State of Tamil Nadu & Orsv.Junglee Games India Pvt Ltd & Ors

Legal Analysis: State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. vs. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors

Citation: 2026 INSC 594 (Reportable)
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Division Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan
Judgment Author: Justice J.B. Pardiwala (with Justice R. Mahadevan concurring)
Date of Decision: May 27, 2026
Nature of Judgment: Civil Appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution of India against the judgments of the Madras High Court and the Karnataka High Court, which had struck down state amendments banning online gaming (including rummy and poker) played for stakes. The Supreme Court allowed the State appeals, upheld the amendments, and held that betting on games of skill falls within the legislative competence of the States under Entry 34 of List II (“betting and gambling”) and also under Entry 1 (“public order”).

Synopsis of the Judgment
The State of Tamil Nadu and the State of Karnataka enacted amendments to their respective gaming/police acts to prohibit online betting and gambling, including on games of skill (rummy, poker, etc.) played for stakes. The Madras High Court and the Karnataka High Court struck down the amendments, holding that Entry 34 of List II (“betting and gambling”) must be read conjunctively as “betting on gambling” (i.e., only games of chance), and that games of skill played for stakes are outside State competence and protected under Article 19(1)(g). The Supreme Court reversed the High Courts, holding that Entry 34 is a broad expression covering all forms of betting and gambling, including betting on games of skill. The Court clarified that the long-standing distinction between games of skill and games of chance is irrelevant once stakes are involved because the act of staking money on an uncertain outcome is betting per se, irrespective of the underlying game. The Court also held that the State Legislatures have competence under Entry 1 (public order) and Entry 6 (public health) to regulate online gaming due to its widespread addictive and financially ruinous effects on the community. The impugned amendments were declared intra vires.

1. Basic Information of the Judgment

• Case Title: State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. vs. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (with connected appeals from Karnataka)

• Civil Appeal Nos.: 6124-6131 of 2023; 8275-8279 of 2026; 6132-6143 of 2023; 6144 of 2023

• Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan (Division Bench)

• Judgment Author: Justice J.B. Pardiwala

• Date of Decision: May 27, 2026

• Citation: 2026 INSC 594 (Reportable)

• Appeal From: (i) Judgment dated 03.08.2021 of the Madras High Court in WP No. 18022 of 2020 etc. (Junglee Games); (ii) Judgment dated 09.11.2023 of the Madras High Court in WP No. 13203 of 2023 etc. (TN Online Gambling Act challenge); (iii) Judgment dated 14.02.2022 of the Karnataka High Court in AIGF v. State of Karnataka.

2. Legal Framework

Laws and Provisions Involved:

• Constitution of India, 1950: Article 246 (distribution of legislative powers), Seventh Schedule, List II (State List): Entry 1 (public order), Entry 6 (public health), Entry 26 (trade and commerce), Entry 33 (sports, entertainments and amusements), Entry 34 (betting and gambling). Article 19(1)(g) (right to practice any profession or carry on any occupation, trade or business), Article 19(6) (reasonable restrictions). Article 14 (equality). Article 245 (extent of laws). Doctrine of pith and substance.

• Tamil Nadu Gaming Act, 1930: Sections 3(b) (definition of “gaming” amended to include cyber space), 3-A (prohibition of wagering or betting in cyber space for rummy, poker or any other game), 11 (protection for games of mere skill removed).

• Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Online Gambling and Regulation of Online Gaming Act, 2022/2023: Sections 2(i), 2(l)(iv), Schedule (deeming rummy and poker as online games of chance).

• Karnataka Police Act, 1963: Sections 2(7) (definition of “gaming” amended to include online games with wagering or betting, including on games of skill), 2(11) (instruments of gaming to include computers, mobile apps, internet), 2(12A) (definition of “online gaming”), 2(13) (“place” to include virtual platforms), 78 (offences for opening or using virtual places for gaming with stakes), 176 (saving clause for pure games of skill but not for wagering on them).

• Public Gambling Act, 1867: Historical context; excluded games of mere skill.

• Information Technology Act, 2000: Referenced for definitions of computer resources, communication devices etc.

