Vice Chancellor, Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation Universityv.Jitendra Singh and Others

Legal Analysis: Vice Chancellor, Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University v. Jitendra Singh and Others

Citation: 2026 INSC 520

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: A Division Bench comprising Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha & Justice Alok Aradhe

Date of Decision: May 21, 2026

Nature of Judgment: Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 16265 of 2024 and connected matter against the order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench dated 22.05.2024.

Synopsis of the Judgment

The respondent (First Registrar) was appointed as the First Registrar of the Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University under the transitional provisions of Section 46(b) of the Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University Act, 2013. His services were terminated during probation, which led to litigation. After remand by the High Court, a fresh disciplinary enquiry was conducted, and the Visitor (President of India) approved termination of his services. The High Court held that the Visitor had no role in disciplinary proceedings against university employees and quashed the termination. The Supreme Court reversed this finding, holding that: (i) under the transitional provisions, the Visitor was the appointing authority for the First Registrar; (ii) under Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the appointing authority has the power to dismiss or remove the appointee; (iii) the Visitor was therefore competent to terminate the services; (iv) however, since the three‑year term under Section 46(b) had already expired, the respondent was not entitled to reinstatement; (v) the High Court’s order granting back wages was set aside, and the matter was disposed of without any further relief.

1. Basic Information of the Judgment

Case Title: Vice Chancellor, Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University v. Jitendra Singh and Others (with connected appeal)

Citation: 2026 INSC 520

Civil Appeal Nos.: Arising out of SLP (C) No. 16265 of 2024 and Diary No. 38863 of 2024

Bench: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha & Justice Alok Aradhe

Date of Decision: May 21, 2026

Court: Supreme Court of India (Civil Appellate Jurisdiction)

Impugned Order: Order dated 22.05.2024 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, setting aside the order of the learned Single Judge dated 25.04.2023 and the order of the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Civil Aviation dated 27.04.2022.

2. Legal Framework

Major Laws and Provisions Involved

• Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University Act, 2013 – Section 2(b) (definition of academic staff), Section 2(l) (definition of employee), Section 2(x) (definition of teacher), Section 9 (Visitor – powers of the President of India), Section 14 (appointment of Registrar by Executive Council), Section 20 (Executive Council – first Executive Council until constituted, Steering Committee to function as interim Executive Council), Section 46 (transitional provisions – first Registrar to be appointed by Visitor on recommendation of Vice‑Chancellor, to hold office for three years).

• Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University, First Statute, 2016 – Statute No. 28 (removal of employees of University – Vice‑Chancellor or appointing authority to take action on misconduct).

• General Clauses Act, 1897 – Section 16 (where a power to make appointment is conferred, the authority having that power shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person so appointed, unless a different intention appears).

Key Precedents Cited and Applied

• No specific precedents were cited; the Court relied on the plain language of Section 46(b) of the Act, Statute No. 28(1), and Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The Court also referred to the principle that a transitional provision is meant to deal with circumstances existing at the time the legislation comes into force and its operation is expected to be temporary.

3. Relevant Facts

The Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University was established under the Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University Act, 2013. The Central Government framed the First Statute, 2016 on 07.03.2016.

The President of India, as Visitor, approved the appointment of the First Registrar on 28.02.2019. The Vice‑Chancellor issued an offer of appointment on 01.03.2019, appointing the respondent on probation for one year. He assumed charge on 08.04.2019.

During the probation period, his services were terminated by order dated 08/09.01.2020, with one month’s salary in lieu of notice. The respondent challenged the termination. A learned Single Judge directed his reinstatement on 17.09.2021. The Division Bench, on 17.12.2021, held that the termination order was stigmatic and remitted the matter to the University to proceed afresh. The respondent’s SLP against that order was dismissed on 04.02.2022.

On 31.12.2021, the respondent was reinstated and simultaneously placed under suspension. A Memorandum of Charges was served on 22.02.2022. An Enquiry Committee submitted its report on 23.03.2022, holding several charges proved. The Visitor granted approval for termination on 20.04.2022, which was communicated to the respondent on 27.04.2022.

