Syed Mohammed Ghouse Pasha Khadriv.Syed Mohammed Adil Pasha Khadri & Ors

Legal Analysis: Syed Mohammed Ghouse Pasha Khadri vs. Syed Mohammed Adil Pasha Khadri & Ors

Citation: 2026 INSC 315
Court: Supreme Court of India
Coram: Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi
Judgment Author: Justice Vipul M. Pancholi
Date of Decision: April 2, 2026
Nature of Judgment: This is a judgment by a Division Bench of the Supreme Court in its civil appellate jurisdiction, arising from Special Leave Petitions against a judgment of the Karnataka High Court.

1. Synopsis of the Judgment

This judgment concerns the succession to the office of Sajjadanashin (spiritual head) of a Dargah. The dispute arose between the youngest son of the original Sajjadanashin (appellant) and his grandson (respondent no. 1), who was nominated as Jan‑Nasheen (successor) through a Khilafatnama dated 26.02.1981. The trial court and first appellate court concurrently found in favour of the respondent, and the High Court dismissed the second appeal, holding that no substantial question of law arose. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the office of Sajjadanashin is primarily spiritual and hereditary in nature, and the incumbent has the authority to nominate a successor. The Court rejected allegations of interpolation in the nomination document, held that a power of attorney cannot confer succession, and declined to interfere with concurrent findings of fact.

2. Basic Information of the Judgment

• Case Title: Syed Mohammed Ghouse Pasha Khadri vs. Syed Mohammed Adil Pasha Khadri & Ors. etc.

• Civil Appeal Nos.: 13345–13346 of 2015 (arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 13229–13230 of 2009)

• Bench: Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi

• Judgment Author: Justice Vipul M. Pancholi

• Date of Decision: April 2, 2026

• Citation: 2026 INSC 315

• Appeal From: Common judgment and order dated 15.04.2008 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in R.S.A. Nos. 1574 and 1575 of 2005.

3. Legal Framework

This judgment involves the law relating to succession to religious offices in Muslim institutions, the scope of second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), and the principles governing proof of documents and nomination.

A. Key Provisions and Concepts:

• Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:
  Section 100: Second appeal lies only on a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact are binding unless perverse.

• Muslim Law – Office of Sajjadanashin:
  The Sajjadanashin is the spiritual head of a Dargah or Khanqah, responsible for religious guidance, conducting Urs, Sandal ceremonies, and preserving the spiritual lineage (silsila).
  Succession is ordinarily determined by custom, usage, or nomination by the incumbent, not by strict rules of inheritance.
  A power of attorney cannot confer succession to a religious office.

• Evidence Act, 1872:
  Section 101: Burden of proof lies on the party who asserts a fact (including allegation of interpolation).

B. Related Precedents (Discussed in the Judgment):

• Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179: Laid down the scope of Section 100 CPC – second appeal is confined to substantial questions of law.

• Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai v. Mohd. Hanifa (1976) 4 SCC 780: Recognised that the office of Sajjadanashin is spiritual in character and succession may be by nomination or custom.

• Ebrahim Aboobaker v. Tek Chand Dolwani AIR 1953 SC 298: Custom must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved.

• H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmaiamma AIR 1959 SC 443: The burden of establishing forgery or interpolation lies on the party alleging it; mere suspicion is insufficient.

• Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2012) 1 SCC 656: A power of attorney is merely an instrument of agency and cannot transfer ownership or create proprietary rights.

• Rangammal v. Kuppuswami (2011) 12 SCC 220: The propounder of a document bears the primary burden of proof.

4. Relevant Facts of the Case

1. Original Sajjadanashin: Peer Pasha Khadri was the original Sajjadanashin of the Hazarath Mardane‑e‑Gaib Dargah, Shivasamudram, Karnataka (as per Wakf Board Notification dated 01.04.1965).

2. First Nomination: Peer Pasha Khadri appointed his eldest son, Akhil Pasha Khadri, as Jan‑Nasheen Sajjada. Akhil predeceased his father on 27.10.1980.

3. Nomination of Respondent No. 1: On 26.02.1981, at a religious function attended by other Sajjadanashins and elders, Peer Pasha Khadri appointed his grandson (respondent no. 1) as Jan‑Nasheen Sajjada, documented in a Khilafatnama (Ex. P‑72). The appellant was present and attested the document as a witness.

4. Death of Original Sajjadanashin: Peer Pasha Khadri died on 06.10.1988. Respondent no. 1 claimed to have become the Sajjadanashin.

5. Rival Claim: The appellant (youngest son) asserted his claim based on a General Power of Attorney (Ex. D‑1), a handwritten Khilafatnama (Ex. D‑13), and an affidavit (Ex. D‑23).