Key Precedents Cited and Applied:

• State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala (RMDC-I) (AIR 1957 SC 699) – Held that a competition to be gambling must depend to a substantial degree on chance; prize competitions of a gambling nature are res extra commercium. The Court in the present case reinterpreted RMDC-I to hold that it did not decide the scope of “betting” in Entry 34; it only dealt with “prize competitions” where entry fees were the stake. The judgment does not protect betting on games of skill.

• R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India (RMDC-II) (AIR 1957 SC 628) – Severability principle; competitions involving substantial skill are business activities protected under Article 19(1)(g). The present Court held that this protection applies only when games are played without stakes; once stakes are introduced, the activity becomes betting.

• Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996) 2 SCC 226 – Horse-racing held to be a game of skill; wagering on horse-racing within club premises protected under the exception carved out by the State. The present Court held that this decision turned on the specific protection clause and the regulated, physical environment of a racing club; it does not apply to online gaming with stakes.

• M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka (1995) (implied) – “Gaming” defined as playing any game, whether of skill or chance, for money or money’s worth.

• State of Rajasthan v. G. Chawla (AIR 1959 SC 544) – Control of use of amplifiers falls under public order (Entry 1 List II) to protect tranquillity, health and comfort of others.

• Rev. Stainislaus v. State of M.P. (1977) 1 SCC 677 – Law against forcible conversions upheld under public order; anything that disturbs the current of life of the community amounts to disturbance of public order.

• Arun Ghosh v. State of W.B. (1970) 1 SCC 98 – Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community; the potentiality of the act determines its impact.

• Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar (1966) 1 SCR 709 – Three concentric circles: law and order (largest), public order (middle), security of State (smallest).

• S. Bagavathy v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) 2 CTC 207 (Madras HC) – Uphheld depositor protection law under public order; economic and social disorders that shake societal order fall within public order.

• Supt., Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia (1960) 2 SCR 821 – Restriction in interest of public order must have a proximate, not remote, connection to public order.

• Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 – Online speech can be restricted on public order grounds only if there is a clear and present danger.

• Dyson v. Mason (L.R. 22 Q.B.D. 351) – Playing any game for money amounts to gaming, irrespective of skill.

• King Emperor v. Arjoon Singh (6 C.L.J. 708) – Existence of a stake, not the character of the game, constitutes gaming.

• Re Musa (1917) (Madras High Court) – Same principle; the nature of the game (skill/chance) is relevant only if the statute creates an exception for games of skill.

What the Judgment is About: The judgment resolves the constitutional validity of state laws banning online games (rummy, poker, fantasy sports) played for stakes. It overrules the High Courts’ interpretation that “betting and gambling” in Entry 34 List II is limited to games of chance. It holds that betting on any uncertain outcome, including the outcome of a game of skill, falls within “betting” under Entry 34, and the State can regulate or prohibit it. It also upholds the laws under the “public order” entry, recognising the widespread social, economic and health harms of online money gaming. The judgment restores the amendments and declares them intra vires.

3. Relevant Facts

• The State of Tamil Nadu enacted the Tamil Nadu Gaming and Police Laws (Amendment) Act, 2021 (the “2021 TN Amendment Act”), which amended the Tamil Nadu Gaming Act, 1930. It expanded the definition of “gaming” to include wagering or betting in cyberspace (Section 3(b)), introduced Section 3‑A prohibiting wagering or betting in cyberspace on rummy, poker or any other game, and removed the protection for games of mere skill (Section 11).

• The Madras High Court, in Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd. v. State of T.N. (03.08.2021), struck down Part II of the 2021 TN Amendment Act as ultra vires, holding that “betting and gambling” in Entry 34 List II must be read conjunctively as “betting on gambling” (games of chance), and that games of skill played with stakes are protected under Article 19(1)(g).

• Subsequently, Tamil Nadu enacted the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Online Gambling and Regulation of Online Gaming Act, 2022/2023 (the “TN Online Gambling Act”), which created a Schedule deeming rummy and poker as online games of chance. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court (09.11.2023) struck down the Schedule and read down Sections 2(i) and 2(l)(iv) to exclude rummy and poker, following the earlier judgment.