The respondent challenged the termination before the High Court. A learned Single Judge held that his services had never been extended beyond the one‑year probation and that he was only entitled to one month’s salary. The Division Bench, however, held that the Visitor had no role in disciplinary proceedings concerning university employees and that the entire action was without jurisdiction. It quashed the termination and granted back wages to the respondent.

The University and the Union of India appealed to the Supreme Court.

4. Issues

Issue No. 1: Whether the Visitor (President of India) had the jurisdiction to take disciplinary action and terminate the services of the First Registrar of the University, given the transitional provisions of Section 46(b) of the Act.

Issue No. 2: Whether the Division Bench of the High Court erred in holding that the Visitor had no role in disciplinary proceedings against the First Registrar.

Issue No. 3: What relief, if any, should be granted to the respondent, considering that his three‑year term under Section 46(b) had expired by the time of the Supreme Court’s judgment.

5. Ratio Decidendi

A. The First Registrar was appointed under the transitional provisions of Section 46(b) of the Act (Paras 21-22).

Section 46(b) of the Act provides that “the first Registrar and the first Finance Officer shall be appointed by the Visitor on the recommendation of the Vice‑Chancellor and each of the said officers shall hold office for a term of three years.” The Court held that this is a transitional provision, meant to deal with the initial establishment of the University. The power under Section 46(b) exhausts itself when it is exercised by making the appointment. The First Registrar was appointed under this provision, not under the regular Statutes.

B. The appointing authority has the power to remove under Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Paras 25-26).

The Court invoked Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, which provides that where a Central Act confers a power to make an appointment, the authority having that power shall also have the power to suspend or dismiss any person so appointed, unless a different intention appears. The Visitor appointed the First Registrar; therefore, the Visitor had the power to terminate his services. The Court noted that the respondent did not raise the plea of lack of jurisdiction in the earlier round of litigation, which had attained finality.

C. The High Court erred in holding that the Visitor had no role in disciplinary proceedings (Paras 27-28).

The Division Bench of the High Court had held that the Visitor had no role under the Act or the Statutes in disciplinary proceedings concerning officers and employees of the University. The Supreme Court reversed this finding, holding that the exercise of power by the Visitor was just and proper, and in consonance with Section 46(b) and Section 16 of the General Clauses Act. The Court specifically noted that the First Registrar was not a regular Registrar; he was the “First Registrar” appointed under the transitional provision.

D. However, the three‑year term under Section 46(b) had already expired; no reinstatement was possible (Para 29).

The Court observed that the term of the First Registrar under Section 46(b) was three years from the date of appointment (01.03.2019 to 28.02.2022). By the time the Supreme Court was deciding the matter (May 2026), the term had long expired. Therefore, even if the termination order was set aside, the respondent could not be reinstated. Consequently, the Court did not grant any relief to the respondent.

E. The appeals were disposed of with no order as to costs, setting aside the High Court’s order (Paras 29-30).

The Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court, but did not reinstate the termination order, as the term had expired. The matter was disposed of without any further relief to the respondent. The High Court’s order granting back wages was also set aside. No order as to costs.

6. New Legal Principles Established / Reiterated

• Under Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the authority empowered to make an appointment is also empowered to suspend or dismiss the appointee, unless a contrary intention appears from the statute. This principle applies to transitional appointments under a newly enacted statute.

• The transitional provisions of a statute (such as Section 46 of the Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University Act) are meant to deal with the initial circumstances at the time the legislation comes into force. The power under a transitional provision exhausts itself when exercised. However, the consequences of that exercise (including the power to remove) are governed by the General Clauses Act.

• In cases where a fixed‑term appointment under a transitional provision has expired during the pendency of litigation, the court may not grant reinstatement even if it finds the termination order to be without jurisdiction, because there is no subsisting employment relationship.