6. Civil Suits: Respondent no. 1 filed O.S. No. 233/1989 seeking declaration as Sajjadanashin; appellant filed O.S. No. 724/1988 (renumbered as 342/1995) claiming the same office.

7. Trial Court (14.11.2000): Decreed respondent no. 1’s suit, dismissed appellant’s suit, holding the office was hereditary and the nomination valid.

8. First Appellate Court (07.07.2005): Dismissed both appeals, affirming the trial court’s findings.

9. High Court (15.04.2008): Dismissed second appeals, holding no substantial question of law arose.

10. Supreme Court Appeal: The appellant challenged the High Court’s judgment.

5. Issues Identified by the Supreme Court

1. Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the Regular Second Appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, holding that no substantial question of law arose, given the concurrent findings of fact by the courts below.

2. Whether the Khilafatnama dated 26.02.1981 (Ex. P‑72) constituted a valid nomination of the respondent no. 1 as Sajjadanashin, or whether it merely conferred a lesser spiritual status (Khilafat).

3. Whether the documents relied upon by the appellant (GPA, earlier Khilafatnama, affidavit) conferred any right of succession to the office of Sajjadanashin.

4. Whether the alleged interpolation in Ex. P‑72 was proved, and whether the burden of proof was correctly placed.

6. Ratio Decidendi (The Reasoning and Decision of the Court)

A. Scope of Second Appeal and Concurrent Findings

• The Court reiterated that under Section 100 CPC, the High Court’s jurisdiction is confined to substantial questions of law. Concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and first appellate court are binding unless shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or ignoring material evidence. In this case, the High Court correctly held that no substantial question of law arose.

B. Nature of the Office of Sajjadanashin

• The Court affirmed that the Sajjadanashin is a spiritual office, not merely a secular managerial role (mutawalli). The incumbent has the authority to nominate a successor in accordance with custom or usage. The office is hereditary in the sense of spiritual lineage, but succession can be by nomination, not necessarily by primogeniture.

C. Validity of Khilafatnama (Ex. P‑72)

• The document was executed at a religious ceremony in the presence of other Sajjadanashins and elders. The appellant himself attested it as a witness. The testimony of attesting witnesses was credible and not shaken in cross‑examination. The document, though not using the precise term “Sajjadanashin”, clearly conveyed the intention to confer spiritual authority and designate the respondent no. 1 as successor (Jan‑Nasheen).

D. Allegation of Interpolation

• The appellant alleged that the word “Jan‑Nasheen” was inserted later. However, he failed to produce any evidence (e.g., expert opinion) to substantiate the allegation. The burden of proving interpolation lay on the appellant, and he did not discharge it. Mere suspicion is insufficient.

E. Documents Relied Upon by the Appellant

• General Power of Attorney (Ex. D‑1): A power of attorney creates only an agency relationship; it cannot confer succession to a religious office. It is co‑terminus with the principal’s life and authority.

• Khilafatnama dated 06.07.1969 (Ex. D‑13): This did not amount to nomination as Sajjadanashin; at best, it conferred some spiritual authority but not succession.

• Affidavit (Ex. D‑23): An affidavit cannot be treated as a valid instrument of nomination for a religious office, especially when not corroborated by formal ceremony or tradition.

F. Rejection of Other Contentions

• The respondent’s residence in Bangalore was factually disputed; the courts below found he also resided in Shivasamudram. This concurrent finding cannot be interfered with.

• The recognition of respondent no. 1 as Sajjadanashin does not extinguish the rights of other family members in Wakf property; those are separate legal rights.

G. Conclusion

• The Supreme Court found no infirmity in the judgments of the courts below. The appeals were dismissed.

7. New Legal Principles Established / Reiterated

1. Nomination by Incumbent is Valid Mode of Succession to Sajjadanashin: The judgment reiterates that for a Dargah, the office of Sajjadanashin may devolve by nomination of the incumbent, especially when supported by custom and religious ceremony, rather than by strict rules of inheritance.

2. Power of Attorney Cannot Confer Succession: A GPA, even if registered, is merely an instrument of agency and cannot create a right to succeed to a religious office. This is an extension of the principle in Suraj Lamp to religious offices.

3. Burden of Proving Interpolation on Alleging Party: The party alleging interpolation in a document must adduce cogent evidence (e.g., expert opinion). Mere suspicion or delay in raising the issue is insufficient.

4. Concurrent Findings Binding in Second Appeal: The Supreme Court reiterated that under Section 100 CPC, the High Court (and the Supreme Court under Article 136) will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless there is manifest perversity or miscarriage of justice.

8. The Court’s Analysis and Examination of Concepts

• Distinction between Sajjadanashin and Mutawalli: The Court clarified that the Sajjadanashin is primarily a spiritual office, while a mutawalli is a secular manager. This distinction was critical because the appellant attempted to argue that the predecessor was only a mutawalli.

