Russi Fisheries P Ltd & Anrv.Bhavna Seth & Ors

Legal Analysis: Russi Fisheries P. Ltd. & Anr. vs. Bhavna Seth & Ors

Citation: 2026 INSC 339

Court: Supreme Court of India

Coram: Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Prasanna B. Varale (Two‑Judge Bench)

Judgment Author: Justice Pankaj Mithal

Nature of Judgment: This is a judgment by a Two‑Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in its civil appellate jurisdiction, arising from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell. The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decree of specific performance granted by the First Appellate Court and affirmed by the High Court in second appeal. The Court held that findings of fact by the First Appellate Court are binding in second appeal unless perverse, that the non‑appearance of the plaintiff in the witness box was rebutted by other cogent evidence, and that the transfers made during pendency of litigation were hit by the doctrine of lis pendens.

1. Synopsis of the Judgment

This judgment arises from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell agricultural land dated 18.07.1988. The Trial Court dismissed the suit for specific performance but granted alternative relief of refund of the admitted advance amount. The First Appellate Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part and granted a decree of specific performance. The High Court in second appeal upheld the decree. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that: (i) the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court were not perverse and could not be reopened in second appeal; (ii) the non‑appearance of the plaintiff in the witness box did not fatally affect the case as his Manager (PW‑4) had deposed based on personal knowledge; (iii) the transfers of the suit land made by the defendants during the pendency of the litigation were hit by the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and were non‑est; (iv) since the plaintiff had already executed a sale deed pursuant to the decree (on 08.01.2010, the same day leave was granted by the Supreme Court), it would be inequitable to disturb the decree after such a long passage of time.

2. Basic Information of the Judgment

Case Title: Russi Fisheries P. Ltd. & Anr. vs. Bhavna Seth & Ors. (Heirs of Anil Kishore Seth)

Civil Appeal No.: 109 of 2010

Bench: Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Prasanna B. Varale

Date of Decision: April 2026 (specific date not in extract)

Citation: 2026 INSC 339

Appeal From: Second Appeal before the High Court (judgment upholding the First Appellate Court’s decree of specific performance)

3. Legal Framework

This judgment involves the scope of second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the principles governing specific performance of contracts (readiness and willingness, time being essence, equitable discretion), the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and the evidentiary value of a party’s non‑appearance in the witness box.

A. Key Provisions of Law:

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

• Section 100: Second appeal lies only on a substantial question of law; findings of fact by the First Appellate Court are binding unless perverse or based on no evidence.

• Order XLI Rule 31: First Appellate Court must frame points for determination and give reasons.

Specific Relief Act, 1963:

• Section 10: Specific performance of contracts enforceable.

• Section 16(c): Plaintiff must plead and prove readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract.

• Section 20: Specific performance is an equitable and discretionary remedy.

Transfer of Property Act, 1882:

• Section 52: Doctrine of lis pendens – during the pendency of any suit or proceeding in which any right to immovable property is in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit so as to affect the rights of any other party under any decree or order that may be made.

Indian Evidence Act, 1872:

• Section 114 (Illustration (g)): Court may presume that evidence which could be produced and is not produced would be unfavourable to the person who withholds it (adverse inference for non‑appearance of a party).

B. Related Precedents (Discussed in the Judgment):

• Bholaram v. Ameerchand (1981): Three‑Judge Bench held that even if findings of fact by courts below are wrong or grossly inexcusable, that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere under Section 100 CPC in the absence of a clear error of law. (Para 32)

• Madhavan Nair v. Bhaskar Pillai (Dead) by Lrs. (Citation not fully provided): Even if the First Appellate Court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. (Para 32)

• Kashibai w/o Lachiram & Anr. v. Parwatibai w/o Lachiram & Ors. (Citation not fully provided): High Court cannot reappreciate evidence and interfere with findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court unless they are perverse. (Para 33)

• Kulwant Kaur & Ors. v. Gurdial Singh Mann (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors. (Citation not fully provided): In a second appeal, a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will not be disturbed unless it is found to be vitiated for want of perversity. (Para 35)

• Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao & Anr. (Citation not fully provided): Where a party does not appear in the witness box, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct. (Para 41)

• Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar & Ors. (Recent case, one of the judges (P. Mithal, J) was a party): A power of attorney holder may depose on behalf of the principal in respect of acts within his personal knowledge but cannot depose for acts done by the principal not known personally to him. (Para 43)

• Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani & Anr. v. Indusind Bank Ltd. & Ors. (Citation not fully provided): Same principle as above. (Para 43)

• Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. Nanak Builders & Investors (P) Ltd. (Citation not fully provided): Transfer pendente lite is neither illegal nor void ab initio but remains subservient to the rights of the parties eventually determined by court in the pending litigation. (Para 17)

4. Relevant Facts of the Case

• Agreement to Sell (18.07.1988): Anil Kishore Seth (since deceased, now represented by his heirs – the respondents) entered into an agreement with Russi Fisheries (P) Ltd. (appellant No.1) through its Managing Director Smt. Surjit Kavaljit Singh (appellant No.2) to purchase agricultural land admeasuring 79 Kanals 15 Marlas for a total sale consideration of Rs. 15,41,000/-. The agreement was unregistered but was not denied and was marked as an exhibit.

• Time Essence – Extensions: Time was the essence of the contract. The sale deed was to be executed by 15.12.1988. The time was twice extended, with the last extended date being 30.06.1989.

• Plaintiff’s Alleged Performance: The plaintiff alleged that on 30.06.1989 (the last extended date), he attended the office of the Sub‑Registrar with the balance sale consideration to get the sale deed executed, but the defendants failed to appear.

• Trial Court (10.12.1999): Dismissed the suit for specific performance, holding that the plaintiff failed to prove continuous readiness and willingness. However, decreed the suit for refund of Rs. 2,75,000/- (the amount admitted to have been paid by cheques) with interest @ 12% per annum.

• First Appellate Court (23.04.2003): Reversed the Trial Court. Held that the plaintiff had paid Rs. 7,75,000/- (including cash payments of Rs. 5,00,000/- to defendant No.3), that the plaintiff attended the Sub‑Registrar’s office on 30.06.1989, and that the plaintiff was ready and willing. Granted a decree of specific performance.

• Second Appeal: The defendants filed second appeal before the High Court. The High Court upheld the First Appellate Court’s decree.

• Special Leave Petition (20.08.2009): The defendants filed SLP before the Supreme Court. Leave was granted on 08.01.2010 with an interim order.

• Execution of Sale Deed (08.01.2010): On the same day that leave was granted (08.01.2010), the heirs of the plaintiff (respondents) got the sale deed executed in their favour on the strength of the decree of specific performance passed by the First Appellate Court and affirmed by the High Court.

• Transfers by Defendants: The defendants sold 60% of the suit land on 12.02.2009 (before filing SLP) and the remaining 40% on 27.02.2025 (during the pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court). These transfers were made without disclosing to the Supreme Court.

• Apology by Defendants: Before the Supreme Court, the defendants tendered an unconditional apology for non‑disclosure of the transfers, stating that it occurred due to improper advice and that the transfers would be subject to lis pendens.

5. Issues Identified by the Supreme Court

• Whether the High Court in second appeal was justified in dismissing the second appeal without reappreciating the evidence, given that there were conflicting findings between the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court.

• Whether the findings of the First Appellate Court on readiness and willingness, extension of time, and cash payments were perverse or based on inadmissible evidence.

• Whether the non‑appearance of the plaintiff in the witness box was fatal to the suit for specific performance.

• Whether the relief of specific performance should be denied on equitable grounds due to the passage of time and alleged escalation of property prices.

• What is the effect of the transfers of the suit land made by the defendants during the pendency of the litigation (doctrine of lis pendens) and the execution of the sale deed by the plaintiffs pursuant to the decree.

6. Ratio Decidendi (The Reasoning and Decision of the Court)

A. Findings of Fact by First Appellate Court are Binding in Second Appeal – No Perversity

The Court held that the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court – that the plaintiff had proved extension of time, cash payment of Rs. 5,00,000/-, and continuous readiness and willingness – are strictly findings of fact. These findings were not shown to be perverse, nor were they returned on the basis of inadmissible evidence. Therefore, it was not open for the High Court in second appeal to reappreciate the evidence or disturb those findings. The High Court correctly dismissed the second appeal as raising no substantial question of law. (Paras 30-35)

The Court cited Bholaram v. Ameerchand, Madhavan Nair, Kashibai, and Kulwant Kaur for the proposition that even erroneous findings of fact cannot be reopened in second appeal unless they are perverse or vitiated by an error of law.