7. Court’s Examination and Analysis

The Court first examined the relevant provisions of the Act. It noted that Section 46(b) specifically provides for the appointment of the “first Registrar” by the Visitor on the recommendation of the Vice‑Chancellor, for a term of three years. This is a transitional provision distinct from the regular appointment process under Section 14 (which requires appointment by the Executive Council).

The Court then examined Statute No. 28, which deals with the removal of employees. It observed that Statute No. 28(1) provides that the appointing authority has the power to remove an employee on grounds of misconduct. Since the Visitor was the appointing authority for the First Registrar, the Visitor was competent to take disciplinary action.

The Court also relied on Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, which is a well‑settled principle that the power to appoint includes the power to dismiss, unless the statute indicates otherwise. The Court found no contrary intention in the Act or the Statutes.

The Court noted that the Division Bench of the High Court had erred by applying the provisions relating to regular appointments to the “First Registrar” who was appointed under the transitional provision. The High Court had also overlooked the fact that the respondent had not challenged the Visitor’s jurisdiction in the earlier round of litigation, which had become final.

However, the Court also recognized the practical reality: the respondent’s three‑year term had expired in February 2022. By the time the Supreme Court was deciding the appeal (May 2026), there was no subsisting appointment. Therefore, even if the termination order was set aside, the respondent could not be reinstated. The Court, therefore, did not grant any relief to the respondent, but allowed the appeals to the extent of setting aside the High Court’s order.

8. Critical Analysis

Strengths: The judgment correctly interprets the transitional provisions of the Act and applies Section 16 of the General Clauses Act. It correctly distinguishes between the “First Registrar” (appointed under the transitional provision) and the regular Registrar (appointed under the regular Statutes). The Court’s finding that the Visitor was the appointing authority and therefore had the power to terminate is sound. The judgment also pragmatically notes that even if the termination was set aside, reinstatement was impossible because the term had already expired. This avoids unnecessary litigation over a moot issue.

Potential concerns: The judgment does not explicitly address whether the disciplinary proceedings themselves were conducted fairly. The High Court had held that the entire action was without jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed on jurisdiction but did not examine the merits of the disciplinary findings. However, given that the term had expired, such an examination was unnecessary. Another concern is that the Court did not discuss whether the respondent’s probation had been extended or confirmed; the learned Single Judge had held that his services were never extended beyond the one‑year probation. The Supreme Court did not comment on this. Nevertheless, the expiry of the three‑year term made the issue moot.

Practical impact: This judgment clarifies that transitional appointments made under a new statute are governed by the General Clauses Act, and the appointing authority (here, the Visitor) retains the power to remove. It also serves as a reminder that in service litigation, if the term of a fixed‑term appointment expires during the pendency of proceedings, the court may not grant reinstatement even if it finds the termination to be invalid. Employees in such positions should seek interim relief to protect their tenure.

9. Final Outcome

The Civil Appeals were disposed of.

• The impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 22.05.2024 was set aside.

• The Court held that the Visitor (President of India) had the jurisdiction to take disciplinary action against the First Registrar, and the exercise of power was just and proper.

• However, having regard to the expiry of the period of appointment of the First Registrar (three years from 01.03.2019 to 28.02.2022), the respondent was not entitled to reinstatement or any other relief.

• The High Court’s order granting back wages was also set aside.

• The appeals were disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

• No order as to costs.

• Pending applications stood disposed of.

10. Practical Application

For a person appointed under a transitional provision of a statute: Understand that your appointment is governed by the transitional provision, which may have a fixed term. The authority that appointed you (e.g., the Visitor) generally has the power to remove you under Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, unless the statute expressly says otherwise. If you challenge your termination, seek interim relief to protect your tenure, because if your term expires during litigation, the court may not reinstate you.

For a university or statutory authority making transitional appointments: When appointing the first Registrar or other transitional officers, clearly specify the term and the applicable service conditions. Ensure that disciplinary proceedings are conducted by the appointing authority. The power to remove flows from the power to appoint under Section 16 of the General Clauses Act.