• Interpretation of Khilafatnama: The Court considered the document in its entirety, including the religious ceremony and surrounding circumstances. It held that even if the exact term “Sajjadanashin” was not used, the conferment of “Khilafat” and the act of nomination in a public religious ceremony constituted a valid designation as successor.

• Burden of Proof on Alleged Interpolation: The appellant claimed that the word “Jan‑Nasheen” was interpolated. The Court noted that the appellant himself was a witness to the document and did not object at the time. The burden shifted to him, and he failed to seek expert examination. The Court refused to entertain the request for CFSL examination at the Supreme Court stage.

• Rejection of the GPA Argument: The Court applied the principle from Suraj Lamp (which dealt with immovable property) to the context of a religious office, holding that a power of attorney cannot transfer the office itself.

9. Critical Analysis of the Judgment

• Strength – Upholding Concurrent Findings: The judgment correctly respects the well‑settled principle that in second appeals, the High Court (and the Supreme Court) should not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless they are perverse. This promotes finality of litigation.

• Clarity on Succession to Religious Offices: The judgment provides useful guidance on how succession to Sajjadanashin should be determined – by examining custom, nomination, and religious ceremonies, not by rigid application of inheritance laws.

• Rejection of Unsubstantiated Allegations: By refusing to entertain the interpolation claim without expert evidence, the Court prevented the appellant from using delay as a tactic to unsettle a long‑standing nomination.

• Potential Critique – Lack of Detailed Custom Proof: The Court did not extensively examine whether the custom of nomination was specifically pleaded and strictly proved (as required by Ebrahim Aboobaker). However, the concurrent findings of the courts below on this point were accepted, and the appellant had himself admitted the practice of nomination.

• Impact: The judgment will be cited in disputes over succession to religious offices in Muslim institutions (Dargahs, Khanqahs). It also serves as a reminder that a power of attorney cannot create proprietary or succession rights.

10. Final Outcome

The Supreme Court dismissed the civil appeals. It affirmed the concurrent findings of the trial court, first appellate court, and the High Court, holding that the respondent no. 1 was validly nominated and is the lawful Sajjadanashin of the Dargah. The interim orders were vacated.

11. Practical Application, Court Lines, and Legal Strategy

Use in Court (Practical Application)

1. To defend a succession to a religious office where the incumbent nominated a successor through a religious ceremony and document, even if the document does not explicitly use the term “Sajjadanashin”. Argue that the intention and surrounding circumstances are determinative.

2. To challenge a claim based on a power of attorney in a dispute over succession to a religious office. Rely on this judgment to argue that a GPA cannot confer succession rights; it is merely an agency.

3. To oppose an allegation of interpolation in a document when the alleging party has not produced expert evidence. Cite this judgment for the principle that the burden lies on the party alleging interpolation, and mere suspicion is insufficient.

Court Lines

• “The office of Sajjadanashin is not merely an administrative manager of Wakf property but is primarily the spiritual head of the shrine, responsible for preserving the spiritual lineage (silsila), guiding disciples (murids), conducting religious ceremonies such as Urs and Sandal, and maintaining the spiritual traditions associated with the shrine.” (Para 35)

• “It is a settled principle that mere suspicion cannot displace a document which has otherwise been duly proved. The burden of establishing forgery or interpolation lies on the party alleging it.” (Para 42)

• “A power of attorney is merely an instrument of agency and cannot by itself transfer ownership or create proprietary rights. … a document which merely authorises another person to act on behalf of the executant cannot be construed as conferring succession to a spiritual office such as that of a Sajjadanashin.” (Para 47, quoting Suraj Lamp)

• “The present litigation concerns succession to the office of Sajjadanashin and not the proprietary rights of descendants in Wakf property or income. The recognition of one individual as Sajjadanashin does not determine or extinguish the independent legal rights of other beneficiaries under Wakf law.” (Para 51)

Legal Strategy Insight

• For a claimant to a religious office: To strengthen a claim based on nomination, produce contemporaneous documentary evidence (Khilafatnama, certificate of succession) and oral evidence of witnesses present at the religious ceremony. Ensure that the document is properly proved and that the custom of nomination is pleaded and proved.

• For a challenger to a nomination: To succeed, the challenger must produce cogent evidence of fraud, interpolation, or that the nomination violated a clear and mandatory custom. Relying on a power of attorney or an affidavit without supporting ceremony is weak. Seek expert examination of the disputed document at the earliest stage, not belatedly.

• For a party facing an allegation of interpolation: If the opponent fails to produce expert evidence or examine the scribe, argue that the burden of proof has not been discharged. Point out any admission by the opponent (e.g., attestation of the document) that undermines the allegation.