B. Non‑Appearance of Plaintiff in Witness Box – Not Fatal When Rebutted by Other Evidence

The Court acknowledged the principle from Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao that when a party does not appear in the witness box, an adverse inference can be drawn that the case set up by him is not correct. However, this presumption is rebuttable. In the present case, PW‑4 (the plaintiff’s Manager) had appeared as a witness, had personal knowledge of the transactions (having worked with the plaintiff since 1988), and substantially corroborated the plaintiff’s case. Therefore, the adverse inference stood rebutted, and the non‑appearance of the plaintiff was not fatal. (Paras 41-42)

The Court also relied on Rajesh Kumar and Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani to hold that a manager may depose about acts within his personal knowledge, and PW‑4’s evidence could not be discarded on the ground that he was not the plaintiff himself. (Para 43)

C. Extension of Time, Cash Payments, and Readiness & Willingness – Findings Upheld

The Court examined the evidence and found:

• Extension of time: Documents showing extension bore the signatures of defendant No.2 (Managing Director) and defendant No.3 (her son). Defendant No.2 admitted her signatures in cross‑examination. The handwriting expert corroborated. Therefore, the finding on extension of time was justified. (Para 36)

• Cash payments: The cash receipts were issued by defendant No.3 (son of defendant No.2) who stated that he was receiving payment on behalf of the company as a Director. He never entered the witness box to deny this. No evidence was led to show that he was not a Director or not authorized. The finding on cash payment was justified. (Para 37)

• Readiness and willingness: The plaintiff issued notices dated 13.06.1989 and 22.06.1989 to the defendants to attend the Sub‑Registrar’s office on 30.06.1989. The plaintiff attended the Sub‑Registrar’s office on that date, which was proved by his application stamped and received by the Sub‑Registrar (PW‑1 proved the stamp). The defendants did not adduce any evidence to show that they were ready and willing to execute the sale deed. The finding on readiness and willingness was justified. (Paras 38-39)

D. Equitable Discretion – No Evidence of Price Escalation, Decree Already Executed

The defendants argued that specific performance should be denied because of the passage of time (agreement in 1988, decree in 2003) and alleged escalation of property prices. The Court held that no evidence was brought on record to establish that prices had escalated, making it inequitable to grant specific performance. Moreover, the plaintiffs had already executed a sale deed on 08.01.2010 pursuant to the decree. Since substantive rights had accrued in favour of the plaintiffs, it would be inequitable to dislodge them at this stage. (Paras 44-45)

E. Doctrine of Lis Pendens – Transfers by Defendants are Non‑Est

The Court held that the transfers made by the defendants on 12.02.2009 and 27.02.2025 (during the pendency of the litigation) were clearly hit by the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Relying on Thomson Press (India) Ltd., the Court held that such transfers are neither illegal nor void ab initio, but remain subservient to the ultimate decree passed in the pending litigation. Since the Supreme Court was upholding the decree of specific performance, the transfers were declared non‑est (of no effect). The defendants’ apology for non‑disclosure was noted but the transfers could not affect the plaintiff’s rights. (Paras 16-17, 46)

F. Appeal Dismissed

The Supreme Court found no merit in the appeal and dismissed it, maintaining the decree of specific performance passed by the First Appellate Court and affirmed by the High Court. The sale deeds executed by the defendants on 12.02.2009 and 27.02.2025 were held to be non‑est. (Para 46)

7. New Legal Principles Established / Reiterated

• Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC – Findings of fact by First Appellate Court are binding unless perverse: The High Court cannot reappreciate evidence in second appeal merely because it disagrees with the First Appellate Court’s findings. Even erroneous findings of fact cannot be disturbed unless they are perverse (i.e., based on no evidence or on inadmissible evidence) or vitiated by an error of law.

• Non‑appearance of a party in the witness box raises a rebuttable presumption, not an absolute bar: The adverse inference under Vidhyadhar can be rebutted by other cogent evidence, including the testimony of a manager or agent who has personal knowledge of the transactions.

• Manager’s evidence is admissible for acts within his personal knowledge: Following Rajesh Kumar, a manager who worked with the principal and had personal knowledge of the transactions can depose on behalf of the principal; his evidence cannot be discarded merely because the principal did not appear.