For a lawyer advising a client in a similar situation: If your client is a transitional appointee whose term is about to expire, consider seeking an interim order from the court restraining the authority from terminating the appointment or extending the term pending litigation. If the term expires before judgment, the court may dismiss the relief as moot. Also, argue that the appointing authority has the power to remove, but challenge the fairness of the proceedings on merits.

For a court dealing with a challenge to termination of a transitional appointee: First, determine whether the appointee was appointed under a transitional provision. If yes, determine who the appointing authority was. Under Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, that authority has the power to remove. However, the court should still examine whether the removal was in accordance with the principles of natural justice and the terms of the appointment. If the term has expired, consider whether any relief (such as back wages) is still available.

For a legal services authority assisting an employee: If the employee was a transitional appointee, verify whether the term has expired. If it has, focus on claiming back wages and other monetary benefits for the period before expiry, rather than reinstatement. The court may still grant monetary relief if the termination was found to be illegal.

11.  Court Lines

Line 1 (Transitional provision – Para 23):
“The function of a transitional provision is to make special provision for the application of legislation to the circumstances which exist at the time when the legislation comes into force. One feature of a transitional provision is that its operation is expected to be temporary, in that it becomes spent when all the past circumstances with which it is designed to deal have been dealt with.”

Line 2 (Power to appoint includes power to remove – Para 25):
“Section 46(b) and Statute No.28(1) must, therefore, be read in the light of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which provides that where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to make appointment is conferred, then, unless a different intention appears, the authority having power to make appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person so appointed in exercise of that power. Thus, the appointing authority necessarily possesses the power to terminate the services of the employee appointed by it.”

Line 3 (Visitor’s jurisdiction – Para 27):
“In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the exercise of power by the Visitor appears to be just and proper. We are, therefore, unable to concur with the finding recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court in its judgment dated 22.05.2024 that the Visitor had no role in the disciplinary proceedings against the First Registrar of University.”

Line 4 (Expiry of term – Para 29):
“However, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, namely, the expiry of period of appointment of the First Registrar under Section 46(b) of the Act, we are not inclined to grant any relief to the respondent.”

Line 5 (Disposal – Para 30):
“Accordingly, the appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms. There shall be no order as to costs.”

12. Legal Strategy Insight

For an employee appointed under a transitional provision (e.g., first Registrar): Immediately upon receiving a termination order, challenge it and also seek an interim order restraining the employer from filling the post or from giving effect to the termination until your term expires. If your term is fixed (e.g., three years), and the litigation continues beyond that term, the court may not reinstate you even if you win on merits. Therefore, seek an expedited hearing or an order extending your term pending litigation.

For an employer (university or government) defending a termination: Rely on Section 16 of the General Clauses Act to argue that the appointing authority has the power to remove. Also, argue that if the employee’s fixed term has expired during litigation, the challenge to termination becomes moot, and no reinstatement is possible. Use this judgment to support that argument.

For a lawyer representing a transitional appointee: Do not merely challenge the termination on jurisdictional grounds. Also challenge the fairness of the disciplinary proceedings on merits. If the term is about to expire, immediately move the court for an interim order extending the term or staying the termination until the final disposal. If the term expires, the court may only be able to award monetary compensation for the period between termination and expiry, not reinstatement.

For a court dealing with such a case: First, determine whether the employee is a “first” appointee under a transitional provision. If yes, the appointing authority has the power to remove. However, examine whether the power was exercised fairly and in accordance with the principles of natural justice. If the term has expired, consider whether any monetary relief (back wages, pension contributions) is due for the period between the date of termination and the date of expiry. Do not grant reinstatement if there is no subsisting post or if the term has expired.

For a policy maker drafting a similar statute: When including transitional provisions for first appointments, specify the service conditions, including the grounds and procedure for removal. If you intend to exclude the application of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, expressly say so in the statute (e.g., “notwithstanding anything contained in the General Clauses Act, 1897”). Otherwise, the power to remove will be inferred from the power to appoint.