• The State of Karnataka enacted the Karnataka Police (Amendment) Act, 2021 (the “2021 Karnataka Amendment Act”), amending the Karnataka Police Act, 1963. It enlarged the definition of “gaming” (Section 2(7)) to include online games involving wagering or betting, including on a game of skill; defined “instruments of gaming” to include computers, mobile apps and internet (Section 2(11)); introduced “online gaming” (Section 2(12A)); extended “place” to virtual platforms (Section 2(13)); amended Section 78 to penalise opening or using virtual places for gaming involving wagering or betting; and amended Section 176 to remove protection for wagering on games of skill (retaining protection only for playing pure games of skill without stakes).

• The Karnataka High Court, in All India Gaming Federation v. State of Karnataka (14.02.2022), struck down Sections 2, 3, 6, 8 and 9 of the 2021 Karnataka Amendment Act as ultra vires, following the same conjunctive interpretation of Entry 34 and holding that games of skill do not metamorphise into games of chance merely because they are played online.

• The States appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted leave, heard extensive arguments, and allowed the appeals.

4. Issues

1. Whether the conjunction “and” in the expression “betting and gambling” in Entry 34 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution is to be interpreted conjunctively to mean that the State Legislature’s competence extends only to betting on gambling activities (i.e., games of chance), or whether betting on games of pure skill also falls within the State’s legislative competence.

2. Whether the decisions of this Court in RMDC-I, RMDC-II and K.R. Lakshmanan have interpreted Entry 34 as excluding games of skill played with stakes, or whether those decisions are limited to their specific factual contexts.

3. Whether the impugned state legislations are manifestly arbitrary under Article 14 for treating games of skill and games of chance in the same manner.

4. Whether the impugned legislations, by imposing a blanket prohibition on online games with stakes, fail the proportionality test under Article 19(1)(g) and are therefore constitutionally invalid.

5. Whether the State Legislatures also derive competence from Entry 1 (public order) and Entry 6 (public health) of List II to enact the impugned provisions.

6. Whether the term “gaming” has acquired the status of nomen juris (legal term of art) meaning only games of chance, or whether the Legislature can redefine it to include games of skill when played with stakes.

5. Ratio Decidendi

A. Entry 34 of List II (“betting and gambling”) is broad and covers betting on games of skill; the conjunctive interpretation adopted by the High Courts is erroneous (Paras 215-290).

The Court held that the High Courts erred in reading Entry 34 as “betting on gambling” (i.e., only betting integral to games of chance). The expression “betting and gambling” is a common usage expression across the world and in Indian legislation. The word “and” in Entry 34 cannot be read as a rigid conjunctive that limits State competence. Several other entries in the Seventh Schedule use the conjunction “and” (e.g., Entry 48 List I “Stock exchanges and futures markets”), yet they are interpreted broadly to cover each subject individually as well as together. The Constituent Assembly Debates (02.09.1949) clearly indicate that the founding fathers intended that even skill‑based games like rummy played for stakes would fall within the regulatory powers of the State under Entry 34. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar specifically stated that the entry was included so that States could regulate or prohibit betting and gambling, and that omitting it would leave the States helpless.

The Court clarified that the two RMDC cases did not decide the scope of “betting” in Entry 34. Those cases dealt with “prize competitions” where the entry fee itself constituted the stake, and the question was whether such competitions were gambling. The Court in RMDC-I held that a competition depending on chance is gambling. It did not hold that betting on a game of skill (i.e., staking money on the outcome of a skill‑based event) falls outside Entry 34. In RMDC-II, the Court applied severability to protect skill‑based prize competitions from the Act, but that was because the Act was aimed at gambling. The observation that competitions involving substantial skill are business activities protected under Article 19(1)(g) applies only when such competitions are conducted without stakes. Once stakes are introduced, the activity becomes betting, which is not protected.

Similarly, K.R. Lakshmanan was decided on the specific exception carved out by the State for “games of mere skill”. The Court protected betting on horse‑racing only because the State itself had created an exception; it did not lay down an absolute constitutional principle that betting on any game of skill is outside Entry 34. Moreover, the Court in Lakshmanan emphasised the regulated, physical environment of a racing club – a factor wholly absent in online gaming.