• Doctrine of lis pendens applies to transfers made during the pendency of a suit, including appeals: Transfers of immovable property made during the pendency of a suit (or appeal) are subservient to the ultimate decree. The transferee takes the property subject to the rights of the parties as finally determined by the court.

• Apology for non‑disclosure of transfers does not cure the effect of lis pendens: While the court may accept an apology for not disclosing transfers, the transfers themselves remain subject to the doctrine of lis pendens and cannot defeat the decree.

8. The Court’s Analysis and Examination of Concepts

A. Scope of Second Appeal – The “Substantial Question of Law” Requirement

The Court reaffirmed the limited jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 CPC. The First Appellate Court is the final court of fact. Its findings of fact cannot be disturbed in second appeal unless the appellant demonstrates that the findings are perverse (i.e., based on no evidence, or based on inadmissible evidence, or so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have arrived at them). The defendants had not made any such showing. The High Court was therefore correct in dismissing the second appeal as raising no substantial question of law. (Paras 30-35)

B. Readiness and Willingness – Continuous Obligation

The Court noted that under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the plaintiff must plead and prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract continuously from the date of the agreement until the date of the decree. The plaintiff in this case had proved: (i) payment of substantial consideration (Rs. 7.75 lakhs out of Rs. 15.41 lakhs); (ii) issuance of notices calling upon the defendants to appear for registration; (iii) actual attendance at the Sub‑Registrar’s office on the last extended date (30.06.1989) with the balance consideration. The First Appellate Court’s finding on readiness and willingness was based on evidence and was not perverse. (Paras 38-39)

C. Adverse Inference for Non‑Appearance – Rebuttal

The Court acknowledged the rule that a party who does not enter the witness box invites an adverse inference. However, this is not an absolute rule; it is a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. The presumption can be rebutted by other evidence. In this case, PW‑4 (the Manager) had personal knowledge of all relevant facts, including the execution of the agreement, the payment of consideration, and the extension of time. His evidence was consistent and credible. Therefore, the adverse inference stood rebutted. (Paras 41-43)

D. Doctrine of Lis Pendens – Scope and Effect

The Court explained that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is based on the principle that a litigant cannot, by transferring the property during the pendency of the litigation, deprive the court of its power to pass an effective decree. The transfer is not void ab initio, but it is void against the decree that may be passed. In other words, the transferee takes the property subject to the outcome of the litigation. Here, the defendants sold the land to third parties without disclosing the pending litigation. Those third parties are bound by the decree of specific performance. The Court accepted the defendants’ apology for non‑disclosure but declared the transfers non‑est. (Paras 16-17, 46)

E. Equitable Discretion – Delay and Laches

The defendants argued that specific performance should be denied because of the passage of time (15 years between the agreement and the decree). The Court held that there was no evidence of price escalation. More importantly, the plaintiff had diligently pursued the litigation. The delay was not attributable to the plaintiff but to the judicial process. Moreover, the decree had already been executed (sale deed executed on 08.01.2010). To disturb the decree at this stage would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff who had already obtained the property. (Paras 44-45)

9. Critical Analysis of the Judgment

Strengths

• Proper deference to First Appellate Court’s findings of fact: The judgment correctly applies the settled principles of Section 100 CPC. It prevents second appeals from becoming a third trial on facts. This is crucial for the finality of litigation.

• Reasonable approach to non‑appearance of plaintiff: The Court did not mechanically apply the adverse inference rule. It examined whether other evidence (PW‑4’s testimony) sufficiently proved the plaintiff’s case. This is a balanced and pragmatic approach.

• Doctrine of lis pendens correctly applied: The judgment protects the plaintiff’s rights against transfers made during litigation, which is essential to prevent parties from frustrating decrees by alienating property.

• Equitable discretion exercised judiciously: The Court considered that the decree had already been executed and substantive rights had accrued. Refusing specific performance after the sale deed was executed would be unjust. The equitable discretion was exercised in favour of upholding the decree.

Potential Concerns / Critiques

• The execution of sale deed on the same day leave was granted (08.01.2010): The Supreme Court granted leave on 08.01.2010 with an interim order. The plaintiffs got the sale deed executed on that very day. This raises questions about whether the execution was done in good faith or was an attempt to pre‑empt the Supreme Court’s decision. The Court noted this fact but did not treat it as a ground to set aside the decree. It held that the decree had already become final (as the High Court had affirmed it) and the Supreme Court had not stayed the decree (only granted leave). While technically correct, a more critical examination of this conduct might have been warranted.

