Court’s Article 227 order: If the High Court reappreciates evidence or substitutes its own view on valuation without finding perversity, cite this judgment to argue that the High Court exceeded its supervisory jurisdiction. Specifically, argue that impleading a non‑party (like a government department) to obtain an “interpretation” of a notification is impermissible.

• Delay in payment: If a compromise decree / court order fixes a value but the decree holder seeks interest despite no clause in the decree, rely on the principle that interest is not automatic. However, note that if a separate order granting interest has become final, you cannot escape it.

By Decree Holders / Claimants

• To defend Executing Court’s valuation: If the Executing Court has given a reasonable interpretation of a guideline notification, argue that the High Court cannot interfere under Article 227 merely because another interpretation is possible. Quote para 36.3.4: “the interpretation adopted by the Executing Court constituted a plausible and reasonable view. In such circumstances, the High Court could not … supplant that view with another interpretation.”

• Residual clauses: If the opposite party tries to apply a general reduction clause (like 50% for industrial land), argue that such clauses apply only where no specific guideline is prescribed. If the notification has a specific rate for the area, the residual clause is excluded.

By High Courts (exercising Article 227)

• Self‑restraint: Before interfering with a subordinate court’s interpretation of a statute/notification, ensure that the interpretation is perverse or unsupported by any evidence. Do not substitute your own view simply because you would have interpreted it differently.

• Impleadment of government: In a private lis, do not implead the government solely to obtain an interpretation of its own notification. That turns the government into a party in interest and may violate principles of natural justice.

By Trial / Executing Courts

• Plausible interpretation is enough: When you interpret a guideline value notification, you are not required to arrive at the only correct interpretation. As long as your interpretation is reasonable, based on a plain reading, and consistent with the notification’s scheme, it will be upheld by the Supreme Court even if a different view is possible.

11. Court Lines

“In exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, the High Court cannot act as an appellate court, nor can it sit in appeal over the correctness of the orders passed by courts and tribunals over which it exercises the power of superintendence under Article 227.” (Para 31)

“The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported.” (Para 35, quoting Garment Craft)

“In substance, the High Court permitted the State to interpret its own notification and thereby influence a lis exclusively between private parties. The State was thus placed in the position of being a rule‑maker, interpreter, and adjudicator of its own notification simultaneously … Such an approach, in our considered view, is impermissible. The executive cannot be allowed to explain away or reinterpret a statutory instrument during the course of litigation to the prejudice of one of the parties.” (Para 36.3.2)

“On bare reading of Instruction No. 6, it can be seen that same is intended to operate only as a residual provision applicable to industrial layouts or industrial zones where no specific guideline value is prescribed. … Consequently, the opening limb of Instruction No. 6 … stands satisfied, and the exclusionary phrase ‘excluding these areas’ squarely applies. As a result, the fallback rule of fixing 50% of the residential site value never gets triggered.” (Para 37)

“Applying Instruction No. 6 in the present factual matrix would lead to an anomalous and absurd outcome whereby converted urban land within BBMP limits is valued lower than agricultural land with conversion benefits, a result that courts have consistently cautioned against.” (Para 37)

“At the very least, the interpretation adopted by the Executing Court constituted a plausible and reasonable view. In such circumstances, the High Court could not, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, supplant that view with another interpretation, merely because such an alternative view was also possible.” (Para 36.3.4)

12. Legal Strategy Insight

For the Judgment Debtor (e.g., N.I.C.E. in similar cases)

• If you are facing an execution proceeding based on a guideline value: Do not challenge the Executing Court’s valuation before the High Court under Article 227 unless the valuation is plainly perverse (e.g., ignoring the notification, applying the wrong column, or relying on no evidence). If the Executing Court’s interpretation is one of two plausible readings, the High Court will likely not interfere after this judgment – and if it does, the Supreme Court will reverse it.

• Avoid depositing a lesser amount: If the Supreme Court has directed payment of the amount determined by the Executing Court, deposit the full amount within the stipulated time. Depositing a self‑calculated lesser amount will expose you to interest liability, even if the decree is silent on interest.

• Do not seek impleadment of the government: In a private execution dispute, do not ask the High Court to implead the government to reinterpret a notification. This judgment strongly disapproves of that tactic. Instead, argue the interpretation based on first principles – specific entries prevail over general residual clauses.

For the Decree Holder (e.g., landowner)

• Resist Article 227 petitions vigorously: File a preliminary objection that the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 227 is limited. Cite Garment Craft and Estrella Rubber. Point out that the Executing Court’s order is well‑reasoned and no jurisdictional error or perversity exists. Emphasise that the Supreme Court had already directed the Executing Court to determine the value – the High Court should not sit in appeal over that determination.

• Challenge any belated impleadment of the government: If the High Court proposes to implead the government, object on the ground that the lis is private and the government has no locus. The executive cannot be allowed to interpret its own notification to favour one party – that violates the doctrine of separation of functions (judicial vs. executive).

• Claim interest even if decree is silent: After this judgment, if the judgment debtor delays payment despite a court‑fixed deadline (e.g., eight weeks from determination), you may file a separate writ petition seeking interest. The Supreme Court has upheld interest @6% p.a. on the delayed payment, even though the compromise decree had no interest clause, because the Supreme Court’s earlier order created a time‑bound obligation and the debtor defaulted.

For the High Court (when hearing Article 227 matters)

• Do not entertain a writ petition merely because the subordinate court’s interpretation differs from what you think is correct. Unless the subordinate court has clearly misinterpreted a plain statutory provision, or its finding is unsupported by any evidence, decline interference.

• Do not implead the government to obtain a “clarification” on a notification in a private lis. If clarification is truly needed, the court itself should interpret the notification without delegating that task to the executive. The executive’s post‑litigation opinion has no binding effect and should not be solicited.

• If the subordinate court’s interpretation is plausible, dismiss the Article 227 petition summarily. This judgment makes it clear that “another possible view” is not a ground for intervention.

For Trial / Executing Courts (subordinate courts)

• When interpreting guideline value notifications, follow a structured approach: (i) Identify the specific column/entry covering the subject property; (ii) apply any highway abuttal additions; (iii) examine whether a general reduction clause (like Instruction No. 6) is a residual clause – if a specific rate is already prescribed, the reduction clause does not apply. Record this reasoning clearly in your order.

• If you give a plausible interpretation, be confident that the Supreme Court will protect your order against High Court interference under Article 227. This judgment reassures subordinate courts that they are not required to be “right” in an absolute sense – only reasonable.