Therefore, the State Legislature has competence under Entry 34 to regulate or prohibit betting on any game, whether of skill or chance, because the essence of betting is staking money on an uncertain outcome. The uncertainty of the outcome of a game of skill (even rummy) is real; the player cannot predict with certainty who will win. Staking money on that uncertainty is betting.

B. The impugned legislations are not manifestly arbitrary and do not violate Article 14 (Paras 291-314).

The Court held that the classification drawn by the impugned Acts – treating all online games played with stakes as betting and gambling – is reasonable. The element of betting (stake on uncertain outcome) is common to both games of chance and games of skill when played for money. Therefore, there is no intelligible differentia to treat them differently. The historical exception for games of skill was a legislative policy choice, not a constitutional mandate. The State is free to remove that exception and bring all betting within the sweep of prohibition. The classification has a rational nexus to the object of curbing addiction, financial distress and social harm caused by online money gaming.

C. The impugned legislations are not disproportionate; they fall outside Article 19(1)(g) protection because betting and gambling are res extra commercium (Paras 315-325).

The Court reiterated that betting and gambling are res extra commercium (outside the stream of commerce). In RMDC-I, this Court held that no one can claim a fundamental right to carry on the business of betting or gambling. Therefore, Article 19(1)(g) does not protect such activities. Once the impugned laws are held to be within Entry 34, the question of proportionality under Article 19(6) does not arise. Even assuming Article 19(1)(g) applies to games of skill played without stakes, the moment stakes are introduced, the activity becomes betting, which is not protected. Consequently, the States are empowered to impose a total prohibition, not merely regulation.

D. The State Legislatures also have competence under Entry 1 (public order) and Entry 6 (public health) (Paras 332-375).

The Court exhaustively analysed the expression “public order” in Entry 1 List II. It held that public order is a wide concept encompassing not only law and order but also public safety, public tranquillity, and the even tempo of the life of the community. The Court cited Romesh Thappar, Arun Ghosh, Rev. Stainislaus, and S. Bagavathy to show that:

• Public order includes protection of public health and tranquillity (G. Chawla – control of amplifiers).

• Anything that disturbs the current of life of the community, and not merely affects an individual, amounts to disturbance of public order (Arun Ghosh).

• Social and economic disorders that shake the orderly functioning of society can also constitute breach of public order (S. Bagavathy – depositor protection).

• The potentiality of the act, not merely its kind, determines its impact on public order.

Applying these principles, the Court found that online money gaming has a definite impact on the public at large. It causes widespread addiction, financial distress, and suicides; it affects the youth, leads to loss of savings, disrupts family peace, and poses a serious threat to public health (including mental health). The State of Tamil Nadu relied on the Justice Chandru Committee report and a survey of two lakh teachers, which documented severe adverse effects on students’ concentration, eyesight, IQ, writing skills, self‑esteem, anger and discipline. The WHO has recognised “gaming disorder” as a disease. The Court held that such widespread harm disturbs the even tempo of community life and therefore falls within the State’s power under Entry 1 (public order) and Entry 6 (public health). The presence of a specific entry (Entry 34) does not preclude the State from also tracing competence to other entries.

E. “Gaming” is not a term of art (nomen juris) limited to games of chance; the Legislature can redefine it (Paras 326-331).

The Court rejected the argument that “gaming” has acquired a fixed legal meaning excluding games of skill. The term “gaming” has been defined differently in different statutes. The Constitution uses “betting and gambling”, not “gaming”. The definition of “gaming” is a matter of legislative policy, and the State can expand it to include games of skill played with stakes. The High Courts’ reliance on an alleged nomen juris was misplaced.

F. The appeals were allowed, and the impugned High Court judgments were set aside (Paras 376-379).

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the State of Tamil Nadu and the State of Karnataka. The judgments of the Madras High Court and the Karnataka High Court were set aside. Part II of the 2021 TN Amendment Act, Sections 2(i), 2(l)(iv) and the Schedule to the TN Online Gambling Act 2022/23, and Sections 2, 3, 6, 8 & 9 of the 2021 Karnataka Amendment Act were declared intra vires the Constitution.