• No discussion on the plaintiff’s failure to prove the source of cash payments: The judgment accepts the cash payments of Rs. 5,00,000/- based on receipts issued by defendant No.3. However, there is no discussion about whether the plaintiff proved the source of such a large cash payment, which could have tax implications. The Court simply notes that defendant No.3 did not enter the witness box to deny. This may be insufficient in cases involving substantial cash transactions.

• Lack of clarity on the effect of non‑registration of the agreement: The agreement was unregistered. Under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, an agreement to sell immovable property does not require registration if it does not create a present interest. The Court noted that it was not denied and was marked as an exhibit. However, no detailed analysis was provided on the admissibility of an unregistered agreement in a suit for specific performance. The law is well‑settled that an unregistered agreement is admissible for collateral purposes (including specific performance), but the judgment could have addressed this point.

• Reliance on PW‑4’s “personal knowledge” – lack of documentary proof of his employment: PW‑4 claimed to have worked with the plaintiff since 1988. The judgment does not mention any documentary evidence (appointment letter, salary slips, etc.) to prove his employment. The Court accepted his testimony on face value. This could be a vulnerability.

Impact

• Second appeals in specific performance cases: This judgment will be cited to argue that findings of fact by the First Appellate Court (on readiness and willingness, payment, extension of time) are binding in second appeal unless perverse. This will reduce the scope of interference by High Courts.

• Non‑appearance of plaintiff: Litigants who cannot appear as witnesses (due to death, illness, or other reasons) can rely on the testimony of managers or agents who have personal knowledge, provided such testimony is credible and corroborated.

• Lis pendens in pending appeals: The judgment confirms that the doctrine of lis pendens applies even during the pendency of an appeal before the Supreme Court. Parties cannot alienate property to defeat a decree that is under challenge.

• Equitable relief after execution of decree: Once a decree of specific performance is executed and a sale deed is registered, courts will be reluctant to reverse the decree, especially after a long passage of time.

10. Final Outcome

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The operative directions were:

1. The appeal was dismissed as having no merit.

2. The decree of specific performance passed by the First Appellate Court (23.04.2003) and upheld by the High Court in second appeal was maintained.

3. The sale deeds executed by the defendants on 12.02.2009 and 27.02.2025 transferring the suit land to third parties were held to be non‑est (of no effect) as they were hit by the doctrine of lis pendens.

4. The sale deed executed by the plaintiffs (heirs of Anil Kishore Seth) on 08.01.2010 pursuant to the decree was upheld.

11. Practical Application, Court Lines, and Legal Strategy

Use in Court (Practical Application)

• For a plaintiff (decree‑holder) in a specific performance suit: If the Trial Court has dismissed the suit but the First Appellate Court has decreed specific performance, and the High Court has dismissed the second appeal, the defendant’s appeal to the Supreme Court is unlikely to succeed if the findings of fact are not perverse. The Supreme Court will not reappreciate evidence. Ensure that you have a manager or agent with personal knowledge who can depose if the plaintiff is unavailable.

• For a defendant (judgment‑debtor) in a specific performance suit: To succeed in second appeal, you must demonstrate that the First Appellate Court’s findings are perverse – i.e., based on no evidence, on inadmissible evidence, or so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have arrived at them. Mere disagreement with the findings is not enough. You must also raise a substantial question of law.

• For a party challenging a decree on the ground that the plaintiff did not appear as a witness: Argue the adverse inference rule from Vidhyadhar. However, be prepared for the opposite party to rebut that inference by calling a manager, agent, or other witness with personal knowledge. The court will weigh the credibility of that witness.

• For a party seeking to protect property during litigation: If you are the plaintiff, immediately register a lis pendens notice under Section 52 of the TP Act. If the defendant transfers the property during the pendency of the suit, the transferee takes the property subject to the decree. You can still execute the decree against the property. The transfer is not void but is subservient.

• For a transferee purchasing property during pending litigation: Always conduct a title search and check for pending suits. If a suit is pending (including an appeal), the property is subject to the doctrine of lis pendens. You take the property at your own risk. The better course is to be impleaded as a party and seek permission from the court before purchasing.