6. New Legal Principles Established / Reiterated

• Entry 34 List II (“betting and gambling”) covers betting on games of skill: The State Legislature has competence to regulate or prohibit the act of staking money on the uncertain outcome of any game, whether of chance or skill. The historical distinction between games of skill and games of chance is irrelevant once stakes are involved because the core activity is betting.

• Overruling of the conjunctive interpretation of Entry 34: The High Courts’ reading of “betting and gambling” as “betting on gambling” (i.e., only games of chance) is a constitutional aberration and is hereby overruled. The word “and” in Entry 34 is not a rigid conjunctive; it denotes a composite field.

• Betting on a game of skill is not protected under Article 19(1)(g): Betting is res extra commercium; no fundamental right to carry on the business of betting exists. Even if the underlying game is a game of skill, the introduction of stakes converts the activity into betting, which falls outside constitutional protection.

• Public order (Entry 1 List II) includes combating social and economic harms caused by online money gaming: Large-scale addiction, financial ruin, mental health degradation, and suicides linked to online gaming disturb the even tempo of community life and fall within the State’s power to legislate on public order.

• State Legislatures can rely on multiple entries cumulatively: Even if a law is primarily relatable to Entry 34, it can also be supported by Entry 1 (public order) and Entry 6 (public health). The doctrine of pith and substance allows such cumulative tracing.

• Removal of statutory exception for games of skill is constitutionally permissible: The State is not bound to continue a legislative policy that exempted games of skill from gambling laws. Changing social conditions (digital accessibility, addiction, financial harm) justify removing such exemptions.

7. Court’s Examination and Analysis of Concepts

• Examination of Constituent Assembly Debates (Paras 218-224): The Court extensively quoted the debates of 02.09.1949, where T.T. Krishnamachari stated that the Bombay Government’s order to stop playing rummy for money fell under the powers of Entry 45 (now Entry 34). Dr. B.R. Ambedkar explained that omitting the entry would leave the States helpless to control betting and gambling. The Court held that this clearly shows the founding fathers intended even skill-based games played for stakes to be regulable by the States.

• Reinterpretation of RMDC-I and RMDC-II (Paras 240-290): The Court parsed the facts of the RMDC cases. It noted that those cases involved “prize competitions” where the entry fee was the stake. The Court observed that in RMDC-I, the second category of competition (forecast of future events) was declared gambling even though it could involve statistical skill, because the average participant could not exercise such skill. This indicates that the Court was not laying down an absolute rule that all skill-based activities are outside the gambling concept. The Court also highlighted that RMDC-II upheld severability, not because the Parliament lacked power over skill competitions, but because the legislation was aimed at gambling and could be severed. The Court held that the observations in RMDC-II about competitions involving substantial skill being business activities under Article 19(1)(g) apply only when such competitions are conducted without stakes. Once stakes are introduced, the activity becomes betting and loses protection.

• Analysis of the distinction between offline and online gaming (Paras 262-263, 309-314): The Court noted that in K.R. Lakshmanan, betting on horse-racing was protected only because it took place within a regulated physical club environment on the day of the race. The Court observed that online gaming lacks such physical boundaries, regulation, and transparency. The veil of anonymity and the use of pseudo‑random algorithms, bots, and AI manipulation fundamentally change the nature of the activity, making it more akin to gambling. Therefore, the rationale of Lakshmanan cannot be extended to online money gaming.

• Application of public order doctrine (Paras 356-375): The Court applied the “even tempo of life of the community” test from Arun Ghosh. It held that online money gaming causes widespread financial losses, addiction, family breakdowns, and suicides. These are not isolated individual harms; they affect large sections of the community and disrupt the normal peaceful pursuit of life. The State has a compelling interest to intervene under Entry 1. The Court also relied on the “potentiality test” – the act of staking money online has a high potential to create public disorder because of its addictive design and easy accessibility to vulnerable populations, including youth.

• Rejection of nomen juris argument (Paras 326-331): The Court held that the meaning of “gaming” is not frozen in time. The definition of “gaming” in statutes has varied; some states have defined it to include games of skill, others have excluded. The Constitution uses “betting and gambling”, not “gaming”. Therefore, the State Legislature is not bound by any supposed fixed legal meaning.

8. Critical Analysis

Strengths: The judgment is a landmark reinterpretation of Entry 34 List II. It correctly recognises that the original understanding of the Constituent Assembly was that the entry covered even skill-based games when played for stakes. The detailed analysis of the Constituent Assembly Debates is compelling. The judgment also pragmatically acknowledges that the technological transformation of gaming (online, anonymous, algorithm-driven) has fundamentally altered the nature of the activity, making it more akin to gambling even if the underlying game involves skill. The Court’s refusal to mechanically apply the 70-year-old RMDC principles without considering the changed factual context is a sound application of constitutional interpretation. The reliance on public order and public health provides an additional, robust basis for the legislation, insulating it from future challenges based on narrow readings of Entry 34.

Potential concerns: The judgment overrules a long-standing line of High Court decisions that protected games of skill played with stakes. This will have significant economic consequences for the online gaming industry, which has grown substantially based on the assumption that skill-based games (rummy, poker, fantasy sports) are legal. The judgment does not explicitly overrule K.R. Lakshmanan but distinguishes it on facts. Some may argue that the distinction is not watertight – if horse-racing (a game of skill) with betting inside a club is legal, why is online rummy with stakes illegal? The Court’s answer is that the club environment provides regulation, transparency, and physical control, which is absent online. However, one could argue that online platforms can also be regulated (e.g., licensing, age verification, spending limits). The State of Tamil Nadu in its preamble noted the difficulty of auditing algorithms and the pseudo‑random nature of online games. The Court accepted that as a rational basis for prohibition rather than regulation. Another concern is that the judgment does not provide a clear test for when a game of skill played with stakes crosses the line into betting. The Court appears to hold that any stake on an uncertain outcome is betting, regardless of the level of skill. This could potentially criminalise even friendly bets on a game of chess between two individuals, though such isolated acts may not be the target of the legislation. However, the legislation is aimed at online platforms that systematically facilitate betting.

Practical impact: This judgment will have an immediate and profound impact on the online gaming industry in India. It validates the prohibition of online rummy, poker, and fantasy sports for money in states like Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, and will likely encourage other states to enact similar prohibitions. The judgment also settles the long-running debate over the constitutional validity of state gambling laws affecting games of skill. It shifts the legal paradigm from “is the game one of skill or chance?” to “is there betting/staking on an uncertain outcome?”. The judgment also affirms that states can rely on public order to justify such prohibitions, making it harder to challenge them on federal grounds. The online gaming companies may now need to pivot to skill-based games played without stakes (free-to-play) or move to states that have a regulatory framework (like Nagaland or Sikkim), but the future of real-money gaming in India is severely curtailed.

9. Final Outcome

• Civil Appeal Nos. 6124-6131 of 2023 (Tamil Nadu appeals) and Civil Appeal Nos. 8275-8279 of 2026 (Tamil Nadu appeals) and Civil Appeal Nos. 6132-6143 of 2023 (Karnataka appeals) and Civil Appeal No. 6144 of 2023: Allowed.

• The impugned judgments of the Madras High Court dated 03.08.2021 and 09.11.2023 were set aside.

• The impugned judgment of the Karnataka High Court dated 14.02.2022 was set aside.

• Part II of the Tamil Nadu Gaming and Police Laws (Amendment) Act, 2021, was declared intra vires the Constitution.

• Sections 2(i), 2(l)(iv) and the Schedule to the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Online Gambling and Regulation of Online Gaming Act, 2022/23, were declared intra vires the Constitution.

• Sections 2, 3, 6, 8 and 9 of the Karnataka Police (Amendment) Act, 2021 (Karnataka Act No. 28 of 2021), were declared intra vires the Constitution.

• The connected appeals were disposed of in the same terms.

• No order as to costs.