Court Lines

“It is settled in law that the findings of fact howsoever erroneous, cannot be reopened and disturbed in second appeal which is required to be adjudicated only upon the substantial question of law, if any, arising therein.” (Para 31)

“Long back in 1981, three judges of this Court in the case of Bholaram vs. Ameerchand had ruled that even if findings of facts by courts below are wrong or grossly inexcusable that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere under Section 100 CPC in the absence of clear error of law.” (Para 32)

“The adverse presumption, if any, drawn for non‑appearing in the witness box by the plaintiff, is a rebuttal presumption and if the aforesaid presumption is successfully rebutted by the other cogent evidence on record, the said presumption would not be material and applicable.” (Para 42)

“In the present case, PW‑4, the Manager of the plaintiff, had appeared as a witness. He has stated that he had been working with the plaintiff since 1988 and had the knowledge of all the transactions in relation to the agreement to sell dated 18.07.1988. His testimony substantially corroborates the case as set up by the plaintiff… Therefore, the non‑appearance of the plaintiff in the witness box would not be fatal in this case.” (Para 42)

“No doubt, the agreement to sell was executed on 18.07.1988 and the decree of specific performance was passed by the First Appellate Court on 23.04.2003, after a gap of 15 years, no evidence whatsoever was brought on record to establish that within this period the price of property in the area had escalated, making it inequitable to grant the decree of specific performance.” (Para 44)

“The sale deeds executed by the defendants during the pendency of the litigation are certainly hit by doctrine of lis pendens and are non est.” (Para 45)

Legal Strategy Insight

For the Plaintiff (Seeking Specific Performance):

• Step 1 – Document everything: Keep a chronological record of all payments, notices, and attendances. Obtain receipts, postal acknowledgements, and certificates from the Sub‑Registrar.

• Step 2 – Prove readiness and willingness continuously: Not just on the date of the agreement, but right up to the date of the decree. If you cannot appear as a witness (e.g., due to death or illness), ensure that a manager or agent with personal knowledge is available to depose.

• Step 3 – If the Trial Court dismisses the suit, file an appeal immediately. The First Appellate Court is your best chance to obtain a decree of specific performance because it can reappreciate evidence.

• Step 4 – After the First Appellate Court decrees the suit, execute the decree promptly. Do not wait for the second appeal or SLP to be decided, unless the higher court has stayed the decree. In this case, the plaintiffs executed the sale deed on the same day the Supreme Court granted leave but did not stay the decree. That was a strategic move that the Supreme Court did not reverse.

For the Defendant (Resisting Specific Performance):

• Step 1 – In the Trial Court, focus on disproving readiness and willingness. Cross‑examine the plaintiff and his witnesses rigorously. Bring evidence to show that the plaintiff did not have the funds, did not issue proper notices, or did not attend the Sub‑Registrar’s office.

• Step 2 – If the Trial Court dismisses the suit, you may not need to appeal. However, if the First Appellate Court reverses, file a second appeal raising substantial questions of law. Do not merely argue that the findings are wrong; argue that they are perverse (based on no evidence or inadmissible evidence).

• Step 3 – Do not transfer the property during the pendency of the litigation. Any transfer will be subject to lis pendens and will be non‑est. It will not help you, and you may also be liable for contempt or costs for non‑disclosure.

• Step 4 – If you are the defendant and the plaintiff has already executed the sale deed, your chances of success in the Supreme Court are very low. The Court will be reluctant to disturb a decree that has already been executed, especially after a long passage of time.

For the High Court (Deciding Second Appeal):

• Do not reappreciate evidence. Your role is limited to examining whether a substantial question of law arises. If the First Appellate Court’s findings are based on some evidence (even if you disagree), you cannot interfere.

• Only if the findings are perverse – i.e., based on no evidence, based on inadmissible evidence, or so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have arrived at them – can you set them aside.

• If the plaintiff has already executed the sale deed pursuant to the decree, consider whether it is equitable to reverse the decree at that stage. The balance of convenience may favour upholding the decree.

For the Supreme Court (In SLP against second appeal):

• The scope is even narrower than the High Court’s second appeal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court will interfere only if there is a grave miscarriage of justice or a clear error of law.

• If the First Appellate Court’s findings are based on evidence and are not perverse, the Supreme Court will not reappreciate the evidence. The appeal will be dismissed, as in this case.