10. Practical Application

• For a State Government seeking to prohibit or regulate online money gaming: You can rely on this judgment to argue that your legislation is within the legislative competence of the State under Entry 34 List II (betting and gambling) and also under Entry 1 (public order) and Entry 6 (public health). You do not need to prove that the game is a game of chance; it is sufficient to show that the activity involves staking money on an uncertain outcome (including the outcome of a game of skill). You may also cite the Constituent Assembly Debates and the public order analysis. If your state previously had a saving clause for games of skill, you can remove it.

• For an online gaming company (operator of rummy, poker, fantasy sports for money): This judgment is a significant setback. To continue operations, you may need to:
  Switch to a model where no real money is staked (e.g., free-to-play with virtual currency, or skill-based tournaments with fixed entry fees and pre-announced prizes that are not linked to the number of participants? The judgment distinguishes entry fees for tournaments (which may be protected) from stakes on individual games. The Court in paragraph 279(m)-(p) makes a distinction: entry fee for a skill-based competition (tournament) may not be gambling if the prize is pre-declared and not linked to the pool of stakes. However, the Court found that the online gaming platforms in question were not conducting tournaments but individual games where each game had a winner and the prize pool was based on the stakes of the players. You may attempt to restructure your platform as a tournament-based competition with fixed entry fees and pre-announced prizes, but this will be subject to judicial scrutiny. The judgment also upholds the removal of the skill exemption, so your best defence is to argue that your platform does not involve “betting” because the outcome is substantially determined by skill and the players are not placing bets on an external uncertain event but are competing in a skill contest. However, the Court rejected this argument in the context of the specific platforms before it. You may need to challenge the law on grounds other than Entry 34, such as that it violates Article 14 by discriminating between online and offline games (the Court held that the classification is rational because online games have unique features like algorithm manipulation, anonymity, and lack of physical supervision). This is an uphill battle.

• For a High Court judge dealing with a challenge to a similar state law: Follow this judgment. Uphold the law if it prohibits or regulates online money gaming, including games of skill. Do not apply the conjunctive reading of Entry 34. The tests are: (i) does the law target betting (staking money on an uncertain outcome)? (ii) if yes, the State has competence. You need not determine whether the underlying game is of skill or chance. Also, you may uphold the law under public order if there is evidence (legislative findings, surveys, reports) showing widespread harm to the community.

• For a litigant (player) who has lost money in online gaming: You may not directly rely on this judgment to recover losses, but you can argue that the gaming platform is operating illegally and therefore your losses were incurred in an illegal contract (void under Section 23 of the Contract Act). However, the judgment declares the prohibition valid only in the states of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka (and potentially other states that enact similar laws). You would need to show that the platform was operating in violation of the law of the state where the transaction took place.

11. Court Lines

• “The finding in the impugned judgments that the expression ‘betting and gambling’ ought to be interpreted as ‘betting on gambling’ is a clear Constitutional aberration, tinkering with the Constitution or actually rewriting the Constitutional text which Courts are not legally entitled to do.” (Para 268)

• “When the uncertainty remains the same and the constant factor in both these groups of games also remains the same, an interpretation taking one out of the regulation and retaining the other especially when the State Governments of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu tracing their power to Entry 34 List II had removed the protection to stakes played on games of skill, is an erroneous reading of Entry 34 of List II.” (Para 270)

• “The protection afforded to games of skill under Entry 34 cannot be construed as protection to betting on games of skill, which essentially becomes a gambling enterprise. The protection is to games of skill, where such games are to be conducted not in a manner which essentially renders them into gambling activities by allowing the players to bet on the uncertain outcome of their victory.” (Para 274)

• “If this Court really intended to permit and constitutionally protect games of skill being played with stakes, it could not have possibly quoted Hamilton's Hedaya and in particular, the above extract in support of that proposition, since it says exactly to the contrary.” (Para 283)

• “The expression ‘betting and gambling’ cannot be split to mean that the staking angle alone would amount to betting whereas the risk angle or the chance element would amount to gamble. Both betting and gambling involve the aspect of staking money on an uncertainty.” (Para 273)

• “The competence of the State to regulate certain activity also enables it to prohibit the same activity. The 2021 TN Amendment Act has not provided a sweeping definition or a ‘Midas touch’. It has merely brought every form of betting and gambling under its sweep, and for that the States are empowered under Entry 34 List II.” (Para 320)

• “In terms of addiction, in terms of monetary losses and in terms of resultant widespread suicides respectively, online money gaming has a definite impact on the public. When such is the case, it has to be recognized that online money gaming has been disturbing the tranquility of the public by making betting and gambling more normalized and accessible. Therefore, public tranquility is breached and consequently, the States would have competence to invoke public order and seek to curb the mischief and restore public tranquility.” (Para 362)

• “The addiction and depression that stems from indulging in online money gaming and the frequent suicides that are reported would go on to indicate that this poses a widespread public health issue as well.” (Para 364)

12. Legal Strategy Insight

• For a State Government (plaintiff/defender of the law): When drafting a similar law, include a detailed Statement of Objects and Reasons that documents the harms of online money gaming – addiction, financial distress, suicides, impact on youth mental health, and the difficulty of regulating due to algorithmic manipulation and anonymity. Cite the WHO’s recognition of “gaming disorder”. Include empirical data (surveys, reports) to satisfy the “public order” and “public health” justifications. Also, explicitly state that the law is enacted under Entry 34, Entry 1, and Entry 6 of List II. If your state previously had a saving clause for games of skill, expressly remove it and state that the removal is based on changed social conditions (digital penetration). In litigation, focus on the fact that the activity being targeted is “betting”, not the underlying game. Use the Constituent Assembly Debates as historical evidence. Also, argue that the classification between online and offline games is rational because online gaming has unique features (anonymity, 24/7 availability, bots, AI, cross-border transactions) that make it more harmful and harder to regulate.

• For an online gaming company (petitioner/challenger): After this judgment, a frontal challenge to state laws under Entry 34 is unlikely to succeed. However, you may still argue that the law is disproportionate because a complete ban is not the least intrusive measure – regulation (licensing, age limits, spending caps, self‑exclusion) would be equally effective. The Court rejected this argument holding that betting is res extra commercium, but you can argue that the platform itself is not betting; it is merely providing a medium for players to compete. The Court distinguished between a tournament entry fee (which may be protected) and individual game stakes. Restructure your platform as a tournament-based skill competition with pre‑declared prizes not linked to the number of participants or the stakes. Also, consider moving your operations to states that have a regulatory framework for online skill games (e.g., Nagaland, Sikkim) and restrict access from states that have banned real-money gaming. However, the judgment in para 321 states that the State’s power to regulate includes the power to prohibit, and that no fundamental right exists. Therefore, a total ban is permissible. Your best hope is to persuade the legislature to enact a regulatory regime instead of a ban, arguing that a regulated market would generate revenue and protect consumers better than an outright ban that drives the activity underground.

• For a litigant (player) suing to recover losses: You may argue that the contract of betting is void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act (object unlawful). After this judgment, the prohibition is constitutionally valid, so any contract for online money gaming in states where such laws apply is void. You may seek recovery of the amount paid as “money had and received” (unjust enrichment) if you can prove that the platform knowingly operated in violation of the law. However, courts may apply the principle of in pari delicto (both parties are equally at fault) and refuse to grant relief. The judgment does not address civil recovery, so this remains uncertain.

• For a criminal defence lawyer representing a person accused of operating an online gaming platform: Argue that the law is still subject to the requirement of “reasonableness” under Article 19(6) if the activity is not betting but a genuine skill competition. But the Court has held that betting is res extra commercium, so the Article 19(1)(g) challenge fails. However, you may argue that the accused had a bona fide belief that the platform was legal based on pre-existing High Court judgments that were overruled now. The Court may consider this as a mitigating factor for sentence, but the conviction would stand if the law is held valid. You may also challenge the law on the ground of excessive delegation or vagueness, but the Court upheld the definitions as clear enough. The better strategy is to negotiate a plea deal or argue for lenient punishment (fine instead of imprisonment) if the platform had taken steps to ensure compliance (age verification, self-exclusion, etc.).